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A
SYSTEM OF ORATORY,

Delivered in a
COURSE OF LECTURES

Publicly read at
**GRESHAM COLLEGE,
L O N D O N.**

In TWO VOLUMES.

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DELIVERED IN A

COURSE OF LECTURES

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ORISHAM COLLEGE

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VOL. I

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A
SYSTEM OF ORATORY,

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GRESHAM COLLEGE,
L O N D O N :

MUSEUM
To which is prefixed

AN INAUGURAL ORATION,
Spoken in Latin, before the Commencement
of the LECTURES, according to the usual
Custom.

By JOHN WARD, D.L.L. P.R.G.C. K
F.R. and A.SS. and T.B.M.

VOL. I.

L O N D O N :

Printed for JOHN WARD, in Cornhill, opposite
to the Royal Exchange,
M.DCC.LIX.

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ADVERTISEMENT SYSTEM OF ORATORY

The character of the author of this work is well known by his other learned and elaborate writings would have been printed in any language which the public, if he had thought proper to have printed it in any language which the public, if he had thought proper to

GRESHAM COLLEGE



Spoken in Latin, before the Commencement of the University, according to the usual custom of that place, he read a few lines of them to be translated after he had some time to himself.

By JOHN WARD, D.D. F.R.S. &c. who was his first secretary, and who the space of thirty eight years, in which he most punctually discharged the duties of his office, and in which he was elected into it on the 1st of September 1701, and dying on the 1st of October 1701, in the 71st year of his age.

Printed by J. W. in Cornhill, opposite to the Royal Exchange.

MDCCLX.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE character of the author of this work, so well known by his other learned and elaborate writings, would have been sufficient to have recommended it to the public, if he had thought proper to have printed it during his own life; which could not conveniently be done, as he was in the constant use of it in his lectures. It will therefore be necessary, for the satisfaction of the reader, to take notice here, that it was the intention of the author, declared to several of his friends, and evident from the manuscript itself, to be seen at the bookseller's, that these lectures should be published: For which purpose he caused a fair copy of them to be transcribed, after he had from time to time revised them with his usual accuracy, during the space of thirty eight years, in which he most punctually discharged the duties of his Professorship at Gresham College, having been elected into it on the 1st of September 1720, and dying on the 17th of October 1758.

VOL. I.

Tho. Birch
22th March 1759.

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THE character of the author of this work, is well known by his other learned and elaborate writings, would have been sufficient to have recommended it to the public, if he had thought proper to have printed it during his own life; which could not conveniently be done, as he was in the constant use of it in his lectures. It will therefore be necessary, for the satisfaction of the reader, to state the reasons, that it was the intention of the author, that it should be published, and to request of the public, that they would be good enough to purchase a copy of it, and to send it to the bookseller, that their names should be published, for which purpose he sent a list copy of them to the printer, after he had been some time in the world, with his usual accuracy, filling the space of thirty eight years, in which he most punctually discharged the duties of his Profession as Grammar-Schoolmaster, having been elected into it on the 1st of September 1720, and dying on the 17th of October 1758.

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T H E
C O N T E N T S.

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ORATIO,

ORATIO,

Quam in COLLEGIO GRESHAMENSI,
cum rhetorices praelegendae pro-
vinciam illic suscepit, publice ha-
buit.

IOHANNES WARDVS,

v. kal. Nov. MDCCXX.

De Usu et Praestantia Artis Dicendi.

CUM mecum ipse reputo, quo in
loco, quantosque viros, qui hoc
munus ante me peregerunt, subse-
cutus, verba apud vos, AUDITORES DO-
CTISSIMI atque HUMANISSIMI, sum factu-
rus, sine metu & tremore in conspectum
vestrum prodire nequeo. Nam, ut in cele-
berrimo hoc et venerando Musarum domi-
cilio nihil proferre convenit, quod non sit
cogitatione eximium, doctrinaque politum
et elaboratum; ita, quam sim ab huiusmodi
tam naturae, quam artis praesidiis imparatus,
haud ignoro. Veruntamen, cum collegii
huiusce curatores dignissimi hanc provin-
ciam rhetorices praecepta tradendi mihi de-
mandare dignati sint, duae res sunt, quas

merito a me expectari sentio : in primis, ut iis gratias agam, per quos in hunc locum devenerim ; deinde ut, quod deest ingenio, cura et diligentia pro viribus compensare studeam : ne tantum beneficium in hominem vel ingratum, vel alio quovis modo eo prorsus indignum, collocatum fuisse unquam videatur. Atque ut harum alteram vere et ex animo meo jam facio, cujus gratissima memoria tam altis radicibus menti infixata adhaeret, quae nulla unquam temporis longinquitate evelli possit ; sic alteram, quantum in me situm est, omni opera semper contendam.

In praesentia autem pauca de *usu et praestantia* rhetorices dicere constitui ; unde et occasio sese offeret praecipuis conviciis et contumeliis, quibus injuste a quibusdam ars haec praestantissima petita fuerit, breviter respondendi. Nec aliud sane argumentum, quo praelectiones auspicarer, aut mihi, aut vobis magis convenire existimavi : nam, ut artem aliquam profitenti, eam nec inutilem, nec ignobilem esse, ostendere omnino congruit ; ita dignam esse, cui operam et studium impendant, ex re auditorum est moneri. Caeterum, quo commodius id praestari possit, hanc veniam oro, ut benigne et attente me dicentem, ut facitis, audiat.

ARTIS igitur *usus*, ut ab illo incipiam,
ex commoditatibus, quas homines exinde
percipiant, praecipue aestimari debet; quae
si et jucunditatem quoque secum afferat, ita
ut poetae illud *utile dulci*¹ ei recte tribuatur,
nihil desiderari potest, quo amorem et gra-
tiam apud omnes conciliet; horum autem
utrumque ars, de qua loquimur, merito sibi
vindicare potest. Etenim, cum viam ra-
tionemque tradat, qua quis apte, compositè,
ornate, et copiose de unaquaque re dicat,
non, ut in aliis quibusdam artibus ac disci-
plinis res se habet, usus ejus certis locis et
temporibus terminatur, sed semper fere et
ubique prodest ac delectat; quippe quae
omni aetati et conditioni hominum conve-
niat, juventuti ac senectae, foro et curiae,
aulae et castris pariter se accommodans.
Imo in quovis hominum coetu, communi-
que vitae consuetudine, compto et eleganti
orationis genere nihil gratius aut acceptius
esse potest. Res nimis longa et operosa esset
singula artis dicendi commoda enumerare,
pauca igitur ex innumeris fere tetigisse con-
tenti erimus. Vis debitis laudibus virtu-
tem efferre, aut vitii turpitudinem depingere
ac vituperare? vis summorum virorum gesta
praeclara celebrare, aliisque ad imitandum
exponere; contra vero nequam et impro-

¹ Horat.
De Art.
Poet. v. 36.

borum hominum pernicioſa facinora in o-
dium et contemptum omnium adducere?
hanc artem cole. Vis alicui ad ea, quae
ſibi, vel aliis ſint utilia, perſuadere; aut ab
iis, quae perniciem et ruinam afferant, de-
hortari? vis patriae de rebus ſeu belli, ſeu
pacis deliberanti opem ferre, et ſaluberrima
conſilia ita proponere, ut alios in ſententiam
tuam pertrahas? haec ars rationem praebe-
bit. Vis innocentem tueri, ac periculum a
capite ejus depellere; aut de ſclerato ut
debita, et communi rei neceſſaria, ſumatur
poena dicendo efficere? ex hac arte adju-
menta petas. In ſumma, omnia, quae ac-
commodata ſunt ad id, quod volumus, per-
ſuadendum atque obtinendum, haec ars tra-
dit et ſuppeditat. Quid, quod Protei ritu in
varias formas docta et artiſcioſa oratio ſe
convertit, quo, quod ſibi velit, aſſequatur?
Alias enim ut rivulus parum profundus hu-
mili ac demiſſo ſermonis genere humi repit;
alias pleni ac leniſſimi fluminis more aequa-
bili curſu fertur ac dilabitur; alias vero quaſi
torrens, magno aquarum confluxu turgel-
cens, ampliſſima ſententiarum gravitate, et
majeſtate verborum grandiloqua inſurgit.
Jam in longas et circumductas periodos ſeſe
profundit, mox incife et membratim rem
peragere inſtituit. Nunc docet, nunc quae-
rit;

rit; nunc reticet, nunc exclamat; nunc ir-
ritat, nunc demulcet; nunc orat, nunc mi-
natur; quoquo versum sese commovens, quo
in pectus eorum, quibuscum agit, se infi-
nuet, et in partes suas perducatur. Porro, ut
homines bruta animantia duobus praecipue
praestant, ratione nimirum et oratione, Ci-
cero, artis hujus optimus aestimator, affir-
mare non dubitavit, *Eloqui copiose, modo pru-
denter, melius esse, quam vel acutissime sine
eloquentia cogitare*¹. Cujus rei illam quo-
que rationem subjungit: *Quod cogitatio in se*
ipsa vertitur; eloquentia complectitur eos, qui-
buscum communitate juncti sumus. Qui in id
igitur solum incumbit, ut mentis perceptio-
nes accurate perpendat, et inter se compa-
ret, unde rerum cognitionem obtineat, sibi
tantum sapit; dum is, qui sensa animi clara
et concinna oratione efferre studeat, et ad
utilitatem et delectationem hominum intel-
ligentiam suam confert. Ideoque ad multa
vitae officia homines aptos reddit dicendi
peritia, ad quae alii prorsus sunt inepti.

BENEFICIA ex hac arte percepta si ex-
emplis eorum, qui ea claruerunt, ostendere
fisciperem, pene infinitus essem. Par illud
celebratissimi nominis oratorum, Demosthe-
nem dico et Ciceronem, ut institutum vitae,
fortunam, et mortem quoque haud admo-

dam dissimilem habuerunt; sic illud gloriae utrique convenit, quod non semel patriam suam in summo periculo constitutam dicendi facultate liberarunt. Quoties ille astutiam et fraudes Philippi, quibus libertati Atheniensium insidiatus, eos in ditio- nem sibi redigere conatus est, indagavit, patefecit, elusit? Pari arte et ingenio hic omnes Catilinae machinationes, ad rem- publicam Romanam evertendam destinatas, detexit, vim atque audaciam fregit, omnia- que illius ac sociorum nefaria consilia in auctorum perniciem convertit. Nec mi- nori postea laude insanas Antonii mol- itiones diu coercuit et repressit; donec tan- dem perfidia eorum, de quibus optime me- ritus erat, in potestatem ejus insidiosè tra- deretur. At nequeo me continere, quin illud de clarissimo hoc viro memorem, quo et amicum de causa capitali postulatum li- beravit, et vis summa eloquentiae, si alias unquam, vel maxime enituit. Bello civili inter Caesarem et Pompeium finito, sum- maque rerum jam in Caesarem devoluta, Quintus Ligarius accusatur a Q. Tuberone, quod Caesaris partibus in Africa hostis fuisset. Ligarii defensionem Cicero susci- pit. Quod cum Caesar intellexit, Quidni, inquit, Ciceronem orantem audiamus? reus enim,

enim, cujus causam agit, pro certo homo improbus et hostis est. Sed cum Cicero dicere ingressus est, oratio tam affectibus varia et venustate admirabilis videbatur, ut Caesaris animum mirifice affecerit, quod primum incerto vultu, crebraque coloris mutatione ostendit; postea vero tantis perturbationibus incitatus est, ut toto corpore contremescens libellos quosdam e manu dimiserit. Causam igitur obtinuit Cicero, ac Ligarius crimine liberatus est¹. Ita¹ Plut. in vit. Cicer. tot gentium domitor vi eloquentiae superatur; et qui per totum fere terrarum orbem victricia arma circumtulera, armis potentioribus ipse tandem devincitur. Miranda fane victoria! in qua togae arma cessisse verissime Cicero gloriari possit. Cum arte igitur militari dicendi facultatem nonnulli conferentes, cui potissimum palma tribui debeat, in dubio reliquerunt. Sin autem caetera pares habeantur, in illis certe haud parum inter se discrepant; quod haec sine vulnere aut laesione aliqua victoriam reportat, illa non sine caede et sanguine; haec volentes captivos ducit et retinet, illa invitos; haec animos, illa corpora tantum devincit.

Ex iis autem, quae de usu rhetorices hactenus dicta sunt, cum et *praestantia* ejus magna

magna ex parte intelligi possit, pauciora de illa dicere opus esse videtur. Si rem autem recte perpendamus, quid pulchrius esse potest, quam ea in re alios excellere, qua homines praecipuo quodam modo bruta animalia excellunt? Quid praeclarius, quam de re quacunque ita dicendo valere, ut non modo auditorum aures demulceas, sed animos etiam summa voluptate perfundas? Quid laudabilius, quam in rebus arduis et difficilibus saluberrima consilia ita proponere, ut ad ea amplectenda homines facile adduci possint? Etenim eam vim animis nostris iniecit natura, ut non modo apta et concinna oratione delectemur, sed etiam variis exinde motibus concitati huc illuc pro voluntate dicentis saepe impellamur. Quanti igitur aestimari debet, regnare quodammodo ac dominari in aliorum animis; flectere eos linguae gubernaculo, quo velis; et quid probent, quid rejiciant, quasi pro imperio ac potestate praescribere? Egregia sane res, et digna, quam omni studio et animi contentione consecremur! Itaque non sine causa *flexanimam*, atque omnium reginam rerum, orationem vetus poeta appellavit¹.

¹ Cic.

De Orat.

Lib. ii.

c. 44.

Pacuvio

tribuit

Nonius.

AT dicet forsan aliquis, homines vi ac pondere rationum, non affectuum impulsu

et

et concitatione ad aliquid vel amplexandum vel fugiendum moveri oportere. Bene profecto cum rebus humanis ageretur, si ita revera esset. Sed quis non quotidiana experientia edoctus plane sentit, plerosque homines aut rationum momenta saepissime non percipere; aut si percipiant, nescio qua mentis pertinacia et obstinatione ad agendum, prout res postulent, nullo modo induci posse, donec affectuum motu incitentur? Constet igitur arti praestantissimae laus sua et dignitas, ad humani generis imbecillitati opitulandum natae, quae in eo, quo jam res sunt, statu, non modo utilis, sed omnino necessaria esse manifesto apparet.

Cum tot igitur tantaeque sint artis dicendi virtutes, non mirum est eam plerosque homines omni aetate in amorem sui et admirationem rapuisse. Sed ita natura comparatum est, ut pro variis ac diversis hominum ingeniis alia aliis placeant, et delectent. Non defuerunt igitur, qui ex artium choro rhetoricen excludere voluerint, usum modo et exercitationem artis expertem esse dicentes. In hunc autem errorem ex Platonis sententia male intellecta nonnulli olim inciderunt. Nam quae summus ille philosophus contra sophistas dixerat,

¹ *Instit. orat.*
Lib. ii.
c. 15.

dixerat, qui fictam tantum et simulatam artis speciem adhibebant; illos in artem ipsam perperam detorsisse ostendit Fabius¹. Aristoteles etiam, Platonis discipulus, in vestibulo operis sui *De arte dicendi*, quae arti sint propria rhetoricae ac dialecticae ex aequo convenire demonstrat. Et profecto quid in se continet dialectica, cujus causa artis nomen sibi assumat, quod rhetoricae quoque haud pari jure conveniat? Inveniendi locos, unde quid cuique argumento proprium sit et congruens petantur, docet? Idem facit et rhetorica. Disponendi etiam quae inventa sint, regulas tradit? Tradit et rhetorica. Syllogismos et inductiones ad fidem faciendam adhibet? Enthymematis et exemplis, nec minori arte, nec felicitate, contendit rhetorica. Pari igitur passu, ut videmus, haecenus incedunt. In eo autem differunt, quod illa nudis et apertis vocibus, quae ad rem explicandam sufficiant, tantummodo utitur; haec autem pro varia argumenti natura nunc hoc, nunc illud dicendi genus, omnibus verborum luminibus adjunctis, suo jure adsciscit. Non infacete igitur Zeno dialecticam *manui clausae*, rhetoricam vero *expansae et dilatatae* comparasse dicitur². Ni quis forsan illam corporis alicujus ossibus inter se compagibus

² Cic.
De fin.
Lib. ii.
c. 6.

pagibus vinctis et colligatis; hanc vero eidem corpori carne vestito, nervis instructo, succo et sanguine pleno, quo et aspectu sit gratius, vitaeque functionibus accommodatus, conferre malit. Sed de hac re pluribus dicendi locus alias dabitur.

CAETERUM levis haec videri possit accusatio prae alia quorundam criminatione, qui rhetoricen non modo non esse utilem, sed etiam perniciosam et pestiferam affirmare non dubitarunt. Et hanc etiam infamiam arti suae conflaverunt sophistae, dum inepte satis & arroganter se docere jactarent, quo modo causa inferior dicendo superior posset evadere; quod non minus ridicule, quam invidiose, ipsi Socrati affingere studuit Aristophanes¹. Sed istam reprehensionem acutissime refutat Aristoteles, quae mala vulgo ex ea fluere putarentur, illa non arti adscribenda, sed eorum improbitati, qui re per se bona & utilissima ad homines decipiendos abuterentur, docens². Nam quod multa incommoda afferre possit, qui injuste utatur hac dicendi facultate, id in omnibus bonorum generibus, virtute sola excepta, commune esse ostendit; et in iis potissimum bonis, quae maximas habent utilitates, ut in robore, sanitate, divitiis, scientia militari. Quis autem

¹ In Nub.

² Rhet.
Lib. i.
c. 1.

autem sanus divitias unquam contempsit, seu comparare noluit, quod non pauci vel ad luxum, vel injustam dominationem iis sint abusi? Aut quis militarem artem negligendam statuit, quod illo proposito nonnulli ea se exercuerint, quo alios facilius aggrederentur, et in potestatem suam redigerent? Ex contrario certe, quo magis ars aliqua in usum et commodum humani generis excogitata, nefariorum hominum vitio in pestem et ruinam illorum traducitur, eo diligentius ab aliis excoli oportet, quo leviori negotio scelestis eorum consiliis obistere possint. Nec melius saepe aliquis se defendere potest, quam eodem armorum genere, quo ab alio petitur.

QUANTA igitur sit artis dicendi utilitas, quanta praestantia, paucis explicui; pro argumenti quidem dignitate breviter nimis et anguste fateor, ut nostrum tamen tulit ingenium. Nec in alia re magis summa vis ac facultas eloquendi requiritur, quam si de ipsa eloquentia quis dicere instituat. Praeterea aliud est artis praeceptiones tradere, aliud usu et consuetudine cum laude exercere. Nam et architectus esse potest, qui non aedificat; neque cos ipsa fecat. Quin et egenus, licet opibus ipse carens, ad argenti et auri divites venas alios dirigere potest,

potest, rationemque docere, qua pretiosum metallum effodiant. Muneri igitur nostro satis me facturum credam, si eas rationes indicem, et quasi digitum ad fontes intendam, quibus facillime ad eloquentiam perveniri posse arbitror. Nulla autem rhetorum praecepta sine assidua et constanti exercitatione ad solidam, et accuratam dicendi facultatem comparandam sufficere possunt. Non enim ex inani verborum copia, figuratis locutionibus, et periodis apte ac numerose cadentibus, ea tota conficitur, ut perperam nonnulli existimasse videntur; sed rerum quoque multarum perceptionem, sententiarumque gravitatem desiderat. Omnium itaque disciplinarum cognitionem Crassus in oratore requirit¹. Item oratorum *principi eloquentia nihil aliud est, quam copiose loquens sapientia*². Et profecto is ingenuarum artium est consensus, ut vinculo quodam inter se connexae sint, et mutuo operas praestent; nulla vero ea, de qua agimus, potiori jure ex aliis, quae sibi sint usui, desumit, utpote qua reliquae omnes vicissim adornatae, et pulchriores et jucundiores fiant.

QUAE cum ita sint, clarissimi hujus collegii fundatoris, equestris dignitatis viri, Thomae Gresham, prudentissimum consilium

¹ Cic.
De Orat.
Lib. i.

c. 16.
² Orat.
Partit.

c. 23.

lium omnes bonarum literarum amatores
 sine dubio magnopere approbabant; cui in-
 ter caeteras liberales artes et scientias, quas
 hic doceri voluit, etiam rhetorice locum
 constitui placuit. Is enim, ut vir fuit opti-
 mus, bonique publici studiosissimus, nihil
 antiquius habuisse videtur; quam ut opes et
 divitiae, quibus adeo abundabat, in civium
 suorum commodum impendi possent. Ideo-
 que cum longo rerum usu, ac multarum
 regionum peragratione bene intelligeret,
 quanti res sit momenti honestas artes pub-
 licae doceri, quibus hominum mentes ad
 virtutem ac debita inter se officia prae-
 standam effingi possint; in istum finem amplissimas
 has aedes, quas ipse habitaverat, Musis di-
 cari iussit. Et hoc quidem egregio consilio
 fecit, cum nec ille habuerit, a quibus sibi
 succedi magis conveniret, nec hae, cui me-
 lius succederent. In commerciis autem
 hominum, et assidua inter se consuetudine,
 cum ars dicendi tanti sit usus, certe in hac
 nobilissima, et frequentissima civitate haud
 injuria inter caeteras sorores ejus locum sibi
 vindicare potuit. Igitur hunc ei denegare
 noluit vir ille ornatissimus, sed inter reliquas
 accepit; quo nimirum cives vel cum exte-
 ris, qui ad hoc per totum terrarum orbem
 celeberrimum emporium perpetuo conflui-
 unt;

ant; vel inter se de quocunque negotiorum genere promptius et accuratius differere possent. Neque hac profecto in re a veterum sapientia decessit, qui eundem Mercurium et eloquentiae et mercaturae deum esse finxerunt; seu, quod eloquentia ad opes acquirendas viam paret, in quem finem et mercatura praecipue instituitur, unde et deus quoque divitiarum Mercurius habebatur¹; seu quod opulentis hominibus, ut¹ Phurnut.
cultus et apparatus, ita et sermonis genus *De nat.*
elegantius, quam aliis conveniat; seu denique, quod fluens et expedita oratio ad contractus et negotia expedienda plurimum conferat. Sed ut fabulas mittamus, ita usu evenisse comperimus, ut bene institutae civitates parem fere sermonis ac morum excolendi curam plerumque habuerint. *deor.*
c. 16.

AMPLISSIMUS hic in viri illustrissimi laudes excurrendi campus sese aperit, qui de utraque re civibus suis tam sapienter prospexerit; sed neque ratio, neque limites instituti nostri, id jam suscipere permittunt. De argumento enim tam nobili et copioso prorsus silere quam leviter tangere, omnino consultius esse duximus. Interim tamen posteritatem tanta beneficia, et tam eximium in rem literariam munificentiae exemplum, perpetuo gratissima memoria prosecuturam

secuturam nequaquam dubitare licet. Is enim in omnium mentibus, qui ulla bonarum artium cura tanguntur, monumentum quovis aere perennius pro certo sibi constituit.

AD vos igitur, AUDITORES CANDIDISSIMI, se convertit oratio, qui tanta patientia me audire dignati estis. Praecipue autem vobis, curatores dignissimi, doctissimique professores, maximae grates sunt habendae, quod praesentia vestra me cohonestare voluistis. Caeterum, quod omnes tam faciles aures mihi prae buistis, vestrae potius benevolentiae, quam nostrae dicendi facultati tribuerim. Sed in laetum omen accipiam, quae in posterum de ipsa dicendi arte traditurus sim, vos pari favore accepturos, quo nihil aut dulcius, aut exoptatius, mihi poterit accidere. DIXI.

SYSTEM of ORATORY

READ AT

GRESHAM COLLEGE.

LECTURE I.

Of the Rise and Progress of Oratory.

WE commonly find, that persons LECT. I.
of an ingenuous temper are
very desirous to know their
benefactors. And certainly those, who
have employed their time to invent or cul-
tivate any part of useful knowledge, ought
to be esteemed as such, and remembered
with honor and gratitude. For which
reason, having indeavoured to shew the
use and excellence of oratory^{*}, I shall enter
upon these lectures by inquiring into its
rise and gradual improvements in different
ages; from whence it will appear, to whom
we are chiefly indebted for the many and
great advantages arising from this art. And

^{*} In the
inaugural
oration.

VOL. I.

B

in

L E C T. in doing this I shall confine myself to rhetoricians, that is, those who either taught the art, or at least have written upon it. Nor will it be necessary, I should mention all of them; but such only, who have been most celebrated on either of these accounts. And as to orators, or those who practised this art, they, who are desirous to be acquainted with their history, may peruse Cicero's treatise *Of famous orators*; and the *Dialogue concerning the causes of corrupt eloquence*, which some ascribe to Tacitus, and others to Quintilian.

THE invention of oratory is by the Egyptians, and fables of the poets, ascribed to Mercury. And it is well known, that the Greeks made their deities the authors likewise of other arts, and supposed that they presided over them. Hence they gave Mercury the titles of Ἀέλιος and Ἑρμῆς, both which names come from words that signify to speak. And Aristides calls eloquence *the gift of Mercury*¹. And for the same reason antiently the tongue was consecrated to him². He was likewise said to be the interpreter or messenger of the gods; which office very well suited him, as he excelled in eloquence. Hence we read in the Sacred Writings, that when the people

¹ *Platonica secunda.*

² *Athenaeus, l. 1.*

c. 14.

Phurnutus De nat.

deorum,

c. 16.

of Lystra took Barnabas and Paul for gods LECT.
in human shape, because of that sudden 1.
and surprizing cure, which was wrought
upon the lame man, they called Barnabas
Jupiter, and Paul *Mercury*; for this rea-
son, as the inspired writer tells us, *because*
*he was the chief speaker*¹, that is (as the 1 Act. xiv.
spectators then thought) the interpreter or 12.
spokesman of Barnabas.

BUT to pass over these fictions of the
heathen deities, let us hear what *Quin-*
tilian says of the *origin* of this art; who
seems to give a very probable account of
it in the following passage. *The faculty of*
speech, says he, *we derive from nature, but*
the art from observation. For as in *physic*
men by seeing that some things promote health,
and others destroy it, formed the art upon
those observations; in like manner by per-
ceiving that some things in discourse are said
to advantage, and others not, they accordingly
marked those things, in order to imitate the
one, and avoid the other. They also added
some things from their own reason and judge-
ment, which being confirmed by use, they be-
gan to teach others, what they knew them-
selves.

But no certain account can be 2 Inst.
given when, or by whom, this method of Orat.
L. iii. c. 2.
observation first began to take place. And

LECT. I. Aristotle supposes, not without reason, that the first lineaments of the art were very rude and imperfect¹. Pausanias indeed in his *Description of Greece* tells us, that Pittheus the uncle of Theseus, taught it at Trezene a city of Peloponnesus, and wrote a book concerning it; which he read himself, as it was published by one of Epidaurus². But as Pittheus lived above a thousand years before Pausanias, who flourished in the time of the emperor Hadrian, some are of opinion he might be imposed upon by the Epidaurian, who published this book under the name of Pittheus. But be that as it will, it is very reasonable to believe, that the Greeks had the principles of this art so early, as the time of Pittheus. For Theseus his nephew lived not long before the taking of Troy, which, according to Sir Isaac Newton, happened nine hundred and four years before the birth of Christ; at which time Cicero thought it was in much esteem among them. *Homer*, says he, would never have given *Ulysses* and *Nestor* in the Trojan wars so great commendations on account of their speeches (to one of whom he attributes force, and to the other sweetness of expression) if eloquence had not in those times been in great repute³. And lest any one

¹ De Sophist.
elench.
c. ult.

² In Corinthiac.

³ De clar.
erat. c. 10.

of ORATORY.

one should imagine, that in those days ^{LECT.} they made use only of such helps, as nature ^{I.} and practice could afford them; the same poet informs us, that Peleus sent Phenix with his son Achilles to the Trojan war, to instruct him not only in the art of war, but likewise of eloquence ¹. But who ^{1 Iliad. α.} were the professors of this art for some ^{443.} ages following is not known. For Quintilian saies, that afterwards Empedocles is the first upon record, who attempted any thing concerning it ². And he, by Sir Isaac ^{2 Inst. orat. Lib. iii. c. 1.} Newton's account, flourished about five hundred years after Troy was taken. At which time, as Cicero observes, men being now sensible of the powerful charms of oratory, and the influence it had upon the mind, there immediately arose several masters of it ³; the cheif of whom are mentioned by Quintilian, who tells us, that: *The oldest writers upon this art are Corax and Tisias, both of Sicily. After them came Gorgias of Leontium in the same island, who is said to have been the scholar of Empedocles, and by reason of his great age (for he lived to be an hundred and nine years old) had many contemporaries. Thrasymachus of Calcedon, Prodicus of Cea, Protagoras of Abdera, Hippias of Elis, and Alcidas of Elea lived*

LECT. in his time, as likewise Antiphon, who first
 I wrote orations ¹, and also upon the art, and

¹ See Voss is said to have spoken admirably well in his
 De nat. own defence; and besides these Polycrates, and
 rhetor. p. 73. Theodore of Byzantium ². Thus far Quin-

² Inst. orat. tilian. These persons contributed different
 Lib. iii. ways towards the improvement of the art.
 c. 1. Corax and Tifias gave rules for methodi-
 zing a discourse and adjusting its particular

³ See Tur- parts ³; as may be conjectured from Cicero's
 neb. ad account of them, who says: *Tho some had*
 dict. Fabii *spoke well before their time, yet none with*
 loc.

⁴ De clar. order and method ⁴. But Gorgias seems to
 orat. c. 12. have excelled all the rest in fame and re-
 putation; for he was so highly applauded
 by all Greece, that a golden statue was
 erected to him at Delphos, which was a
 distinguishing honour conferred upon him

⁵ Id. De only ⁵. And he is said to have been so
 orat. L. iii. great a master of oratory, that in a public
 c. 32. assembly he would undertake to declaim
 immediately upon any subject proposed to

⁶ Ib. lib. 1. him ⁶. He wrote, as Cicero informs us,
 c. 22. in the demonstrative or laudatory way ⁷;

⁷ De clar. which requires most of the sublime, and
 orat. c. 12. makes what Diodorus Siculus says of him
 the more probable, that, *He first introduced*
the strongest figures, members of periods oppo-
site in sense, of an equal length, or ending
with

with a like sound, and other ornaments of ^{L E C T}
that nature ^{1.} And hence those figures,

which give the greatest force and lustre to a discourse, were antiently called by his ^{Voss. De natura rhetor.}

name ^{2.} Cicero tells us further, that Thrasymachus and Gorgias were the first, who ^{p. 70. 2 Dion. Halicarn.}

introduced numbers into prose, which Isocrates afterwards brought to perfection ^{3.} ^{Ep. ad Pomp. 3 Orat. c. 13, 52.}

Quintilian likewise mentions Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Thrasymachus, as

the first, who treated of common places, and shewed the use of them for the inven-

tion of arguments ^{4.} Nor must we omit ^{4 Inst. orat. Lib. iii. c. 1.}

Plato, whose elegant dialogue upon this subject is still extant, which he entitles

Gorgias. For tho he does not lay down the common rules of the art; yet he very

well explains the nature of it, and maintains its true end and use against the ge-

nerality of its professors, who had greatly perverted the original design of it. Thus

by the study and industry of so many ingenious and great men the art of oratory

was then carried to a considerable height among the Grecians. Tho many of those,

who professed it in those times, employed their skill rather to promote their own re-

putation and applause, than to serve the real interests of truth and virtue. For they ^{proposed}

LECT. I. *proposed in an arrogant manner (as Cicero
sais) to teach how a bad cause might be so
¹ De clar. managed, as to get the better of a good one ¹.
orat. c. 8.*

That is, they would undertake to charm the ears, and strike the passions of their hearers in so powerful a manner, by sophistical reasonings, turns of wit, and fine language, as to impose falsehood upon them for truth; than which nothing could be either more disingenuous in itself, or prejudicial to society.

BUT those, who succeeded them, seem to have consulted better, both for their own honor, and that of their profession. Isocrates was the most renowned of all Gorgias his scholars, whom Cicero frequently extols with the highest commendations, as the greatest master and teacher of oratory; *Whose school, as he sais, like the Trojan horse,*

² De orat. *sent forth abundance of great men ². Aristotle*
Lib. ii. *was chiefly induced to ingage in this*
c. 22. *province from an emulation of his glory; and would often say in a verse of Sophocles, somewhat varied to his purpose,*

To be silent it is a shame,

While Isocrates gets such fame ³.

³ Cic. De
orat. L. iii.
c. 35.

Quint.
Inst. orat.

Lib. iii c. 1.

⁴ Ibidem.

Quintilian sais they both wrote upon the art ⁴, tho there is no system of the former now extant. But that of Aristotle is esteemed

esteemed the best, and most compleat, of LECT.
any in the Greek language. In this age I.
the Grecian eloquence appeared in its
highest perfection. Demosthenes was an
hearer both of Isocrates and Plato, as also
of Isaeus (ten of whose orations are yet
extant) and by the assistance of a surpri-
zing genius, joined with indefatigable in-
dustry, made that advantage of their pre-
cepts, that he has been always esteemed
by the best judges the prince of Grecian
orators. His great adversary and rival
Aeschines, after his banishment is said to
have gone to Rhodes, and imployed his
time there in teaching rhetoric ¹. Theo-
dectes and Theophrastus, both of them Quint. Inst. orat. Lib. xii. c. 10.
scholars of Aristotle, imitated their master Philostrat. De Vit. Soph. in Aeschin.
in writing upon the art. And from that
time the philosophers, especially the stoics
and peripatetics, applied themselves to lay
down the rules of oratory ²; which So-
crates had before separated from the pro-
vince of a philosopher. And there is yet Quint. Inst. orat. Lib. iii. c. 1.
preserved a treatise upon this subject, which
some have ascribed to Demetrius Phalereus
the peripatetic, and scholar of Theophra-
stus, tho others more probably to Dio-
nysius of Halicarnassus. Quintilian men-
tions several other famous rhetoricians in
the

LECT. the following ages, who were likewise
 I. writers; as Hermagoras, Athenaeus, Apollonius Molon, Areus Caecilius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Apollonius of Pergamus, and Theodore of Gadara¹. But of these nothing now remains upon the subject of oratory, except some tracts of Dionysius, who flourished in the reign of Augustus Caesar. Nor have there be wanting some eminent writers of this kind among the Greeks since the time of Quintilian; two of whom I cannot omit to mention, Hermogenes, and Longinus, the author of the incomparable treatise *Of the sublime*, a book which can scarce be too much commended, or too often read.

It was long before Rome received this art, and not without difficulty at first. The reason was, because the Romans were for several ages wholly addicted to military affairs, and to enlarge their territories; so that they not only neglected to cultivate learning, but thought the pursuit of it a thing of ill tendency, by diverting the minds of their youth from the cares and toils of war, to a more soft and indolent kind of life. Therefore so late as the year of their city five hundred ninety two, when by the industry of some Grecians the liberal arts

of ORATORY.

III

arts began to flourish in Italy; a decree LECT. I.
 passed the senate, by which all philosophers and rhetoricians were ordered to depart out of Rome ¹. But in a few years after, Sueton. De clar. rhetor. c. 1.
 when Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes, who were not only philosophers but orators, came ambassadors from Athens to Rome; the Roman youth were so charmed with the eloquence of their harangues, that they could no longer be stopt from pursuing the study of oratory. And by a further acquaintance with the Greeks it soon gained such esteem, that persons of the first quality imployed their time and pains to acquire it. And a young gentleman, who was ambitious to advance himself in the service of his country, could have little hopes of success, unless he had laid the foundation of his future prospects in that study.

SENECA tells us, that Lucius Plotius, a Gaul, was the first, who taught the art of oratory at Rome in Latin ²; which Cicero Praefat. ad Lib. ii. controu.
 sais, was while he was a boy, and when the most studious persons went to hear him, he lamented that he could not go with them; being prevented by the regard he paid to the opinion of some of his freinds, who thought that greater improvements

LECT. improvements were made by exercises in the

I. Greek language under Grecian masters¹.

¹ See Suet. *De clar.* Seneca adds, that this profession continued

rbet. c. 2. for some time in the hands of freedmen; and that the first Roman, who engaged in

² *Ubi su-* it, was Blandus of the equestrian order²,
pra.

who was succeeded by others; some of whose lives are yet extant, written by Suetonius, as many of the Grecians are by Philostratus and Eunapius. Quintilian like-

wise gives us the names of those among the Romans, who wrote upon the art.

The first, saith he, as far as I can learn, who

composed any thing upon this argument, was

M. Cato the Censor. After him Anthony

the orator began upon the subject, which is

the only work he has left, and that imper-

*fect*³. Then followed some of less note. But

he who carried eloquence to its highest pitch

among us, was Cicero; who has likewise by

his rules given the best plan both to practise,

and teach the art. After whom modesty

would require us to mention no more, had he

not told us himself, that his Books of rhetoric

slipt out of his hands, while he was but a

youth⁴. And those lesser things, which many

persons want, he has purposely omitted in his

Discourses of oratory⁵. Cornificius wrote

largely upon the same subject. Stertinius and

Gallio

³ See Cic. *De orat.*
Lib. 1.
c. 21.

⁴ See Cic. *De orat.*
Lib. 1. c. 2.

⁵ See Cic. *Ad fam.*
Lib. 1.
Ep. 9.

Gallio the father, each of them something. But Celsus and Lenas were more accurate than Gallio; and in our times Virginius, Pliny, and Rutilius. And there are at this day some celebrated authors of the same kind, who, if they had taken in every thing, might have saved my pains¹. Time has since deprived us of most of the writers mentioned here by Quintilian. But we have reason to be more easy under this loss, since it has preserved to us Cicero's treatises upon this subject; which we may well suppose to have been chiefly owing to their own excellency, and the great esteem they have always had in the world. Besides his *Two books of invention*, which Quintilian here calls his *Books of rhetoric*, there are extant of his *Three books of an orator*, one *Of famous orators*, and another, which is called, *The orator*, as also his *Topics*, a preface *Concerning the best sort of orators*, and a treatise *Of the parts of oratory*. Each of which treatises, whether we regard the justness and delicacy of the thoughts, the usefulness of the rules, or the elegance and beauty of the stile, deserve to be frequently perused by all who are lovers of eloquence. For who can be thought so well qualified to give the rules
of

¹ *Inst. erat.*
Lib. iii.
c. 1.

LECT. of any art, as he who excelled all mankind in the practice of them? But those *Four books to Herennius*, which are published among Cicero's works, seem with good reason to be attributed to Cornificius, whom Quintilian here mentions. And Celsus is by some affirmed to have taught oratory, whom he also places among the rhetoricians, and whose *Eight books of medicine* are yet extant, wrote in so beautiful a stile, as plainly shews him to have been a master of eloquence. But Quintilian himself outdid all, who went before him, in diligence and accuracy as a writer. St. Jerom says, he was the first who taught publicly at Rome, and received a salary from the treasury¹. But since he places this in the eighth year of Domitian, I fear it will not hold in point of time. For we are told by Suetonius, that Vespasian was the first, who granted out of the treasury a yearly salary of near eight hundred pounds sterling to the Latin and Greek rhetoricians². A generous act indeed, and well becoming so great a prince! But I return to Quintilian, whose *Institutions* are so comprehensive, and written with that great exactness and judgement; that they are generally allowed to be the most perfect work

¹ In Chron.
Eusebian.

² In vit.
c. 18.

of ORATORY.

work of this kind. With this excellent LECT. 1.
author therefore I shall finish my account
of the Latin rhetoricians.

THERE were indeed some others in the following ages, whose works are yet extant; but as they contain nothing of moment, which is not to be found in those already mentioned, I shall forbear to name them. Much less shall I descend to that numerous body of writers, who since the revival of learning have treated upon this subject, for the same reason. And a very good judge has not long since given it as his opinion; that the method of forming the best system of oratory, is to collect it from the finest precepts of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longinus, and other celebrated authors; with proper examples taken from the choicest parts of the purest antiquity. This method therefore I shall endeavour to pursue in my following discourses.

A. B. of
Cambr.
Lett.

p. 213.

LECT.

LECTURE II.

*Of the Nature of Oratory.*LECT.
II.

IN treating upon any art or science, it is necessary in the first place to explain the nature and design of it; from whence a judgment may best be formed of the fitness of those rules, which are laid down in order to attain it. For this reason Cicero ^{De off. Lib. i. c. 2.} advises to begin with a *definition*¹, which gives a general and comprehensive view of the whole subject. This method I propose to take in treating on the art of oratory. And therefore having already considered the *rise* and *progress* of this art, and shewn the antiquity of it; the subject of my present discourse shall be, first to define it, and then to explain and illustrate the several parts of the definition, as clearly and briefly as I can.

BUT before I enter upon this, it may not be amiss to observe, that the terms *rhetoric* and *oratory* having no other difference, but that one is taken from the Greek language, and the other from the Latin, may be used promiscuously; but the case is not the same with respect to the words

words *rhetorician* and *orator*. For altho the Grecians used the former both to express those, who taught the art, and such who practised it; yet the Romans afterward, when they took that word into their language, confined it to the teachers of the art, and called the rest *orators*. And there seems to have been a sufficient reason for this distinction, since the art was the same in both, and might therefore go by either name; but the different province of rhetoricians and orators made it not improper, they should be called by different names. Besides antiently, before rhetoric was made a separate and distinct art from philosophy, the same persons taught both. And then they were called not only *rhetoricians*, but *sophists*. But because they often imployed their art rather to vindicate what was false and unjust, than to support truth and virtue; this disingenuous conduct, by which they frequently imposed upon weak minds, brought a discredit both upon themselves and their profession. And therefore the name *sophist* or *sophister* has been more generally used in an ill sense, to signify one skilled rather in the arts of cavilling, than qualified to speak well and accurately upon any subject. I shall just mention a

LECT.

II.

remarkable instance of this kind, as it is related by some antient writers, and then procede to the principal subject of my present discourse. Corax the rhetorician (who is said first to have taught the art for money) agreed to instruct a young man, whose name was Tifias, upon condition of receiving a certain summ when he had learnt it. Tifias afterward defering to pay the money, Corax sued him for it. Upon which Tifias, agreeably to the method in which he had been taught, asking what was the end of this art, and Corax replying to persuade, proposed to him this sophism: If I persuade the judges I owe you nothing, I will not pay, because I have carried the cause; but if I do not persuade them, I will not pay, because I have not yet learned the art. But Corax, who was too cunning a sophister to be so easily baffled by his scholar, immediately retorts upon him: Nay, if you do persuade the judges, you shall pay, because it is a proof you have learnt the art, and you are bound by your agreement; but if you do not persuade them, you shall pay, because they give the cause against you. Upon hearing this the judges presently cried out, *An ill bird hatches an ill egg*; and so dismissed them

them without trying the cause. In the LECT. II. Greek it is *an ill Corax*, alluding to the master's name, which in that language signifies *a raven*¹. If such artifice was only used for mirth and pleasantry, it might perhaps afford matter of diversion; but when it enters into the serious affairs of life, and becomes a profession, it ought by all means to be exploded.

¹ Erasm.
Chil.
p. 1420.

BUT I come now to the *definition* of oratory, which may be thus laid down: Oratory is the art of speaking well upon any subject, in order to persuade.

IT is not necessary to use many words, to prove that oratory is an *art*. For it is comprised under certain rules, agreeable to reason, delivered in a regular method, and suited to attain the end it proposes; which are characters sufficient to denominate it an art. Indeed the case is the same here, as in most other things, that a good genius is of itself more serviceable, than the most exact acquaintance with all the rules of art, where that is wanting. But it is sufficient that art help nature, and carry it farther, than it can otherwise advance without it. And he who is desirous to gain the reputation of a good orator, will find the assistance of both very necessary.

LECT. II. Some persons have thought, that many of the common systems wrote upon the subject of oratory have been attended with this inconvenience; that by burdening the mind with too great a number of rules about things of less importance, they have oftentimes rather discouraged than promoted the study of eloquence. This undoubtedly is an extreme, which should be always carefully avoided. But however, an indifferent guide in a strange road is better than none at all. It may be worth while to hear Quintilian's opinion upon this head. *I would not, says he, have young persons think they are sufficiently instructed, if they have learned one of those compends, which are commonly handed about, and fancy themselves safe in the decrees, as it were, of these technical writers. The art of speaking requires much labour, constant study, a variety of exercise, many trials, the greatest prudence, and readiness of thought. But however these treatises are useful, when they set you in a plain and open way, and do not confine you to one narrow tract, from which he who thinks it a crime to depart, must move as slowly as one that walks upon a rope*. We see he is not for having us confine ourselves too closely to systems, tho' he thinks they are

¹ Inst. orat.
Lib. ii.

c. 13.

of service at first, till use and experience render them less necessary. But I procede.

L E C T. II.

THE business of oratory is to teach us to *speak well*, which, as Cicero explains it, is to speak *justly, methodically, floridly, and copiously*.

¹ De Invent. Lib. i. c. 5. De orat. Lib. i. c. 11.

Now in order to speak *justly*, or pertinently, a person must be master of his subject, that he may be able to say all that is proper, and avoid whatever may appear foreign and trifling. And he must cloath his thoughts with such words and expressions, as are most suited to the nature of the argument, and will give it the greatest force and evidence.

AND as it teaches to speak *justly*, so likewise *methodically*. This requires, that all the parts of a discourse be placed in their proper order, and with that just connexion, as to reflect a light upon each other, and thereby to render the whole both clear in itself, and easy to be retained. But the same method is not proper for all discourses. And very frequently a different manner is convenient in handling the same subject. For it is plain, that art, as well as nature, loves variety; and it discovers the speaker's judgement, when the disposition of his discourse is so framed,

LECT. as to appear easy and natural, rather than
 the effect of industry and labour.

To speak *floridly* is so peculiar a property of this art, that some have wholly confined it to the pomp and ornaments of language. But that it extends farther, and respects things as well as words, I shall have occasion to shew hereafter, when I come to treat of the several parts of which it is composed. It contains indeed the whole subject of elocution, but does not wholly consist in it. True and solid eloquence requires not only the beauties and flowers of language; but likewise the best sense and clearest reasoning. Besides rhetoric gives rules for the several sorts of stile, and directs the use of them agreeably to the nature of the subject. To make this more evident, I shall a little consider the difference between *grammar* and *rhetoric*, that by fixing the bounds of the former, the extent of the latter may the more easily be perceived. *Grammar* then is the art of speaking correctly. And he speaks *correctly*, who makes choice of proper words, applies them in their usual sense, and joins them together in construction agreeably to the use and idiom of the language, in which he discourses. Nor does grammar, strictly considered,

sidered, procede any farther. Wherefore the subject of stile, with the different properties, by which the several forms of it are distinguished from each other, belong to another art, which must be rhetoric. For tho rhetoric is said to be the art of speaking well, and grammar the art of speaking correctly; yet since the rules for speaking and writing are the same, under speaking we are to include writing, and each art is to be considered as treating of both. And tho the word *stile*, in its proper sense, respects only what is written; yet it is applied to speech, and so I shall sometimes use it. Now there are usually reckoned three sorts of stile, called the low, middle, and sublime. Should any one therefore, in treating upon a familiar and common subject, swell it with florid and pompous language; or on the contrary, in handling a lofty and magnificent argument, should he fall into a low and vulgar manner of expression; what was said might be all good grammar, but it would certainly be very bad oratory. But the orator often makes use of all these sorts of stile in the same discourse, and varies his language according to the different nature of each part of his subject, and his particular view

LECT.
II.

at that time in speaking. Tho' the use of this art is not wholly confined to an orator, or one who speaks in public; but, as Plato observes¹, does in some measure extend to all occasions of discourse.

¹ In Phaedro.

BUT the force of oratory appears in nothing more, than a *copiousness of expression*, or a proper manner of enlargement, suited to the nature of the subject, which is of great use in persuasion, and makes the last property, required by Cicero, of speaking well. A short and concise account of things is often attended with obscurity, from an omission of some necessary circumstances relating to them. Or however, where that is not the case, yet for want of proper embellishments to inviven the discourse, and thereby to excite and fix the hearers attention, it is apt to slip thro' their minds without leaving any impression. But where the images of things are drawn in their full proportion, painted in their proper colours, set in a clear light, and represented in different views, with all the strength and beauties of eloquence, they captivate the minds of the audience with the highest pleasure, ingage their attention, and by an irresistible force move and bend them to the design of the speaker.

THE

THE *subject* of oratory, as I have said in the definition, is *every thing*. For there is nothing, but what is capable of receiving much advantage and ornament from this art. Indeed the subject of *logic* is equally extensive; but the difference both in its short and concise way of reasoning from the fluency and copiousness of oratory; and the end it proposes, which is only the knowledge of truth, while the other carries us to action, render it intirely a distinct art. So a statuary and a mason are conversant in the same matter, that is stone; but as the one uses it in buildings, and the other in forming images, these are arts plainly different. And both physics and medicine are imployed about the human body; but as the former only contemplates its nature and properties, while the latter gives prescriptions to cure its disorders, no one esteems them the same art. However, it is not necessary, that an orator should be acquainted with all arts; because there is none, upon which he may not have occasion to discourse. But since some have formerly been of that opinion, as we learn from Quintilian, I shall give you his answer to it, who has very fully expressed himself upon this head. *Some,*
sais

LECT. ^{II.} *sais he, have asserted, that an orator must be skilled in all arts, if he is to speak upon all.*

I might here reply in the words of Cicero, in whom I find this expression: In my opinion no one can be an excellent orator, who has not acquired the knowledge of all the great and laudable arts¹. But it is sufficient for me, if the orator be not unacquainted with the subject, about which he is to discourse. He is not indeed acquainted with all causes, and yet he should be able to talk upon all. Upon which then shall he speak? Upon those which he has learnt. The same is to be said of arts. Those, of which he is to speak, let him first learn; and of those which he has learned, let him speak. But will not a workman talk better about his own art? or a musician of music? Yes certainly, if the orator be wholly ignorant of the subject. For even a peasant, or an illiterate person, will represent his own cause to better advantage than an orator, who is intirely unacquainted with it; but being once instructed by the musician, workman, or peasant, he will discourse better upon those subjects, than he who taught him².

¹ See *De orat. Lib. i. c. 6.*

² *Inst. orat. Lib. ii. c. 21.*

By this passage it appears, that Quintilian thought much less furniture necessary for an orator, than Cicero had done, who required a knowledge of all the great arts; by

by which he seems to have meant all those, which at that time were esteemed liberal arts among the Romans. And yet what Cicero thought requisite, was greatly short of some others, who had insisted upon a skill in *all arts*; which, if at all practicable, could doubtless be attained but by very few.

THE principal *end* and design of oratory is to *persuade*. For which reason it is frequently called *the art of persuasion*. Indeed the orator has often other subordinate views: as when he endeavours either to delight his hearers, with what is pleasant and agreeable; or to conciliate their good opinion, by a smooth and artful address: but still both these are in order to persuade and excite them to action. Some have objected to this, that persuasion is not peculiar to oratory, and other things are found to have as much influence to that end. So money, authority, and interest persuade; and sometimes the very aspect, and a sorrowful countenance, shall sway the mind as much, or more, than words. Thus when Anthony the orator in defending M. Aquilius produced his garment, and exposed the holes, thro which he had received several wounds in defence of his country; it is thought, that

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that the Roman populace were principally moved by that sight to clear him from his accusation. And we are told by Cato, that Servius Galba had the like good fortune merely by raising the compassion of the people, when he produced not only his own helpless children, but likewise carried about the son of Gallus Sulpitius in his own arms¹. No one will deny, that the several things here mentioned are suited to persuade, by influencing the passions; but this is no just exception, why persuasion may not properly be said to be the end of oratory; since it is of a different kind, and means only so far, as that end can be attained by speaking. Nor can this be with any greater reason denied, because the orator does not always gain his point; than curing the diseases of human bodies can be denied to be the end of the art of medicine, because the physician may not always prove successful.

¹ Quint.
Inst. orat.
Lib. ii.
c. 16.

UPON the whole therefore, as the orator has always this in view; while he employs his art in pursuing only those ends, for which it was at first designed, the persuading men to good and virtuous actions, and dissuading them from every thing that is ill and vicious; nothing can be more commendable in itself, or useful to human societies.

L E C

LECTURE III.

Of the Division of Oratory.

HAVING in my last discourse treated LECT.
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upon the *nature* of oratory, I now
proceede to consider the *division* of it. This
will give us a more distinct view of the
art, by representing the several parts of
which it consists, and afford us a plan for
our future discourses, that we may pro-
ceede regularly in the explication of them.
And every one must be sensible of the ad-
vantages, that attend method and order,
as they render things more clear and con-
spicuous, and very much help the memory
to retain them.

Now oratory consists of these four parts;
*Invention, Disposition, Elocution, and Pronun-
ciation.* This will appear by considering
the nature of each of them, and what it
contributes in forming an orator. Every
one who aims to speak well and accurately
upon any subject, does naturally in the
first place inquire after and pursue such
thoughts, as may seem most proper to ex-
plain and illustrate the thing, upon which
he designs to discourse. And if the nature
of

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of it requires, that he should bring reasons to confirm what he says, he not only seeks the strongest, and such as are like to be best received; but also prepares to answer any thing, which may be offered to the contrary. This is *Invention*. After this he deliberates with himself in what method to dispose of those things, which have occurred to his mind, that they may appear in the plainest light, and not lose their force by disorder and confusion. This is the business of *Disposition*. His next concern is to give his thoughts an agreeable dress, by making choice of the fittest words; clearest expressions, smooth and harmonious periods, with other ornaments of style, as may best suit the nature of his subject, brighten his discourse, and render it most entertaining to his hearers. And this is called *Elocution*. The last thing he attends to, is to deliver what he has thus composed, with a just and agreeable *Pronunciation*. And daily experience convinces us, how much this contributes both to engage the attention, and impress what is spoken upon the mind. This then is the method to which nature directs, in order to qualify ourselves for discoursing to the best advantage. Tho by custom and habit these

these things become so familiar to us, that we do not always attend to them separately in their natural order. However it is the business of art to follow nature, and to treat of things in that manner, which she dictates.

INDEED some have excluded both *invention* and *disposition* from the art of oratory, supposing they more properly belong to logic; but, I think, without any just reason. For, as was shewn in my last discourse, two arts may be conversant about the same subject, without interfering, provided they have not the same end, and their manner of treating it be likewise different. Thus both logic and rhetoric teach us to reason from the same principles, as from the cause, effects, circumstances, and many others, whence arguments are usually taken. But besides these, rhetoric directs us to other considerations, more peculiarly adapted to conciliate the mind, and affect the passions, with which the other art has no concernment. For logic contents itself with such principles of reasoning, which arising from the nature of things, and their relations to each other, may suffice to discover truth from falsehood, and satisfy thinking and considerate

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considerate persons. Nor does it propose any thing more than assent, upon a just view of things fairly represented to the mind. But rhetoric not only directs to those arguments, which are proper to convince the mind; but also considers the various passions and interests of mankind, with the bias they receive from temper, education, converse, or other circumstances of life; and teaches how to fetch such reasons from each of these, as are of the greatest force in persuasion. It is plain therefore that rhetoric not only supplies us with more heads of *invention* than logic, but that they very much differ from each other in the use and design of them; the one employing them only as principles of knowledge, but the other chiefly as motives to action.

NOR is their manner of treating them less different, which respects *disposition*. The logician so places the several propositions of a syllogism in a certain prescribed method, that the relation between the terms may be evident, and the conclusion appear to be fairly drawn from the premises. And if either of the premises seems weak, or the truth of it not sufficiently clear, he supports it by a fresh argument; and

and so proceeds in one succinct and uniform chain of reasoning, till he has made out the proof of what he at first proposed. But the orator is not thus tied down to mode and figure; or to perfect syllogisms, which he seldom uses: but reasons in the manner he thinks most convenient; begins with either of the premises, and sometimes with the conclusion itself; confirms one part with proper reasons, and enlarges upon it for greater evidence and variety, before he proceeds to another; and drops any part, which he thinks sufficiently clear of itself, and may be supplied by the attentive hearer. And thus by a diversity of method, and an agreeable variety, he consults the pleasure and entertainment of his hearers, as well as their instruction. Besides, he considers the frame and structure of his whole discourse, and as his view is not every where the same, he divides it into certain parts, and so disposes each of them, as may best answer his intention. From all which it appears, that *Disposition*, considered as a part of oratory, is widely different from that, which is taught by logic.

THE third part of oratory before mentioned is *Elocution*. In what this consists

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has been hinted already. All acknowledge it belongs to this art, tho many seem to mistake the true nature and extent of it. For nothing is more common, than to suppose that only to be oratory, which is delivered in a florid and pompous stile. Whereas *Elocution* comprehends all characters of stile, and shews how each of them is to be applied; and directs as well to a choice of words, and propriety of expression, as to the ornaments of tropes and figures. Indeed as the florid and sublime characters more especially relate to the orator's province, who has the greatest occasion for them; the name of *Eloquence* has been more peculiarly appropriated to those characters. But to suppose from hence, that the art of oratory is wholly confined to these, or that the orator acts out of his sphere, when he does not use them, is equally to mistake in both cases.

IN Aristotle's time rhetoricians had treated only of the three parts already mentioned. And accordingly he himself says: *There are three things to be treated of in rhetoric: the first respects the invention of arguments, the second elocution, and the third the right placing the several parts of a discourse*. And if we consider the art

¹ De rhetor. Lib. iii.
c. 1.

in itself, without regard to the principal use and application of it; nothing further seems to be necessary. For as architecture

consists in three things; materials proper for building, the putting together those materials, and beautifying the whole structure; so here, the invention of arguments, placing every thing in its just order, and giving it a suitable and proper dress, seems to contain the whole of this art. And where discourses are only published in order to be read, nothing can be done further. But the chief end of oratory, which is persuasion, is often much better attained by speaking, than writing. The orator's province is to be the mouth of an assembly, to address to others in person, to advise them to their good, dissuade them from things prejudicial, and excite them by all proper motives to fall in with, and pursue their true interest. He is to appear upon all occasions as a patron of truth and virtue, and to oppose every thing, which has a tendency to subvert them. And he, who engages in this province, will find it necessary to be master not only of a ready invention; an easy method of disposing his thoughts; and a happy elocution; but likewise of all the arts of address,

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dress, and advantages of a good delivery.

This shews the necessity of the fourth part of oratory, which is called *Pronunciation*, and sometimes *Action*. For as this does not only comprehend the just management of the voice, but likewise of the countenance and gesture, that each of them may suit the nature of the argument, and manner of expression; from the former of these it has been called *Pronunciation*, and from the latter *Action*, both being generally understood by the antients under either

¹ See Cic.
De invent.
Lib. 1.

c. 7.

name ¹. It seems highly probable, that orators took this first from the stage. Whence the Greeks call it *ὑπόκρισις*, which is a word borrowed from the theatre, and signifies the personating of another, as actors do on the stage, by their manner of speech and behaviour suited to the persons of those, whom they represent. And Aristotle tells us, that in his time some rules had been

² *Ubi su-*
pra.

written for the pronunciation of actors ². But however the name might take its origin from the theatre, yet the pronunciation of an orator is very different from that of actors. For his manner of expression has not that rapture and extasy, which we sometimes find in tragedy; nor do the ludicrous motions and gestures of the stage

suit

suit the gravity of his character. His design is not barely to amuse or terrify, but

so far to affect the passions, as thereby to ingage the mind to a more ready compliance with what is offered. Aristotle

saw, that the want of this was a defect in the rules of oratory; and therefore, tho he mentions but three parts of the art, he has notwithstanding given some few precepts concerning it¹. And it is plain,

that Demosthenes was then very sensible^{pra.} of its influence, and laid the greatest stress upon it; who, as we are told in Cicero,

*being asked, what was the principal thing in oratory, is said to have given the first, second, and third place to action, as if the whole art consisted in it*². But tho it was

not introduced into the schools so early, as the other parts of this art; yet many since Aristotle have written upon it more largely; nor is any system esteemed perfect, in which this is wanting.

BUT many writers add a fifth part of oratory to the four already mentioned, and that is *Memory*. And this opinion is supported by great authorities. For Cicero more than once divides the art into five parts³; and so does Quintilian, who says:

The whole of oratory consists, as the most and best alibi.

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*best authors reckon, of five parts; Invention,
Method, Elocution, Memory, Pronunciation*

Inst. orat. or Action ¹.

Lib. iii.

c. 3.

But if we consider the use of this faculty, it is very evident, that it is not peculiar to oratory, but common to all arts and sciences; for which reason it ought not to be esteemed as a part of this art, distinct from all others. Tho' since none have more occasion for its assistance than the orator, and there seems to be no other art, to which it can so properly be referred (unless it be made a distinct art of itself) I shall hereafter speak more of it, in treating upon *Pronunciation*, to which it seems most properly to relate.

WHAT has been hitherto said of the nature and use of the several parts of oratory, may, I presume, be sufficient to shew, that the division here made is adequate to the subject, and comprehensive of the whole art. A fuller and more distinct explication of each of them, in the order now laid down, will be the business of our following discourses. At present it may not be amiss to reduce the several things, about which it treats, to a few general heads, which may be of service hereafter to shew the different use of some of its parts in each of them.

ALL

ALL discourse then consists of *things* or ideas, and *words* the signs of those ideas, by which they are expressed to others. And therefore some have reduced the four parts of oratory already mentioned to two, *Invention*, and *Elocution*; the former of which they attribute to things, and the latter to words¹. But as they bring *Dis-*
position under *Invention*, and *Pronunciation* under *Elocution*, there is no real difference between this division of the art, and the former. I shall procede therefore with the division of its subject. And what relates purely to *words*, I shall refer to its proper place, which is *Elocution*. But the *things* it treats of are differently divided, according to their different nature, or the several ways of considering them.

¹See Voff.
De rhe-
tor. nat.
§ confit.
c. 17.

AND first, they are either *simple* or *complex*: that is single, individual things; or such as are connected in propositions. Thus for instance: If *Virtue* was made the subject of a discourse, and any one should speak in the praise of it, shew the excellency of its nature, the pleasure that attends the practice of it, and its happy effects to human society; this would be a simple theme. But should it be inquired: *Whether virtue is to be sought for itself?*

LECT. the subject would be complex. For here
 III. are two things mentioned, *virtue* and *sought for itself*; and the relation these stand in to each other, or whether they are so connected, that one may justly be affirmed of the other, is the matter which comes under consideration.

AGAIN, the argument of a discourse may be either a *general*, or a *particular proposition*. A general proposition is that, which is expressed in general terms, divested of all circumstances, such as persons, time, place, and the like. And a particular proposition is limited by some or other of these circumstances, which the former wants. So if the question be put: *Whether it be lawful for a man to kill himself?* the inquiry is general. But if it be asked: *Whether Cato did well in so doing?* this is particular.

BUT the principal distribution of the subject of oratory is made, by dividing it into three kinds of discourse, called by the antients *demonstrative*, *deliberative*, and *judicial*. The *first* of these comprehends all such discourses, as relate to the praise or dispraise of persons, or things. This is a very extensive feild, and contains in it whatever in nature or art, on the account

of any good or bad qualities, excellences or defects, is fit to be made the subject of a discourse. By this virtue is applauded, and vice censured; good examples recommended to the imitation of others, and bad ones exposed to their abhorrence. All panegyric and invective are its proper themes. So that the chief design of these discourses is to inspire men with generous sentiments of honor and virtue, and to give them a distaste to every thing, that is base and vitious, by examples of each, which are the most powerful means of instruction. Tho, as has been said already, they are not wholly confined to persons. To the *deliberative* kind belongs whatever may become a subject of debate, consultation, or advice. Of this sort are all speeches made in public assemblies, which respect the common good and benefit of mankind, their lives, liberties, and estates; whatever is advised to, or dissuaded from, upon the foot of any valuable interest, which is the end proposed in these discourses, so far as it is consistent with honor and justice. The last head contains all *judicial subjects*; by this property is secured, innocence protected, justice maintained, and crimes punished. All

matters

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III.

See
Quint.
Inst. orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 4.

matters canvassed at the bar are of this sort. And it is doubtless a very valuable and useful end in speaking, to vindicate justice and equity in opposition to fraud or violence. Aristotle is said to have been the author of this division¹, which seems to be very just; since perhaps there is no subject of oratory, whether sacred or civil, but may be referred to one or other of these heads. And not only the view and intention of the speaker (as we have seen already) is different in each of them, which would be sufficient to distinguish them from one another; but they require likewise a different stile and way of management, as will be shewn hereafter, when I come to treat of each of them in particular.

L E C

LECTURE IV.

*Of Invention in general, and particularly of
Common Places.*

A FINE and stately building affords an LECT.
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agreeable prospect, tho seen at a distance; but the beauty and elegance of its parts, their proportion and order, with the united harmony and splendor resulting from the whole, which discover themselves at a nearer view, give a much greater pleasure to a curious and judicious eye. In like manner, tho the account already given of the *nature* of oratory, its importance, and the great ends it is designed to answer, may excite a regard for it in studious and inquisitive minds; yet a more distinct explication of the several parts, whereof it consists, and the fitness of its precepts to attain their respective ends, will doubtless very much contribute to highten its just value and esteem. I now propose therefore to enter upon this subject, and in the prosecution of it, I shall follow the method before laid down in my last discourse on the *division* of oratory. And as I there observed the similitude between the arts of speaking and building, in both
of

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of which the artist first collects his materials, then adjusts them in proper order, and afterwards gives them such ornaments as suit his design; I shall accordingly begin with *Invention*, which furnishes the orator with materials. For invention, considered in general, is the discovery of such things, as are proper to persuade¹. And in order to attain this end, the orator proposes to himself three things; to prove or illustrate the subject upon which he treats, to conciliate the minds of his hearers, and to engage their passions in his favor. And as these require different kinds of arguments or motives, invention furnishes him with a supply for each of them, as will be shewn in their order.

¹ Voss.
Part. orat.
Lib. 1. c. 2.
§. 1.

I SHALL first consider that part of *Invention*, which directs to *arguments proper for the proof of a thing*; which, as Cicero tells us, is, *The discovery of such things, as are really true, or that seem to be so, and make the thing, for which they are produced, appear probable*². And the things, which

² De invention. Lib. 1. c. 7.

are thus discovered, are called *Arguments*. For, an *Argument*, as defined by him, is a *reason, which induces us to believe, what before we doubted of*³. If we reflect upon those things, which relate to the common

³ Topic. c. 2.

affairs

affairs of life, and the numerous transactions between mankind, we shall find that most of them are of a dubious nature, and liable to various constructions, as they are taken in different views; from whence a diversity of opinions is formed concerning them. And where the nature of the thing does not admit of certainty, every considerate and prudent person will give into that side of the question, which carries in it the greater degree of probability. And as these are the subjects, with which the antient orators were principally concerned, we find by Cicero's definition, that all he requires of such arguments, as they commonly made use of, is to render a thing probable. Indeed there are some things, which do not so much require reasoning, as a proper and suitable manner of representing them, to make them credible; and because the several ways of illustrating these are also taught by the precepts of this art, they are likewise in a large sense of the word called *arguments*.

BUT as different kinds of discourses require different *arguments*, rhetoricians have considered them two ways; in general, under certain heads, as a common fund for all subjects; and in a more particular manner,

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manner, as they are suited to *demonstrative, deliberative, or judicial* discourses.

At present I shall treat only upon the former of these. And now, that one thing may receive proof and confirmation from another, it is necessary that there be some relation between them; for all things are not equally adapted to prove one another. And that we may the better conceive this, I shall make use of a plain and familiar instance. In measuring the quantity of two things, which we would shew to be either equal or unequal, if they are of such a nature, that one cannot be applied to the other, then we take a third thing, which may be applied to them both; and that must be equal at least to one of the two, which if applied to the other, and found equal to that also, we presently conclude, that those two things are equal; but if it be unequal to the other, we say, that those two things are unequal. Because it is the certain and known property of all quantities, that whatsoever two things are equal to a third, are equal to one another; and where one of any two things is equal to a third, and the other unequal, those two things are unequal to one another.

What has been said of quantities, will hold

true in all other cases, that so far as any two things or ideas agree to a third, so far they agree to one another. And by agreeing I understand this, that the one may be affirmed of the other. So likewise on the contrary, as far as one of any two things or ideas does agree to a third, and the other does not, so far they disagree with one another, in which respect one of them cannot be truly affirmed of the other. Since therefore in every proposition one thing is spoken of another, if we would find out whether the two ideas agree to each other or not, where this is not evident of itself, we must find out some third thing, the idea of which agrees to one of them; and then that being applied to the other, as it does agree or disagree with it, so we may conclude, that the two things proposed do agree or disagree with one another. This will be made more clear by an example or two. Should it be inquired, *Whether virtue is to be loved?* the agreement between virtue and love might be found by comparing them separately with happiness, as a common measure to both. For since the idea of happiness agrees to that of love, and the idea of virtue to that of happiness; it follows, that

LECT. that the ideas of virtue and love agree to
 IV. { one another; and therefore it may be affirmed, *That virtue is to be loved.* But on the contrary, because the idea of misery disagrees with that of love, but the idea of vice agrees to that of misery, the two ideas of vice and love must consequently disagree with one another; and therefore it would be false to assert, *That vice is to be loved.* Now this third thing logicians call the *Medium* or *middle Term*, because it does as it were connect two extremes, that is, both parts of a proposition. But rhetoricians call it an *Argument*, because it is so applied to what was before proposed, as to become the instrument of procuring our assent to it. I have mentioned these plain examples only for illustration, by which we may in some measure perceive the nature and use of arguments.

BUT from whence, and by what methods they are to be sought, I shall now explain.

A LIVELY imagination and readiness of thought are undoubtedly a very great help to invention. Some persons are naturally endued with that quickness of fancy, and penetration of mind, that they are seldom at a loss for arguments either to defend
 their

their own opinions, or to attack their adversaries. However these things being the gift of nature, and not to be gained by art, do not properly fall under our present consideration. LECT. IV.

BUT, I suppose, it will be readily granted, that great learning and extensive knowledge are a noble fund for invention. Indeed Crassus, the Roman orator, carries this matter much farther, when he says: *I think, that no one ought to be accounted an orator, who is not thoroughly accomplished with all those arts, which are fit for a gentleman to learn. For tho in an oration we do not make use of them, yet whether we have learnt them, or not, will appear very easily, and cannot be hid. As in sculpture, tho the artist doth not directly make use of the art of painting, yet it is not difficult to discover whether he understand painting or not. In like manner in discourses at the bar, in the forum, or senate, tho other arts are not made use of, yet it presently appears, whether the person speaking be only acquainted with the method of declaiming, or comes to it qualified with all the liberal arts.* It may be hard to deny the name of orator to all such, who fall short of the qualifications here mentioned; and Quintilian, as I have

Cic. De orat. Lib. i. c. 16.

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IV.¹ Lect. II.
p. 20.

shewn in a former discourse¹, is for making considerable abatements; but yet it must be owned, that the greater furniture any one has acquired of useful learning, he will by that means be better prepared to speak in public upon all occasions. An orator therefore should be furnished with a stock of important truths, solid maxims of reason, and a variety of knowledge, collected and treasured up both from observation, and a large acquaintance with the liberal arts; that he may not only be qualified to express himself in the most agreeable manner, but likewise to support what he says with the strongest and clearest arguments.

BUT the greatest help to invention is, for a person to consider well before hand the subject, upon which he is to speak, and not to venture to affirm any thing concerning it, which he has not first a clear notion of himself. The better any one understands a thing himself, the better is he able to explain it to others. For tho the same arguments do not strike the minds of all persons with equal force, either because they do not come equally prepared to attend to what is said; or from a different way of thinking, to which they have been

accustomed: yet there is no method, by which any one can more reasonably hope to bring others to his opinion, than by laying before them those very arguments, by which upon a close consideration of the thing he was himself induced to believe it. And the more thoroughly he is himself persuaded of the truth of what he says, he will be qualified to impress it with greater strength and clearness upon the minds of those, to whom he speaks.

BUT because all are not born with a like happy genius, and have not the same opportunity to cultivate their minds with learning and knowledge; and because nothing is more difficult than to dwell long upon the consideration of one thing, in order to find out the strongest arguments, which may be offered for and against it; upon these accounts art has prescribed a method to lessen in some measure these difficulties, and help every one to a supply of arguments upon any subject. And this is done by the contrivance of *common places*, which Cicero calls the *seats* or *heads* of arguments, and by a Greek name *topics*.¹ ¹ *Topic*,
They are of two sorts, *internal* and *external*.^{c. 1, 2.} As to the former, the things with regard to their nature and properties are

LECT. IV. exceeding various, yet they have certain common relations, by means whereof the truth of what is either affirmed or denied concerning them in any respect may be evinced. The antient Greek rhetoricians therefore reduced these relations to some general heads; which are termed *common places*, because the reasons or arguments suited to prove any proposition are repositied in them, as a common fund or receptacle. And they are called *internal heads*, because they arise from the subject, upon which the orator treats; and are therefore distinguished from others named *external*, which he fetches from without, and applies to his present purpose, as will be shewn hereafter.

1. *Lea. V.* after 1. Cicero and Quintilian make them sixteen; three of which comprehend the whole thing they are brought to prove; namely, *Definition, Enumeration, and Notation*; and of the remaining thirteen some contain a part of it, and the rest its various properties and circumstances, with other considerations relating to it; and these are *Genus, Species, Antecedents, Consequents, Adjuncts, Conjugates, Cause, Effect, Contraries, Opposites, Similitude, Dissimilitude, and Comparison*. I shall give a breif account of each of these, in the order now mentioned.

of ORATORY.

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IV.

DEFINITION explains the nature of the thing defined, and shews what it is. And to whatsoever the definition agrees, the thing defined does so likewise. If therefore Socrates be a rational creature, he is a man; because it is the definition of a man, that he is a rational creature.

ENUMERATION takes in all the parts of a thing. And from this we prove, that what agrees to all the parts, agrees to the whole; and what does not agree to any one or more parts, does not agree to the whole. As when Cicero proves to Piso, that all the Roman state hated him; by enumerating the several ranks and orders of Roman citizens, who all did so ¹. *1 In Pison.*

NOTATION or etymology explains the meaning or signification of a word. From which we reason thus: If he cannot pay his debts, he is insolvent: For that is the meaning of the word insolvent. ^{c. 27.}

GENUS is what contains under it two or more sorts of things, differing in nature. From this head logicians reason thus: Because every animal is mortal, and man is an animal, therefore man is mortal. But orators make a further use of this argument, which they call ascending from the hypothesis to the thesis, that is, from a

particular to a general. As should a person, when speaking in praise of justice, take occasion from thence to commend and shew the excellency of virtue in general, with a view to render that particular virtue more amiable. For since every species contains in it the whole nature of the genus, to which it relates, besides what is peculiar to itself, whereby it is distinguished from it; what is affirmed of the genus, must of necessity be applicable to the species.

SPECIES is that, which comprehends under it all the individuals of the same nature. From hence we may argue: He is a man, therefore he has a rational soul. And orators sometimes take occasion from this head to descend from the thesis to the hypothesis; that is, in treating upon what is more general to introduce some particular contained under it, for the greater illustration of the general.

ANTECEDENTS are such things, as being once allowed, others necessarily, or very probably follow. From this head an inseparable property is proved from its subject: as, It is material, and therefore corruptible.

CONSEQUENTS are such things, as being allowed, necessarily, or very probably infer their

their antecedents. Hence the subject is proved from an inseparable property, in this manner: It is corruptible, and therefore material.

ADJUNCTS are separable properties of things, or circumstances that attend them. These are very numerous, and afford a great variety of arguments, some of which usually occur in every discourse. They do not necessarily infer their subject, but if fitly chosen render a thing credible, and are a sufficient ground for assent. The way of reasoning from them we shall shew presently.

CONJUGATES are words deduced from the same origin with that of our subject. By these the habit is proved from its acts: as, He who does justly, is just. He does not act wisely, therefore he is not wise. But this inference will not hold, unless the actions appear continued and constant.

A CAUSE is that, by the force of which a thing does exist. There are four kinds of causes, matter, form, efficient and end, which afford a great variety of arguments. The way of reasoning from them is to infer the effect from the cause: as, Man is endued with reason, therefore he is capable of knowledge.

LECT.
IV.

AN EFFECT is that, which arises from a cause, therefore the cause is proved by it; as, He is endued with knowledge, therefore with reason.

CONTRARIES are things, which under the same genus are at the utmost distance from each other. So that what we grant to the one, we utterly deny the other: as, Virtue ought to be embraced, therefore vice should be avoided.

OPPOSITES are such things, which, tho' repugnant to each other, yet are not directly contradictory: as, to love and to injure, to hate and to commend. They differ from contraries in this, that they do not absolutely exclude one another. An argument is drawn from things repugnant thus: He will do a man a mischief, therefore he does not love him. He loves a man, therefore he will not reproach him.

SIMILITUDE is an agreement of things in quality. Thus Cicero proves, that pernicious citizens ought to be taken out of the state; by the likeness they bear to corrupted members, which are cut off to prevent further damage to the body¹.

¹ *Philipp.*
viii. c. 5.

DISSIMILITUDE is a disagreement of things in quality. From this head Cicero shews the preference of his own exile to
Piso's

Piso's government of Macedonia; by the difference between their conduct, and the people's esteem of them¹.

LECT.
IV.

¹ In *Pison.*
c. 14, &c.

COMPARISON is made three ways. For either a thing is compared with a greater, with a less, or with its equal. This place therefore differs from that of similitude on this account, that the quality was considered in that, but here the quantity. An argument from the greater is thus drawn: If five legions could not conquer the enemy, much less will two. And by this the manner of the rest may be easily conceived.

I SHALL just give one example somewhat larger, than I have hitherto done, of the manner of reasoning from these heads, whereby the use of them may further appear. If any one therefore should have indeavoured to persuade Cicero not to accept of his life upon the condition offered him by Antony; that he would burn his Philippic orations, which had been spoken against him; he might be supposed to use such arguments as these; partly taken from the adjuncts of Cicero, partly from those of Antony, and partly from the thing itself. And first with re-

LECT.
IV.

gard to Cicero it might be said: That so great a man ought not to purchase his life at so dear a price, as the loss of that immortal honor, which by so great pains and labor he had acquired. And this might be confirmed by another argument. That now he was grown old, and could not expect to live much longer. And from the character of Antony he might argue thus: That he was very crafty and deceitful, and only designed by giving him hopes of life, to have the Philippics first burnt, which otherwise he knew would transmit to posterity an eternal brand of infamy upon him; and then he would take off the author. And this might be shewn by comparison. For since he would not spare others, who had not so highly exasperated him, and from whom he had not so much to fear; certainly he would not forgive Cicero, since he knew well enough, that so long as he lived, he himself could never be in safety. And lastly an argument might also be fetched from the nature of the thing itself in the following manner. That Cicero by this action would shamefully betray the state, and the cause of liberty, which he had thro his whole life most

cou-

courageously defended, with so great honor to himself, and advantage to the public. Upon such an account a person might have used these, or the like arguments with Cicero, which arise from the forementioned heads.

See Senec. Senator. vii.

FROM this account of *Common Places* it is easy to conceive, what a large field of discourse they open to the mind upon every subject. These different considerations furnish out a great number and variety of arguments, sufficient to supply the most barren invention. He can never be at a loss for matter, who considers well the nature of his subject, the parts of which it consists, the circumstances which attend it, the causes from whence it springs, the effects it produces, its agreement, disagreement, or repugnancy to other things, and in like manner carries it thro all the remaining heads. But altho this method will assist us very much to enlarge upon a subject, and place it in different views; yet a prudent man is not so desirous to say a great deal, as to speak to the purpose, and therefore will make choice of proper arguments, and such only, which have a direct tendency to confirm or illustrate his subject.

LECT. subject. And for this end, it is necessary
 IV. for him to gain first a thorough knowledge
 of his subject, and then arguments will
 naturally spring up in his mind proper to
 support it; and if he be still at a loss, and
 find occasion to have recourse to these
 heads, he will readily perceive from whence
 to take those, which are best suited to his
 purpose.

L E C.

LECTURE V.

Of external Topics.

THE nature and design of *Common* LECT. V.
Places have been shewn already; and a particular account of those, which, because they are taken from the subject matter of a discourse, are therefore called *internal*, has likewise been given. But the orator sometimes reasons from such topics, as do not arise from his subject, but from things of a different nature, and for that reason are called *external*. And because the former are more properly invented by him, and the effect of his art, Aristotle calls them *artificial Topics*, and the latter *inartificial*¹. But as they both require skill in the management, Quintilian very much blames those, who take no notice of these latter, but exclude them from the art of rhetoric². I propose therefore to make them the subject of my present discourse, and shew the methods of reasoning from them. They are all taken from authorities, and are by one general name called *Testimonies*.

¹ De rhetor. Lib. i. c. 2. See also Quint. Inst. orat. Lib. v. c. 1.

² Ibid.

Now

LECT.

V.

Now a *Testimony* may be expressed by writing, speech, or any other sign proper to declare a person's mind. And all *testimonies* may be distinguished into two sorts, *divine* and *human*. A *divine Testimony*, when certainly known to be such, is incontestable, and admits of no debate, but should be acquiesced in without hesitation. Indeed the antient Greeks and Romans esteemed the pretended oracles of their deities, the answers of their augurs, and the like fallacies, *divine testimonies*. But with us no one can be ignorant of their true notion, tho they do not so directly come under our present consideration. *Human Testimonies* are of various kinds, but as they furnish the orator with arguments (in which view I am now to consider them) they may be reduced to three heads; *Writings, Witnesses, and Contracts*.

By *Writings* here are to be understood written laws, wills, or other legal instruments, expressed and conveyed in that manner. And it is not so much the force and validity of such testimonies, considered in themselves, that is here intended; as the occasion of dispute, which may at any time arise concerning their true design and import, when produced in proof upon either

either side of a controversy. And these are five; *Ambiguity, Disagreement between the words and intention, Contrariety, Reasoning, and Interpretation*¹. I shall speak to each of these in their order.

¹ Cic. De Invent. Lib. ii. c. 40.

A WRITING is then said to be *ambiguous*, when it is capable of two or more senses, which makes the writer's design uncertain. Now ambiguity may arise either from single words, or the construction of sentences. From single words; as when either the sense of a word, or the application of it is doubtful. As: *should it be questioned, whether ready money ought to be included under the appellation of chattels left by a will. Or: if a testator bequeath a certain legacy to his nephew Thomas, and he has two nephews of that name. But ambiguity is also sometimes occasioned from the construction of a sentence; as when several things, or persons having been already mentioned, it is doubtful to which of them, that which follows ought to be referred. For example: a person writes thus in his will: Let my heir give as a legacy to Titius, an horse out of my stable, which he please*². Here it may be questioned whether the word *he* refers to the heir, or to Titius; and consequently, whether

² See Quint. Inst. orat. Lib. vii. c. 9. Et Cic. De Invent. Lib. ii. c. 40.

LECT. ther the heir be allowed to give Titius
 V. which horse he please, or Titius may
 choose which he likes best. Now as to
 controversies of this kind, in the first case
 above mentioned, the party, who claims
 the chattels, may plead, that all moveable
 goods come under that name, and there-
 fore that he has a right to the money.
 This he will endeavour to prove from some
 instances, where the word has been so
 used. The business of the opposite party
 is to refute this, by shewing that money is
 not there included. And if either side
 produce precedents in his favor, the other
 may endeavour to shew the cases are not
 parallel. As to the second case, arising
 from an ambiguity in the name, if any
 other words or expressions in the will seem
 to countenance either of the claimants, he
 will not fail to interpret them to his ad-
 vantage. So likewise if any thing said by
 the testator, in his life time, or any regard
 shewn to either of these nephews more
 than the other, may help to determine,
 which of them was intended; a proper
 use may be made of it. And the same
 may be said with regard to the third case.
 In which the legatee may reason likewise
 from the common use of language, and
 shew,

shew, that in such expressions it is usual to make the reference to the last or next antecedent; and from thence plead, that it was the design of the testator to give him the option. But in answer to this it may be said, that allowing it to be very often so; yet in this instance it seems more easy and natural, to repeat the verb *give* after *please*, and so to supply the sentence, *which he please to give him*, refering it to the heir; than to bring in the verb *choose*, which was not in the sentence before, and so by supplying the sense, *which he please to choose*, to give the option to Titius. But where controversies of this kind arise from a law, recourse may be had to other laws, where the same thing has been expressed with greater clearness, which may help to determine the sense of the passage in dispute.

A SECOND controversy from *Writings* is, when one party adheres to the *words*, and the other to what he asserts was the writer's *intention*. Now he who opposes the literal sense, either contends, that what he himself offers is the simple and plain meaning of the writing; or that it must be so understood in the particular case in debate. An instance of the former is this,

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V.

as we find it in Cicero. A person who died without children, but left a widow, had made this provision in his will: *If I have a son born to me, he shall be my heir. And a little after: If my son die, before he comes of age, let Curius be my heir.* There is no son born, Curius therefore sues for the estate, and pleads the intention of the testator, who designed him for his heir, if he should have no son, who arrived at age; and saies, there can be no reason to suppose, he did not intend the same person for his heir, if he had no son, as if he should have one, who afterwards died in his minority. But the heir at law insists upon the words of the will, which, as he saies, require, that first a son should be born, and afterwards die under age, before Curius can succede to the inheritance. And there being no son, a substituted heir, as Curius was, can have no claim, where the first heir does not exist, from whom he derives his pretention, and was to succede by the appointment of the will. Of the latter case rhetoricians give this example: *It was forbidden by a law to open the city gates in the night. A certain person notwithstanding in time of war did open them in the night, and let*

¹ See Cic.
De orat.
Lib. ii.
c. 32.
De invent.
Lib. ii.
c. 42.

in some auxiliary troops, to prevent their being cut off by the enemy, who was posted near the town. Afterwards, when

LECT.
V.

the war was over, this person is arraigned, and tried for his life, on the account of this action¹. Now in such a case the

¹Hermog.
De stat.
§. 11.

prosecutor founds his charge upon the express words of the law; and pleads, that no sufficient reason can be assigned for going contrary to the letter of it, which would be to make a new law, and not to execute one already made. The defendant on the other hand alleges, that the fact, he is charged with, cannot however come within the intention of the law; since he either could not, or ought not to have complied with the letter of it in that particular case, which must therefore necessarily be supposed to have been excepted in the design of that law, when it was made. But to this the prosecutor may reply; that all such exceptions, as are intended by any law, are usually expressed in it: and instances may be brought of particular exceptions expressed in some laws; and if there be any such exception in the law under debate, it should especially be mentioned. He may further add; that to admit of exceptions not expressed in the

LECT. ^{V.} law itself, is to enervate the force of all laws by explaining them away, and in effect to render them useless. And this he may further corroborate, by comparing the law under debate with others, and considering its nature, and importance, and how far the public interest of the state is concerned in the due and regular execution of it; from whence he may infer, that should exceptions be admitted in other laws of less consequence, yet however they ought not in this. Lastly, he may consider the reason alleged by the defendant, on which he founds his plea, and shew, there was not that necessity of violating the law in the present case, as is pretended. And this is often the more requisite, because the party, who disputes against the words of the law, always endeavours to support his allegations from the equity of the case. If therefore this plea can be enervated, the main support of the defendant's cause is removed. For as the former arguments are designed to prevail with the judge to determine the matter on this side the question, from the nature of the case; so the intention of this argument is to induce him to it, from the weakness of the defense made by the opposite party.

But

But the defendant will on the contrary LECT.
V.

use such arguments, as may best demonstrate the equity of his cause, and endeavour to vindicate the fact from his good design, and intention in doing it. He will say, that the laws have allotted punishments for the commission of such facts, as are evil in themselves, or prejudicial to others; neither of which can be charged upon the action, for which he is accused: that no law can be rightly executed, if more regard be had to the words and syllables of the writing, than to the intention of the legislator. To which purpose he may allege that direction of the law itself, which saith: *The law ought not to be too rigorously interpreted, nor the words of it strained; but the true intention and design of each part of it duly considered*¹.

¹ L. 19.

As also that saying of Cicero: *What law may not be weakened and destroyed, if we bend the sense to the words, and do not regard the design and view of the legislator*²?

hibend.

² Pro Cat.
cin. c. 18.

Hence he may take occasion to complain of the hardship of such a procedure, that no difference should be made between an audacious and wilful crime, and an honest or necessary action, which might happen to disagree with the letter of the law, tho

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V.

not with the intent of it. And as it was observed before to be of considerable service to the accuser, if he could remove the defendant's plea of equity; so it will be of equal advantage to the defendant, if he can fix upon any words in the law, which may in the least seem to countenance his case, since this will take off the main force of the charge.

THE third controversy of this kind is, when two writings happen to *clash* with each other, or at least seem to do so. Of this Hermogenes gives the following instance. One law enjoins: *He, who continues alone in a ship during a tempest, shall have the property of the ship.* Another law says: *A disinherited son shall enjoy no part of his father's estate*¹. Now a son, who had been disinherited by his father, happens to be in his father's ship in a tempest, and continues there alone, when every one else had deserted it. He claims the ship by the former of these laws, and his brother tries his right with him by the latter. In such cases therefore it may first be considered, whether the two laws can be reconciled. And if that cannot be done, then which of them appears more equitable. Also whether one be positive, and the

¹Hermog.
De Stat.
§. 12.

the other negative; because prohibitions are a sort of exceptions to positive injunctions. Or if one be a general law; and the other more particular, and come nearer to the matter in question. Likewise which was last made: since former laws are often abrogated, either wholly or in part, by subsequent laws; or at least were designed to be so. Lastly, it may be observed, whether one of the laws be not plain and express, and the other more dubious, or has any ambiguity in it. All or any of which things that party will not omit to improve for his advantage, whose interest is concerned in it.

THE fourth controversy is *Reasoning*. As when something not expressly provided for by a law, is infered by similitude, or parity of reason, from what is contained in it. Quintilian mentions this instance of it: *There was a law made at Tarentum to prohibit the exportation of wool, but a certain person exports sheep*. In this case the prosecutor may first compare the thing, which occasions the charge, with the words of the law, and shew their agreement, and how unnecessary it was, that particular thing should have been expressly mentioned in the law, since it is plainly con-

*Inst. orat.
Lib. vii.
c. 8.*

LECT.
V.

tained in it, or at least an evident consequence from it. He may then plead that many things of a like nature are omitted in other laws for the same reason. And lastly, he may urge the reasonableness and equity of the procedure. The defendant on the other hand will endeavour to shew the deficiency of the reasoning, and the difference between the two cases. He will insist upon the plain and express words of the law, and set forth the ill tendency of such inferences, and conclusions drawn from similitudes, and comparisons; since there is scarce any thing, but in some respect may bear a resemblance to another.

THE last controversy under this head is *Interpretation*, in which the dispute turns upon the true meaning and explication of the law, in reference to that particular case. We have the following instance of this in the Pandects: *A man who had two sons, both under age, substitutes Titius as heir to him, who should die last, provided both of them died in their minority. They both perish together at sea, before they came to age. Here arises a doubt, whether the substitution can take place, or the inheritance devolves to*

last,

¹ L. 9. ff. *de rebus dub.*

last, the substitution cannot take place, LECT. V.
 which was suspended upon the condition,
 that one died after the other. But to this
 it may be said, it was the intention of the
 testator, that if both died in their nonage,
 Titius should succede to the inheritance;
 and therefore it makes no difference whe-
 ther they died together, or one after the
 other; and so the law determines it.

THE second head of external arguments
 are *Witnesses*. These may either give their
 evidence, when absent, in writing sub-
 scribed with their name; or present, by
 word of mouth. And what both of
 them testify, may either be from hear-say;
 or what they saw themselves, and were
 present at the time it was done. As the
 weight of the evidence may be thought
 greater or less on each of these accounts,
 either party will make such use of it, as he
 finds for his advantage. The characters of
 the witnesses are also to be considered; and
 if any thing be found in their lives, or be-
 haviour, that is justly exceptionable, to in-
 validate their evidence, it ought not to be
 omitted. And how they are affected to the
 contending parties, or either of them, may
 deserve consideration; for some allowances
 may be judged reasonable in case of freind-
 ship,

See
 Quint.
 Inst. orat.
 Lib. v.
 c. 7.

222
 XI. B. 1

LECT.
V.

ship, or enmity, where there is no room for any other exception. But regard should chiefly be had to what they testify, and how far the cause is affected by it. Cicero is very large upon most of these heads in his defense of Marcus Fonteius, with a design to weaken the evidence of the Gauls against him¹. And where witnesses are produced on one side only, as orators sometimes attempt to lessen the credit of this kind of proof, by pleading that witnesses are liable to be corrupted, or biased by some prevailing interest or passion, to which arguments taken from the nature and circumstances of things are not subject; it may be answered on the other hand, that sophistical arguments, and false colourings are not exposed to infamy or punishment, whereas witnesses are restrained by shame and penalties, nor would the law require them, if they were not necessary.

THE third and last head of external arguments are *Contracts*, which may be either public or private. By public are meant the transactions between different states, as leagues, alliances, and the like; which depend on the laws of nations, and come more properly under deliberative discourses, to which I shall refer them². Those are called

¹ See
Lect. IX.

private, which relate to lesser bodies, or societies of men, and single persons; and may be either written, or verbal. And it is not so much the true meaning and purport of them, that is here considered, as their force and obligation. And, as the Roman law declares, *Nothing can be more agreeable to human faith, than that persons should stand to their agreements*. There-^{L. 1. pr.}fore in controversies of this kind, the party,^{ff. de poet.} whose interest it is, that the contract should be maintained, will plead, that such covenants have the force of private laws, and ought religiously to be observed, since the common affairs of mankind are transacted in that manner; and therefore to violate them, is to destroy all commerce and society among men. On the other side it may be said, that justice and equity are chiefly to be regarded, which are immutable. And besides, that the public laws are the common rule to determine such differences, which are designed to redress those, who are aggrieved. And indeed where a compact has been obtained by force or fraud, it is in itself void, and has no effect either in law or reason. But on the other hand, the Roman lawyers seem to have very rightly determined, that all such
ob-

LECT. V. obligations, as are founded in natural equity, tho not binding by national laws, and are therefore called *nuda pacta*, ought however in honor and conscience to be performed.

Pauli
Recept.
Sent.

Lib. ii.

t. 14. de

usur. §. 1.

& ibi

Schulting.

Thus I have gone thro the common heads of invention, both internal and external, which may be of service to an orator, when his view is to inform his hearers, and prove the truth of what he asserts. But the particular application of them to the several sorts of discourses, he may have occasion to treat upon, I shall explain in some following lectures.

L E C.

LECTURE VI.

Of the State of a Controversy.

IN my two last discourses I considered LECT.
VI.
the nature of *Common Places*, with the method of reasoning from them; and should now procede in a more particular manner to shew the use of them in the several kinds of discourses; but there is one thing, which must be first inquired into, and that is, what rhetoricians call, *The State of a Cause or Controversy*. For the antients observing, that the principal question, or point of dispute, in all controversies might be refered to some particular head, reduced those heads to a certain number; that both the nature of the question might by that means be better known, and the arguments suited to it be discovered with greater ease. And these heads they call *States*.

By the *State of a Controversy* then we are to understand, the principal point in dispute between contending parties, upon the proof of which the whole cause or controversy depends. We find it expressed by several other names in antient writers:

as,

LECT. VI. as, *the constitution of the cause, the general head, and the cheif question*¹. And as this

¹ Quint.
Inst. orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 6.
Juven.
Sat. 6.

is the principal thing to be attended to in every such discourse; so it is what first requires the consideration of the speaker, and should be well fixed and digested in his mind, before he proceeds to look for arguments proper to support it. Thus Antony, the Roman orator, speaking of his own method in his pleadings, saies: *When I understand the nature of the cause, and begin to consider it, the first thing I endeavour to do is, to settle with myself what that is, to which all my discourse relating to the matter in dispute ought to be refered: then I diligently attend to those other two things, how to recommend myself, or those for whom I plead, to the good esteem of my hearers; and how to influence their minds,*

² De orat.
Lib. ii.
c. 27.

*as may best suit my design*². This way of proceeding appears very agreeable to reason and prudence. For what can be more absurd, than for a person to attempt the proof of any thing, before he has well settled in his own mind a clear and distinct notion, what the thing is, which he would endeavour to prove? Quintilian describes

³ Inst. orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 6.

it to be, *That kind of question, which arises from the first conflict of causes*³. In judicial

cial cases it immediately follows upon the charge of the plaintiff, and plea of the defendant. Our common law expresses it by one word, namely, the *Issue*. Which interpreters explain, by describing it to be, *That point of matter depending in suit, whereupon the parties join, and put their cause to the trial*. Examples will further help to illustrate this, and render it more evident. In the cause of Milo, the charge of the Clodian party is, *Milo killed Clodius*. Milo's plea or defense, *I killed him, but justly*. From hence arises this grand question, or state of the cause: *Whether it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius?* And that Clodius was lawfully killed by Milo, is what Cicero in his defense of Milo principally endeavours to prove. This is the main subject of that fine and beautiful oration. The whole of his discourse is to be considered as centering at last in this one point. Whatever different matters are occasionally mentioned, will, if closely attended to, be found to have been introduced some way or other, the better to support and carry on this design. Now in such cases, where the fact is not denied, but something is offered in its defense, the state of the cause is taken from the

Manley
in voc.
Issue.

LECT.
VI.

defendant's plea, who is obliged to make it good. As in the instance here given, the cheif point in dispute was the lawfulness of Milo's action, which it was Cicero's business to demonstrate. But when the defendant denies the fact, the state of the cause arises from the accusation; the proof of which then lies upon the plaintiff, and not, as in the former case, upon the defendant. So in the cause of Roscius, the charge made against him is, *That he killed his father.* But he denies the fact. The grand question therefore to be argued is: *Whether or not he killed his father?* The proof of this lay upon his accusers. And Cicero's design in his defense of him is to shew, that they had not made good their charge. But it sometimes happens, that the defendant neither absolutely denies the fact, nor attempts to justify it; but only endeavours to qualify it, by denying that it is a crime of that nature, or deserves that name, by which it is expressed in the charge. We have an example of this proposed by Cicero: *A person is accused of sacrilege, for taking a thing, that was sacred, out of a private house. He owns the fact, but denies it to be sacrilege; since it was committed in a private house, and not*

in

in a temple. Hence this question arises: *Whether to take a sacred thing out of a private house is to be deemed sacrilege, or only simple theft?* It lies upon the accuser to prove, what the other denies; and therefore the state of the cause is here also, as well as in the preceding case, taken from the inditement.

LECT. VI.

De In-

vent.
Lib. ii.

c. 18.

See also
Quint.

Inst. orat.
Lib. vii.

c. 3.

BUT besides the principal question, there are other subordinate questions, which follow upon it in the course of a dispute, and should be carefully distinguished from it. Particularly that, which arises from the reason or argument, which is brought in proof of the principal question. For the principal question itself proves nothing, but is the thing to be proved, and becomes at last the conclusion of the discourse. Thus in the cause of Milo, his argument is: *I killed Clodius justly, because he assassinated me.* Unless the Clodian party be supposed to deny this, they give up their cause. From hence therefore this subordinate question follows: *Whether Clodius assassinated Milo?* Now Cicero spends much time in the proof of this, as the hinge, on which the first question, and consequently the whole cause depended. For if this was once made to appear, the lawfulness

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of Milo's killing Clodius, which was the grand question or thing to be proved, might be infered, as an allowed consequence from it. This will be evident, by throwing Milo's argument, as used by Cicero, into the form of a syllogism.

An assassinator is lawfully killed:

Clodius was an assassinator:

Therefore he was lawfully killed by Milo, whom he assassinated.

If the minor proposition of this syllogism was granted, no one would deny the conclusion. For the Roman law allowed of self defense. But as Cicero was very sensible this would not be admitted, so he takes much pains to bring the court into the beleif of it. Now where the argument brought in defense of the second question is contested, or the orator supposes that it may be so, and therefore supports that with another argument, this occasions a third question consequent upon the former; and in like manner he may procede to a fourth. But be they more or fewer, they are to be considered but as one chain of subordinate questions, dependent upon the first. And tho each of these has its particular state, yet none of these is, what rhetoricians call *The State*

of the Cause, which is to be understood only of the principal question. And if, as it frequently happens, the first or principal question is itself directly proved from more than one argument; this makes no other difference, but that each of these arguments, so far as they are followed by others to support them, become a distinct series of subordinate questions, all dependent upon the first. As when Cicero endeavours to prove, that Roscius did not kill his father, from two reasons or arguments: *Because he had neither any cause to move him to such a barbarous action, nor any opportunity for it* ¹.

¹ Pro Rosc.
Amer.
c. 14.

MOREOVER, besides these subordinate questions, there are also incidental ones often introduced, which have some reference to the principal question, and contribute towards the proof of it, tho they are not necessarily connected with it, or dependent upon it. And each of these also has its *State*, tho different from that of the *Cause*. For every question, or point of controversy, must be stated, before it can be made the subject of disputation. And it is for this reason, that every new argument advanced by an orator is called a question, because it is considered as a

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fresh matter of controversy. In Cicero's defense of Milo, we meet with several of this sort of questions, occasioned by some aspersions, which had been thrown out by the Clodian party to the prejudice of Milo. As, *That he was unworthy to see the light, who owned he had killed a man.* For Milo before his trial had openly confessed, he killed Clodius. So likewise, *That the senate had declared the killing of Clodius was an illegal action.* And further, *That Pompey, by making a new law to settle the manner of Milo's trial, had given his judgement against Milo.* Now to each of these Cicero replies, before he proceeds to the principal question. And therefore, tho the question, in which the state of a controversy consists, is said by Quintilian to arise from, *the first conflict of causes*, yet we find by this instance of Cicero, that it is not always the first question in order, upon which the orator treats.

BUT it sometimes happens, that the same cause or controversy contains in it more than one state. Thus in judicial causes, every distinct charge occasions a new state. All Cicero's orations against Verres relate to one cause, founded upon a law of the Romans against unjust ex-
actions,

actions, made by their governors of provinces upon the inhabitants; but as that prosecution is made up of as many charges, as there are orations, every charge, or inditement, has its different state. So likewise his oration in defense of Coelius has two states, in answer to a double charge made against him by his adversaries: one, *for borrowing money of Clodia, in order to bribe certain slaves to kill a foreign ambassador; and the other, for an attempt afterward to poison Clodia herself.* Besides which there were also several other matters of a less heinous nature, which had been thrown upon him by his accusers, with a design, very likely, to render the two principal charges more credible; to which Cicero first replies, in the same manner, as in his defense of Milo.

Tho all the examples, we have hitherto brought to illustrate this subject, have been taken from judicial cases; yet not only these, but very frequently discourses of the deliberative kind, and sometimes those of the demonstrative, are managed in a controversial way. And all controversies have their *State*. And therefore Quintilian very justly observes, that *states belong both to general and particular questions; and to all*

LECT. VI. *sorts of causes demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial*¹. In Cicero's oration for the

¹*Inst. orat.*
Lib. iii.

c. 6.

See also

Cic. De
orat.

Lib. ii.

c. 42.

Manilian law, this is the main point in dispute between him, and those who opposed that law: *Whether Pompey was the fittest person to be intrusted with the management of the war against Mithridates?* This is a subject of the deliberative kind. And of the same nature was that debate in the senate, concerning the demolition of Carthage. For the matter in dispute between Cato, who argued for it, and those who were of the contrary opinion, seems to have been this: *Whether it was for the interest of the Romans to demolish Carthage?*²

²See Flor.
Lib. ii.

c. 15. &c.

And so likewise in those two fine orations of Cato and Caesar, given us by Sallust, relating to the conspirators with Catiline, who were then in custody, the controversy turns upon this: *Whether those prisoners should be punished with death, or perpetual imprisonment?* Examples of the demonstrative kind are not so common; but, I think, Cicero's oration concerning the *Answers of the soothsayers*, may afford us an instance of it. Several prodigies had lately happened at Rome, upon which the soothsayers being consulted, assigned this as the reason of them; because some places con-
secrated

fecrated to the gods, had been afterwards converted to civil uses. Clodius charged this upon Cicero, whose house was rebuilt at the public expense, after it had been demolished by Clodius, and the ground consecrated to the goddess Liberty. Cicero in this oration retorts the charge, and shews, that the prodigies did not respect him, but Clodius. So that the question in dispute was: *To which of the two those prodigies related.* This oration does not appear to have been spoken in a judicial way, and must therefore belong to the demonstrative kind. His invective against Piso is likewise much of the same nature, wherein he compares his own behaviour and conduct with that of Piso.

As to the number of these *States*, both Cicero and Quintilian reduce them to three. I shall recite Quintilian's reason, which he gives for this opinion. *We must,* says he, *agree with those, whose authority Cicero follows, who tell us, that three things may be inquired into in all disputes; whether a thing is, what it is, and how it is. And this is the method, which nature prescribes. For in the first place it is necessary the thing should exist, about which the dispute is: because no judgement can be made*

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either of its nature, or quality, till its existence be manifest; which is therefore the first question. But tho it be manifest, that a thing is, it does not presently appear what it is; and when this is known, the quality yet remains: and after these three are settled,

Inst. orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 6.

no further inquiry is necessary. Thus far Quintilian. Now the first of these three states is called the *conjectural* state; as if it be inquired: *Whether one person killed another?* This always follows upon the denial of a fact, by one of the parties, as was the case of Roscius. And it receives its name from hence, that the judge is left, as it were, to conjecture, whether the fact was really committed, or not, from the evidence produced on the other side. The second is called the *definitive* state, when the fact is not denied; but the dispute turns upon the nature of it, and what name is proper to give it; as in that example of Cicero: *Whether to take a sacred thing out of a private house be theft, or sacrilege?* For in this case it is necessary to settle the distinct notion of those two crimes, and shew their difference. The third is called the state of *quality*, when the contending parties are agreed both as to the fact, and the nature of it; but the

dis-

dispute is: *Whether it be just or unjust, profitable or unprofitable, and the like*: as in the cause of Milo. Aristotle¹, and from him Vossius², add a fourth state, namely of *quantity*. As: *Whether an injury be so great, as it is said to be*. But Quintilian thinks this may be referred to some or other of the preceding states; since it depends upon the circumstances of the fact, as the intention, time, place, or the like³.

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¹ *De rhetor. Lib. iii. c. 26.*

² *Inst. orat. Lib. i. c. 6. §. 7.*

³ *Inst. orat. Lib. iii. c. 6.*

FROM what has been said upon this subject, the use of it may in a good measure appear. For whoever engages in a controversy, ought in the first place to consider with himself the main question in dispute, to fix it well in his mind, and keep it constantly in his view; without which he will be very liable to ramble from the point, and bewilder both himself, and his hearers. And it is no less the business of the hearers principally to attend to this; by which means they will be helped to distinguish and separate from the principal question, what is only incidental, and to observe how far the principal question is affected by it; to perceive what is offered in proof, and what is only brought in for illustration; not to be misled

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by digressions, but to discern when the speaker goes off from his subject, and when he returns to it again; and, in a word, to accompany him thro the whole discourse, and carry with them the principal chain of reasoning, upon which the cause depends, so as to judge upon the whole, whether he has made out his point, and the conclusion follows from the premises. The necessity of this is generally the greater, in proportion to the length of a discourse, however exact and artful the composition may be. They, who have read Cicero's orations with care, cannot but know, that altho they are formed in the most beautiful manner, and wrought up with the greatest skill; yet the matter of them is often so copious, the arguments so numerous, the incidents either to conciliate or move his audience so frequent, and the digressions so agreeable; that without the closest attention it is many times no easy matter to keep his main design in view. A constant and fixed regard therefore to the state of the cause, and principal point in dispute, is highly necessary to this end. But tho rhetoricians treat of these states only as they relate to controversies, and become the subject matter of dispute between differing parties;

parties; yet every discourse has one or more principal heads, which the speaker chiefly proposes to prove or illustrate. And therefore what has been said upon this subject, may likewise be considered, as proper to be attended to in all discourses.

I HAVE only to add, that hitherto I have treated of the nature and use of the three states so far, as relates to them in general; a more particular account of them, with the arguments, which are properly suited to each state, will be given hereafter in their due place¹.

¹ See
Lect. IX.

LECTURE VII.

*Of Arguments suited to Demonstrative Discourses.*LECT.
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THE general method of deducing *Arguments* from *Common Places*, has been already explained. But more fully to shew the use of this subject, and the assistance it affords the orator, it may not be improper separately to consider the particular heads, which are more especially suited to the several kinds of discourses. These are subordinate to the former, and spring from them, like branches from the same stock, or rivulets from a common fountain; as will evidently appear, when we come to explain them.

THIS is what I propose to enter upon at present, and shall begin with those, which relate to *demonstrative* discourses. And as these consist either in praise or dispraise, agreeably to the nature of all contraries, one of them will serve to illustrate the other. Thus he, who knows, what *Arguments* are proper to prove the excellency of virtue, and commend it to our esteem; cannot be much at a loss for such, as will shew the

the odious nature of vice, and expose it to every one's abhorrence; since they are all taken from the same heads, and directly the reverse of each other. In treating therefore upon the topics, suited to this kind of discourses, I need only mention those, which are requisite for praise; from whence such, as are proper for dispraise, will easily enough be discovered.

Now we praise either *persons* or *things*: under which division all beings with their properties and circumstances may be comprehended, so as to take in whatever belongs either to nature or art. But in each part of the division I shall confine my discourse principally to those subjects, relating to social life, in which oratory is more usually conversant. And under the former head, which respects persons or intelligent beings, I shall only speak of men. The antient sophists among the Greeks in their laudatory speeches seem rather to have studied, how to display their own eloquence, than to make them serve any valuable purposes in life; for their characters were so heightened, like poetical images, as suited them more to excite wonder and surprise, than to become the proper subjects of imitation. And for this reason Aristotle ex-

cludes

LECT. VII. cludes them from the number of civil discourses, or such as relate to the affairs of society¹. Tho if we consider their nature, rather than the abuse of them, they appear to be very proper subjects for an orator, and to come within the main design of his province, which is persuasion. For to what purpose can eloquence be better employed, than to celebrate virtuous persons, or actions, in such a manner, as to excite mankind to their imitation, which is the proper end of such discourses. And indeed the panegyrics of the Greeks, which were pronounced in the general assemblies of their several states, seem to have been designed to recommend virtue by so public a testimony, as appears by that of Isocrates in praise of the Athenians. For as to the invectives of Demosthenes against king Philip, they are rather of the *deliberative* kind, and so do not come under our present consideration; since the orator's principal view in those discourses is to animate the Athenians in a defense of their liberties, by a vigorous prosecution of the war against king Philip; to which end he likewise proposes the fittest methods for carrying it on with success. And most of Cicero's invectives against Mark Antony may be referred

¹ Quint.
Inst. orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 7.

ferred to the same kind of discourses. But LECT. VII.
as it is evident from common observation, }
that men are more influenced by exam-
ples, than precepts; so the celebrating vir-
tue, and exposing vice, from particular
instances in human life, as patterns to
others in what they ought to pursue, and
what to avoid, has by wise men been ge-
nerally esteemed very serviceable to man-
kind. For which reason likewise the trans-
mitting to posterity the lives of great and
eminent men has met with good accep-
tance, as a useful and laudable design. And
therefore the Romans, who were sensible
that such discourses were not only suited
for entertainment, but might likewise be
made very useful to the public, did not
confine them to the schools of rhetoricians,
and the exercises of young persons. For
it was their custom, as Quintilian tells us,
to have them pronounced in public assem-
blies, even by magistrates, and sometimes
by an order from the senate ¹. So we ¹ *Inst. orat.*
read, that a funeral oration was spoken in ^{Lib. iii.}
honor of Junius Brutus by Publicola, his ^{c. 7.}
colleague in the consulship ². And a like ² *Dion.*
discourse, with a statue and public funeral ^{Hal.}
was decreed by the senate to the honor of ^{Lib. v.}
M. Juventius ³. Tho afterwards indeed ^{c. 17.}
³ *Dion.*
Cass.
Lib. xlv.
we p. 324.

LECT. VII. we generally find this office performed by some relation. In compliance with which custom, as Suetonius relates, Augustus, when but twelve years of age, pronounced a funeral discourse in praise of his grandmother Julia ¹. And Tiberius, when but nine years old, paid the like honor to his deceased father, as the same historian informs us ². And Cicero's invective against Piso, with his second against Mark Antony, may be referred to *demonstrative* discourses, as they respect things that were past, and so could not then be subjects for consultation. For all praise or dispraise must either regard what is past, or present. And generally speaking, persons are most affected by present things. Indeed the encomiums of antient heroes, and their famous actions, are very entertaining, and afford an agreeable pleasure in the recital; but such examples of virtue, as are still in being, or at least yet fresh in memory, have the greatest influence for imitation.

BUT in praising or dispraising *persons*, rhetoricians prescribe two methods. One is, to follow the order, in which every thing happened, that is mentioned in the discourse; the other is, to reduce what is said under certain general heads, without

out a strict regard to the order of LECT.
time. VII.

IN pursuing the former method, the discourse may be very conveniently divided into three periods. The first of which will contain, what preceded the person's birth; the second, the whole course of his life; and the third, what followed upon his death.

UNDER the first of these may be comprehended, what is proper to be said concerning his country or family. And therefore, if these were honorable, it may be said to his advantage, that he no ways disgraced them, but acted suitably to such a descent. But if they were not so, they may be either wholly omitted, or it may be said, that instead of deriving thence any advantage to his character, he has conferred a lasting honor upon them; and that it is not of so much moment where, or from whom a person derives his birth, as how he lives.

IN the second period, which is that of his life, the qualities both of his mind and body, with his circumstances in the world, may be separately considered. Thus Quintilian rightly observes: *All external advantages are not praised for themselves,*

LECT. VII. *selves, but according to the use, that is made*
 of them. For riches, and power, and interest,

¹Inst. erat.
 Lib iii.
 c. 7.

as they have great influence, and may be applied either to good or bad purposes, are a proof of the temper of our minds, and therefore we are either made better, or worse by them ¹. But these things are a just ground for commendation, when they are the reward of virtue, or industry. Bodily indowments are health, strength, beauty, activity, and the like; which are more or less commendable, according as they are employed. And where these, or any of them, are wanting, it may be shewn, that they are abundantly compensated by the more valuable indowments of the mind. Nay sometimes a defect in these may give an advantageous turn to a person's character; for any virtue appears greater, in proportion to the disadvantages the person laboured under in exerting it. But the chief topics of praise are taken from the virtues and qualifications of the mind. And here the orator may consider the disposition, education, learning, and several virtues, which shone thro the whole course of the person's life. In doing which the preference should always be given to virtue above knowledge, or any other accom-

plishment. And in actions, those are most considerable, and will be heard with greatest approbation, which a person either did alone, or first, or wherein he had fewest associates; as likewise those, which exceeded expectation, or were done for the advantage of others, rather than his own. And further, as the last scene of a man's life generally commands the greatest regard, if any thing remarkable at that time was either said or done, it ought particularly to be mentioned. Nor should the manner of his death, or cause of it, if accompanied with any commendable circumstances, be omitted; as if he died in the service of his country, or in the pursuit of any other laudable design.

THE third and last period relates to what followed after the death of the person. And here the public loss, and public honors conferred upon the deceased, are proper to be mentioned. Sepulchers, statues, and other monuments to perpetuate the memory of the dead, at the expence of the public, were in common use both among the Greeks and Romans. But in the earliest times, as these honors were more rare, so they were less costly. For as in one age it was thought a sufficient

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reward for him, who died in the defense of his country, to have his name cut in a marble inscription, with the cause of his death; so in others it was very common to see the statues of gladiators, and persons of the meanest rank, erected in public places. And therefore a judgement is to be formed of these things from the time, custom, and circumstances of different nations; since the frequency of them renders them less honorable, and takes off from their evidence, as the rewards of virtue. But, as Quintilian says: *Children are an honor to their parents, cities to their founders, laws to those who compiled them, arts to their inventors, and useful customs to the authors*

¹ *Inst. orat. of them* ¹.

Lib. iii.

c. 7.

AND this may suffice for the method of praising persons, when we propose to follow the order of time, as Isocrates has done in his *funeral oration* upon Evagoras, king of Salamis, and Pliny in his *panegyric* upon the emperor Trajan. But as this method is very plain and obvious, so it requires the more agreeable dress to render it delightful; lest otherwise it seem rather like an history, than an oration. For which reason we find, that epic poets, as Homer, Virgil, and others, begin with the

the middle of their story, and afterwards take a proper occasion to introduce what preceded, to diversify the subject, and give the greater pleasure and entertainment to their readers.

THE other method above hinted was, to reduce the discourse to certain general heads, without regarding the order of time. As if any one in praising the elder Cato should propose to do it, by shewing, that he was a most prudent senator, an excellent orator, and most valiant general; all which commendations are given him by Pliny ¹. *Hist. Nat. Lib. vii. c. 27.* In like manner the character of a good general may be comprised under four heads, skill in military affairs, courage, authority, and success; from all which Cicero commends Pompey ². And agreeably to this method Suetonius has written the lives of the first twelve Caesars. ² *Pro leg. Manil. c. 11.*

BUT in praising of persons care should always be taken, to say nothing that may seem fictitious, or out of character, which may call the orator's judgement, or integrity in question. It was not without cause therefore, that Lyfippus the statuary, as Plutarch tells us, blamed Apelles for painting Alexander the Great with thunder in his hand; which could never suit his

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character, as a man, however he might boast of his divine descent; for which reason Lyfippus himself made an image of him holding a spear, as the sign of a warrior¹. Light and trivial things in commendations are likewise to be avoided, and nothing mentioned, but what may carry in it the idea of something truly valuable, and which the hearers may be supposed to wish for, and is proper to excite their emulation. These are the principal heads of praise with relation to men. In dispraise, as was hinted before, the heads contrary to these are requisite; which being sufficiently clear from what has been said, need not particularly be insisted on.

¹ De Is. &
Ofir.

I PROCEED therefore to the other part of the division, which respects *things*, as distinguished from *persons*. By which we are to understand all beings inferior to man, whether animate or inanimate; as likewise the habits and dispositions of men, either good or bad, when considered separately, and apart from their subjects, as arts and sciences, virtues and vices; with whatever else may be a proper subject for praise or dispraise. Some writers indeed have for their own amusement, and the diversion of others, displayed their eloquence in a
jocose

jocose manner upon subjects of this kind. So Lucian has written in praise of a *fly*, and Synesius an elegant encomium upon *baldness*. Others, on the contrary, have done the like in a satyrical way. Such is Seneca's *Apotheosis* or consecration of the emperor Claudius; and the *Mysopogon* or beard hater, written by Julian the emperor. Not to mention several modern authors, who have imitated them in such ludicrous compositions. But as to these things, and all of the like nature, the observation of Antony in Cicero seems very just: *That it is not necessary to reduce every subject we discourse upon to rules of art*.

¹ De orat.
Lib. ii.
c. 11.

For many are so trivial, as not to deserve it; and others so plain and evident of themselves, as not to require it. But since it frequently comes in the way both of orators and historians to describe *countries*, *cities*, and *facts*, I shall briefly mention the principal heads of invention, proper to illustrate each of these.

COUNTRIES then may be celebrated from the pleasantness of their situation, the clemency and wholesomeness of the air, and goodness of the soil, to which last may be referred the springs, rivers, woods, plains, mountains, and minerals. And to

CT. VII. all these may be added their extent, cities, the number and antiquity of the inhabitants, their policy, laws, customs, wealth, character for cultivating the arts both of peace and war, their princes, and other eminent men they have produced. Thus Pacatus has given us a very elegant description of Spain, in his *panegyric upon the emperor Theodosius*, who was born there ¹.

CITIES are praised from much the same topics, as countries. And here, whatever contributes either to their defense, or ornament, ought particularly to be mentioned; as the strength of the walls and fortifications, the beauty and splendor of their buildings, whether sacred or civil, public or private. We have in Herodotus a very fine description of Babylon, which was once the strongest, largest, and most regular city in the world ². And Cicero has accurately described the city Syracuse, in the island Sicily, in one of his orations against Verres ³.

BUT *facts* come much oftner under the cognizance of an orator. And these receive their commendation from their honor, justice, or advantage. But in describing them all the circumstances should be related in their proper order, and that in the most lively and affecting manner, suited

² Lib. 1.
c. 178.

³ *Act.* iv.
in Verr.
c. 52.

to their different nature. Livy has re-LECT.
presented the demolition of Alba by the VII.
Roman army, which was sent thither to
destroy it, thro the whole course of that
melancholy scene, in a stile so moving and
pathetic, that one can hardly forbear con-
doling with the inhabitants, upon reading
his account.

BUT in discourses of this kind, whether
of praise or dispraise, the orator should (as
he ought indeed upon all occasions) well
consider where, and to whom he speaks.
For wise men often think very differently
both of persons and things from the com-
mon people. And we find that learned
and judicious men are frequently divided
in their sentiments, from the several ways
of thinking, to which they have been ac-
customed. Besides different opinions pre-
vail, and gain the ascendant, at different
times. While the Romans continued a
free nation, love of their country, liberty,
and a public spirit, were principles in the
highest esteem among them. And there-
fore when Cato killed himself, that he
might not fall into the hands of Caesar,
and survive the liberty of his country, it
was thought an instance of the greatest
heroic virtue; but afterwards, when they
had

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had been accustomed to an arbitrary government, and the spirit of liberty was now lost, the poet Martial could venture to say,

¹ Lib. ii.
ep. 80.

*Death to avoid 'tis madness sure to die*¹.

A prudent orator therefore will be cautious of opposing any settled and prevailing notions of those, to whom he addresses; unless it be necessary, and then he will do it in the softest and most gentle manner.

Now if we look back, and consider the several heads of praise, enumerated under each of the subjects above mentioned; we shall find, they are taken from their nature, properties, circumstances, or some other general topic; as was intimated in the beginning of this discourse.

L E C.

LECTURE VIII.

Of Arguments suited to Deliberative Discourses.

IN my last discourse I began to treat LECT. VIII.
 upon the particular heads of argument, suited to the three kinds of orations, and I went thro those, which properly relate to the *demonstrative* kind. I shall now proceed to give a breif account of such, as more peculiarly respect *deliberative* subjects, in which we either advise to a thing, or dissuade from it. And they are taken from the nature and circumstances of the thing itself under consultation.

THIS kind of discourses must certainly have been very antient, since doubtless from the first beginning of mens conversing together, they deliberated upon their common interest, and offered their advice to each other. But neither those of the *laudatory*, nor *judicial* kind, could have been introduced, till mankind was settled in communities, and found it necessary to encourage virtue by public rewards, and bring vice under the restraint of laws. The early practice of *suasory* discourses
 appears

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appears from sacred writ, where we find, that when Moses was ordered upon an embassy into Egypt, he would have excused himself for want of eloquence ¹. And Homer represents the Greeks at the siege of Troy, as flocking like a swarm of bees to hear their generals harangue them ². Nor is this part of oratory less conspicuous for its usefulness to mankind, than its antiquity; being highly beneficial either in councils, camps, or any societies of men. How many instances have we upon record, where the fury of an enraged multitude has been checked and appeased by the prudent and artful persuasion of some particular person? The story of Agrippa Menenius, when the commons of Rome withdrew from the senators, and retired out of the city, is too well known, to need reciting ³. And how often have armies been animated and fired to the most dangerous exploits, or recalled to their duty, when ready to mutiny, by a moving speech of their general? many instances of which we find in history.

¹ Liv.
Lib. ii.
c. 32.
Flor.
Lib. i. c. 23.

ALL deliberation respects something future, for it is in vain to consult about what is already past. The subject matter of it, are either things public or private, sacred

sacred or civil; indeed all the valuable concerns of mankind, both present and future, come under its regard. And the end proposed by this kind of discourses is chiefly profit or interest. But since nothing is truly profitable, but what is in some respect good; and every thing, which is good in itself, may not in all circumstances be for our advantage; properly speaking, what is both good and profitable, or beneficial good, is the end here designed. And therefore, as it sometimes happens, that what appears profitable, may seem to interfere with that, which is strictly just and honorable; in such cases it is certainly most adviseable to determine on the safer side of honor and justice, notwithstanding some plausible things may be offered to the contrary. But where the dispute lies apparently between what is truly honest, and some external advantage proposed in opposition to it, all good men cannot but agree in favor of honesty. Such was the case of Regulus, who being taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, was permitted to go to Rome upon giving his oath, that unless he could persuade the senate to set at liberty some young Carthaginian noblemen, then prisoners at Rome,

in

LECT. in exchange for him, he should return again
 VIII. to Carthage. But Regulus, when he came
 to Rome, was so far from endeavouring to
 prevail with the senate to comply with the
 desire of the Carthaginians, that he used
 all his interest to dissuade them from
 harkening to the proposal. Nor could the
 most earnest intreaties of his nearest rela-
 tions and friends, nor any arguments they
 were able to offer, engage him to continue
 at Rome, and not return again to Car-
 thage. He had then plainly in his view
 on the one side ease, security, affluence,
 honors, and the enjoyment of his friends;
 and on the other certain death, attended
 with cruel torments. However thinking
 the former not consistent with truth and
 justice, he chose the latter *. And he cer-
 tainly acted, as became an honest and brave
 man, in choosing death, rather than to vio-
 late his oath. Tho whether he did pru-
 dently in persuading the senate not to make
 the exchange, or they in complying with
 him, I shall leave others to determine.
 Now when it proves to be a matter of de-
 bate, whether a thing upon the whole be
 really beneficial or not; as here arise two
 parts, advice and dissuasion, they will each
 require proper heads of argument. But

* Florus,
 Lib. ii.
 c. 2.

as they are contrary to each other, he who is acquainted with one, cannot well be ignorant of the other. For which reason, as in my last discourse, I recited only the topics suited for praise, leaving those for dispraise to be collected from them; so here likewise, I shall chiefly mention those proper for advice, from whence such as are suited to dissuade will easily be perceived. Now the principal heads of this kind are these following, which are taken from the nature and properties of the thing itself under consideration.

AND first, *pleasure* often affords a very cogent argument in discourses of this nature. Every one knows, what an influence this has upon the generality of mankind. Tho, as Quintilian remarks, pleasure ought not of itself to be proposed, as a fit motive for action in serious discourses, but when it is designed to recommend something useful, which is the case here. So would any one advise another to the pursuit of polite literature. Cicero has furnished him with a very strong inducement to it, from the pleasure which attends that study, when he says: *If pleasure only was proposed by these studies, you would think them an entertainment becoming a man of sense,*

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sense, and a gentleman. For other pursuits
 neither agree with all times, all ages, nor
 all places; but these studies improve youth,
 delight old age, adorn prosperity, afford a re-
 fuge and comfort in adversity, divert us at
 home, are no hindrance abroad, sleep, travel,

* *Pro Ar-* and retire with us in the country¹.
chia, c. 7.

A SECOND head is *profit* or advantage,
 which has no less influence upon many
 persons, than the former; and when it
 respects things truly valuable, is a very just
 and laudable motive. Thus Cicero, when
 he sends his *Books of offices* to his son,
 which he wrote in Latin for his use, ad-
 vises him to make the best advantage both
 of his tutor's instructions, and the conver-
 sation at Athens, where he then was; but
 withal to peruse his philosophical treatises,
 which would be doubly useful to him,
 not only upon account of the subjects, but
 likewise of the language, as they would
 enable him to express himself upon those
 arguments in Latin, which before had only
 been treated of in Greek.

THE last head of this kind, which I
 shall mention, is *honor*. And no argument
 will sooner prevail with generous minds,
 or inspire them with greater ardor. Virgil
 has very beautifully described Hector's
 ghost

ghost appearing to Aeneas, the night Troy was taken, and advising him to depart, from this motive of honor. LECT. VIII.

*O goddess-born, escape by timely flight
The flames, and horrors of this fatal night.
The foes already have possess'd the wall,
Troy nods from high, and totters to her fall.
Enough is paid to Priam's royal name;
More than enough to duty, and to fame.
If by a mortal hand my father's throne
Cou'd be defended, 'twas by mine alone.*

The argument here made use of, to persuade Aeneas to leave Troy immediately is, that he had already done all that could be expected from him, either as a good subject, or brave soldier; both for his king, and country; which were sufficient to secure his honor; and now there was nothing more to be expected from him, when the city was falling, and impossible to be saved; which could it have been preserved by human power, he himself had done it.

BUT altho a thing considered in itself appear beneficial, if it could be attained, yet the expediency of undertaking it may still be questionable; in which case the following heads taken from the circumstances, which attend it, will afford proper arguments to ingage in it.

AND first the *possibility* of succeeding may sometimes be argued, as one motive to this end. So Hannibal endeavoured to convince king Antiochus, that it was possible for him to conquer the Romans, if he made Italy the seat of the war; by observing to him, not only that the Gauls had formerly destroyed their city; but that he had himself defeated them, in every battle he fought with them in that country ¹.

¹ Justin,
Lib. xxxi.
c. 5.

BUT the bare possibility of a thing is seldom a sufficient motive to undertake it, unless on very urgent occasions. And therefore an argument founded upon *probability* will be much more likely to prevail. For in many affairs of human life, men are determined either to prosecute them or not, as the prospect of success appears more or less probable. Hence Cicero after the fatal battle at Pharsalia dissuades those of Pompey's party, with whom he was engaged, from continuing the war any longer against Caesar; because it was highly improbable after such a defeat, by which their main strength was broken, that they should be able to stand their ground, or meet with better success, than they had before ².

² Ad fam.
Lib. vii.
ep. 3.

But

BUT further, since probability is not a motive strong enough with many persons to engage in the prosecution of a thing, which is attended with considerable difficulties, it is often necessary to represent the *facility* of doing it, as a further reason to induce them to it. And therefore Cicero makes use of this argument to encourage the Roman citizens in opposing Mark Antony (who upon the death of Caesar had assumed an arbitrary power) by representing to them, that his circumstances were then desperate, and that he might easily be vanquished ¹.

¹ *Philipp.*
iv. c. 5.

AGAIN, if the thing advised to can be shewn to be in any respect *necessary*, this will render the motive still much stronger for undertaking it. And therefore Cicero joins this argument with the former, to prevail with the Roman citizens to oppose Antony, by telling them, that, *The consideration before them was not in what circumstances they should live; but whether they should live at all, or die with ignominy and disgrace* ². This way of reasoning will sometimes prevail, when all others prove ineffectual. For some persons are not to be moved, till things are brought to an

² *Ibidem.*

extremity, and they find themselves reduced to the utmost danger.

To these heads may be added the consideration of the *event*, which in some cases carries great weight with it. As when we advise to the doing of a thing from this motive, that whether it succeeds or not, it will yet be of service to undertake it. So after the great victory gained by Themistocles over the Persian fleet, at the streights of Salamis, Mardonius advised Xerxes to return into Asia himself, lest the report of his defeat should occasion an insurrection in his absence; but to leave behind him an army of three hundred thousand men under his command; with which, if he should conquer Greece, the chief glory of the conquest would redound to Xerxes; but if the design miscarried, the disgrace would fall upon his generals¹.

¹ Justin.
Lib. ii.
c. 13.

THESE are the principal heads, which furnish the orator with proper arguments in giving advice. Cicero in his oration for the Manilian law, where he endeavours to persuade the Roman people to choose Pompey for their general in the Mithridatic war, reasons from three of these topics, into which he divides his whole discourse;

course; namely, the necessity of the war, the greatness of it, and the choice of a proper general. Under the first of these he shews, that the war was necessary from four considerations; the honor of the Roman state, the safety of their allies, their own revenues, and the fortunes of many of their fellow citizens, which were all highly concerned in it, and called upon them to put a stop to the growing power of king Mithridates, by which they were all greatly indangered. So that this argument is taken from the head of *necessity*. The second, in which he treats of the greatness of the war, is founded upon the topic of *possibility*. For tho he shews the power of Mithridates to be very great, yet not so formidable, but that he might be subdued; as was evident from the many advantages, Lucullus had gained over him and his associates. In the third head he endeavours to prevail with them to intrust the management of the war in the hands of Pompey, whom he describes as a consummate general, for his skill in military affairs, courage, authority, and success, in all which qualities he represents him as superior to any other of their generals, whom they could at that time make choice

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of. The design of all which was to persuade them, they might have very good reason to hope for success, and a happy event of the war, under his conduct. So that the whole force of his reasoning under this head is drawn from *probability*. These are the three general topics, which make up that fine discourse. Each of which is indeed supported by diverse other arguments and considerations, which will be obvious in perusing the oration itself, and therefore need not be here enumerated. On the contrary, in another oration he endeavours to dissuade the senate from consenting to a peace with Mark Antony, because it was base, dangerous, and impracticable¹.

¹ *Philipp.*
vii. c. 3.

BUT no small skill and address are required in giving advice. For since the tempers and sentiments of mankind, as well as their circumstances, are very different and various; it is often necessary to accommodate the discourse to their inclinations and opinions of things. And therefore the weightiest arguments are not always the most proper, and fittest to be used on all occasions. Cicero, who was an admirable master of this art, and knew perfectly well how to suit what he said to the

taste

taste and relish of his hearers, in treating upon this subject, distinguishes mankind into two sorts; the ignorant and unpolished, who always prefer profit to honor; and such as are more civilized and polite, who prefer honor and reputation to all other things¹. Wherefore they are to be moved by these different views, praise, glory, and virtue influence the one; while the other is only to be engaged by a prospect of gain, and pleasure. Besides it is plain, that the generality of mankind are much more inclined to avoid evils, than to pursue what is good; and to keep clear of scandal and disgrace, than to practise what is truly generous and noble. Persons likewise of a different age act from different principles; young men for the most part view things in another light, from those who are older, and have had more experience, and consequently are not to be influenced from the same motives. Every nation also has its particular customs, manners, and polity, which give a different turn to the genius of the inhabitants. Hence we find in history, that what was commendable in one country, was a disgrace in another. For which reason, Cornelius Nepos, in writing the life of that

¹ Orat.
Partit.
c. 25, &c.

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excellent Theban general, Epaminondas,
introduces his account of him by saying:

I must caution my readers, not to judge of foreign customs by their own; nor to think, that such things as are disregarded by them, were equally condemned by others. For we know that music with us is unbecoming the character of a gentleman, and dancing is looked upon as a vice; but these things are approved, and in great esteem among the Greeks. And therefore when Cato, by way of reproach, had called Muraena a dancer; Cicero questions the fact, as highly improbable; since, as he says: No sober man would dance even at a modest entertain-

† *Pro Muraena* c. 6.

I mention this to shew, how requisite it is many times to guard against common prejudices, and to suit our discourse to the sentiments of those, to whom we address. And this can never be more necessary, than in giving advice. The speech of Alexander, made to his soldiers before he engaged the Persians, as we have it in Curtius, is finely wrought up in this respect. For as his army was composed of different nations, the parts of his discourse are admirably well suited to their several views in prosecuting the war. He reminds his countrymen, the Macedonians,

of their former victories in Europe; and tells them, that Persia is not to be the boundary of their conquests, but they are to extend them farther than either Hercules or Bacchus had done: that Bactra and the Indies would be theirs, and that what they saw, was but a small part of what they were to possess: that neither the rocks of Illyrium, nor the mountains of Thrace, but the spoils of the whole east were now before them: that the conquest would be so easy, they would scarce have occasion to draw their swords, but they might push the enemy with their bucklers. Then he reminds them of their subduing the Athenians under his father Philip, and the late conquest of Boeotia, the victory at the river Granicus, and the many cities and countries now behind them, and under their subjection. When he addresses to the Greeks, he tells them, they are now going to engage with those, who had been the enemies of their country, first by the insolence of Darius, and afterwards of Xerxes, who would have deprived them even of the necessaries of life, who destroyed their temples, demolished their towns, and violated both their sacred and civil rights. And then directing his discourse

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course to the Illyrians and Thracians, who were accustomed to live by plunder, he encourages them with the prospect of booty, from the rich armour and furniture of the Persians, which they might be masters of with the greatest ease: and tells them, they would now exchange their barren mountains and snowy hills, for the fertile country and feilds of Persia¹.

¹ Lib. iii.
c. 10.

It seems unnecessary to add more examples for the illustration of that, which so frequently occurs in all good writers, who give us any discourses of this nature. And therefore I shall only observe further, that not only matters of advice and exhortation, but likewise all consolatory and petitory speeches, come under this head of *discourses*. Besides we often find those things intermixed, which relate to the *laudatory* kind; as in Cicero's oration for the Manilian law, a considerable part of it is employed in the praise of Pompey. But his view in that was only to induce his hearers, to choose him for their general, and a discourse ought to receive its name from the principal design of the speaker.

L E C-

LECTURE IX.

Of Arguments suited to Judicial Discourses.

I COME now to consider the arguments, LECT. IX.
proper for the third and last sort of
discourses, which relates to *judicial* affairs.

And in these both the Grecian and Roman youth, who were desirous to gain a reputation for eloquence, used commonly to give the first proofs of their genius and ability. The first of Cicero's orations now extant, is his defence of Publius Quintius, which he spoke in the twenty sixth year of his age ¹. *Deliberative* discourses were

not made before a judge, but in larger assemblies, either of the body of the Roman citizens, or the senate. And as they generally related to affairs of great importance, and such as respected the state; they required some authority in the speaker, which he had gained by former proofs of his ability and judgement. The bar therefore (as we call it) was commonly the place, where young orators used first in public to exercise and try their genius. And they took care in a particular manner to prepare themselves for this, by declaiming

*Euseb.
in Chron.
See also
Cic. De
clar. orat.
c. 90, &c.*

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claiming before hand either in the schools,
or under the instruction of some skilful
person in private. Nor did the greatest
persons at Rome think it beneath them

¹ Cic, *De* to assist young gentlemen in this design ¹.

clar. orat.
c. 89.

Now in *judicial* controversies there are
two parties, the plaintiff or prosecutor, and
the defendant or person charged. The sub-
ject of them is always something past.

And the end proposed by them Cicero
calls *equity*, or *right and equity* ²; the for-
mer of which arises from the laws of the

c. 31, 38.

Orat. Par-
tit. c. 37.

country, and the latter from reason and
the nature of things. For at Rome the
praetors had a court of equity, and were
impowered, in many cases relating to pro-
perty, to relax the rigor of the written laws.
But as this subject is very copious, and
causes may arise from a great variety of
things, writers have reduced them to three
heads, which they call *States*, to some one
of which all *judicial* proceedings may be re-
ferred; namely, *whether a thing is, what it*
is, or how it is. By the *State* of a cause
therefore is meant the principal question
in dispute, upon which the whole affair
depends. Which if it stops in the first
enquiry, and the defendant denies the fact,
the *State* is called *conjectural*; but if the
fact

fact be acknowledged, and yet denied to LECT.
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 be what the adversary calls it, it is termed *definitive*; but if there is no dispute either about the fact, or its name, but only the justice of it, it is called the *State of quality*: as was shewn more largely before in a former lecture¹. But I then considered ¹ See
Lect. VI.
 these *States* only in a general view, and deferred the particular heads of argument, proper for each of them, to this *judicial* kind of discourses; where they most frequently occur, and from which examples may easily be accommodated to other subjects. And this is what I am now particularly to treat of.

ALL *judicial* causes are either *private* or *public*. They are called *private*, which relate to the right of particular persons; and they are likewise called *civil* causes, as they are conversant about matters of property. *Public* causes are those, which relate to public justice, and the government of the state; which are also called *criminal*, because by them crimes are prosecuted, whether capital, or those of a less heinous nature. I shall take the heads of the arguments only from this latter kind, because they are more copious, and easy to be illustrated by examples; from which
 such

LECT. such as agree to the former, namely *civil*
 IX. causes, will sufficiently appear.

AND I shall begin with the *conjectural* state, which comes first in the order of inquiry. When therefore the accused person denies the fact, there are three things, which the prosecutor has to consider: Whether he *would* have done it, whether he *could*, and whether he *did* it ¹. And hence arise three topics; from the *Will*, the *Power*, and the *Signs*, or circumstances, which attended the action. The affections of the mind discover the *Will*; as, passion, an old grudge, a desire of revenge, a resentment of an injury, and the like. Therefore Cicero argues from Clodius's hatred of Milo, that he designed his death, and from thence infers, that he was the aggressor in the combat between them, where-
¹ Quint. *Inst orat.* Lib. vii. c. 2. in Clodius was killed ². This is what he principally endeavours to prove, and comes properly under this *State*: for Milo owned that he killed him, but alleged that he did it in his own defence. So that in regard to this point, which of them assaulted the other, the charge was mutual. The prospect of advantage may also be alleged to the same purpose. Hence it is said of L. Cassius, that whenever he sat as judge
 in

² *Pro Milon.* c. 13.

in a case of murder, he used to advise and move the court, to examine, to whom the advantage arose from the death of the deceased ¹. And Cicero puts this to Antony concerning the death of Caesar. *If any one, sais he, should bring you upon trial, and use that saying of Cassius, cui bono, who got by it, look to it, I beseech you, that you are not confounded* ². To these arguments may be added, hope of impunity, taken either from the circumstances of the accused person, or of him who suffered the injury. For persons, who have the advantage of interest, freinds, power, or money, are apt to think they may easily escape; as likewise such, who have formerly committed other crimes with impunity. Thus Cicero represents Clodius as hardened in vice, and above all the restraint of laws, from having so often escaped punishment upon committing the highest crimes ³. On the contrary, such a confidence is sometimes raised from the condition of the injured party, if he is indigent, obscure, timorous, or destitute of freinds; much more if he has an ill reputation, or is loaded with popular hatred and resentmer. It was this presumption of the obscurity of Roscius, who lived in

the

¹ Ascon.
ad Cicer.
orat. pro
Milon.
See also
Cic. pro
Rosci.
Amer.
c. 30.

² Philipp.
ii. c. 14.
Et pro
Milon.
c. 12.

³ Pro Mil.
c. 14.

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the country, and his want of interest at Rome, which encouraged his accusers to charge him with killing his father, as Cicero shews in his defense of him ¹. Lastly, the temper of a person, his views, and manner of life, are considerations of great moment in this matter. For persons of bad morals, and such who are addicted to vice, are easily thought capable of committing any wickedness. Hence Sallust argues from the evil disposition, and vitious life of Catiline, that he affected to raise himself upon the ruins of his country ².

¹ *In per-orat.*² *Bell. Cat.*
c. 5.

The second head is the *power* of doing a thing; and there are three things which relate to this, the *place*, the *time*, and *opportunity*. As if a crime is said to have been committed in a private place, where no other person was present; or in the night; or when the injured person was unable to provide for his defence. Under this head may likewise be brought in the circumstances of the persons; as if the accused person was stronger, and so able to overpower the other; or more active, and so could easily make his escape. Cicero makes great use of this topic in the case of Milo, and shews, that Clodius had all the advantages of *place*, *time*, and *opportunity*

to

to execute his design of killing him ¹. LECT. IX.

The third head are the *Signs* and circumstances, which either preceded, accompa-

¹ *Pro Milon. c. 19.*

nied, or followed the commission of the fact. So threats, or the accused person being seen at or near the place before the fact was committed, are circumstances that may probably precede murder; fighting, crying out, bloodshed, are such as accompany it; paleness, trembling, inconsistent answers, hesitation or faltering of the speech, something found upon the person accused, which belonged to the deceased, are such as follow. Thus Cicero proves, that Clodius had threatened the death of Milo, and given out that he should not live above three days at the farthest. These arguments, taken from conjectures, are called *presumptions*, which, tho they do not directly prove, that the accused person committed the fact, with which he is charged; yet, when being laid together they appeared very strong, sentence by the Roman law might sometimes be given upon them ² *L. ult. de probation.* to convict him.

THESE are the topics, from which the prosecutor takes his arguments. Now the business of the defendant is to invalidate these. Therefore such as are brought from

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the *Will*, he either endeavours to shew are not true, or so weak as to merit very little regard. And he refutes those taken from the *Power*, by proving, that he wanted either opportunity, or ability: as, if he can shew, that neither the place nor time insisted on was at all proper; or that he was then in another place. In like manner he will endeavour to confute the *Circumstances*, if they cannot directly be denied, by shewing that they are not such, as do necessarily accompany the fact, but might have proceeded from other causes, tho nothing of what is alleged had been committed; and it will be of great service to assign some other probable cause. But sometimes the defendant does not only deny, that he did the fact, but charges it upon another. Thus Cicero in his oration for Roscius, not only defends him from each of these three heads, but likewise charges the fact upon his ac-

¹ Cap. 28. cusers ¹.

I COME now to the *definitive* state, which is principally concerned in defining and fixing the name proper to the fact. Tho orators seldom make use of exact definitions, but commonly choose larger descriptions, taken from various properties of the subject, or thing described.

THE

THE heads of argument in this State are much the same to both parties. For each of them defines the fact his own way, and endeavours to refute the other's definition. We may illustrate this by an example from Quintilian: *A person is accused of sacrilege, for stealing money out of a temple, which belonged to a private person*¹. The fact is owned, but the question is, *Whether it be properly sacrilege?* The prosecutor calls it so, because it was taken out of a temple. But since the money belonged to a private person, the defendant denies it to be sacrilege, and sais it is only simple theft. Now the reason why the defendant uses this plea, and insists upon the distinction, is, because by the Roman law the penalty of theft was only four times the value of what was stolen; whereas sacrilege was punished with death². The prosecutor then forms his definition agreeable to his charge, and sais: *To steal any thing out of a sacred place is sacrilege*. But the defendant excepts against this definition, as defective; and urges, that it does not amount to sacrilege, unless the thing stolen was likewise sacred. And this case might once perhaps have been a matter of controversy, since we find it expressly

See
Lect. VI.
p. 81.

² Inst. §. 5.
de oblig.
quae ex de-
licto. L. 9.
ff. ad legem
Jul. pecu-
lat. &c.

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determined in the Pandects, that, *An action of sacrilege should not lie, but only of theft, against any one, who should steal the goods of*

¹ L. 5. ff. *private persons deposited in a temple* ¹.

ad leg. Jul.
pecul. &c.

THE second thing is the proof brought by each party to support his definition, as in the example given us by Cicero, of one, who carried his cause by bribery, and was afterwards prosecuted again upon an action of prevarication ². Now if the defendant

² Orat.
Partit.
c. 36.

³ L. ult. ff.
de prae-
var.

was cast upon this action, he was by the Roman law subjected to the penalty of the former prosecution ³. Here the prosecutor defines prevarication to be, *any bribery or corruption in the defendant, with a design to pervert justice*. The defendant therefore, on the other hand, restrains it to, *bribing only the prosecutor*.

AND if this latter sense agree better with the common acceptation of the word, the prosecutor in the third place pleads the intention of the law, which was to comprehend all bribery in judicial matters under the term of prevarication. In answer to which the defendant endeavours to shew, either from the head of contraries, that a real prosecutor and a prevaricator are used as opposite terms in the law; or from the etymology of the word, that a prevaricator denotes

denotes one, who pretends to appear in the prosecution of a cause, while in reality he favors the contrary side¹; and consequently, that money given for this end, only can, in the sense of the law, be called prevarication.

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Cic.
Orat. Part.
c. 36. L. 1.
princ. ff. de
prævar.

LASTLY, the prosecutor pleads, it is unreasonable, that he, who does not deny the fact, should escape by a cavil about a word. But the defendant insists upon his explication, as agreeable to the law, and says, the fact is misrepresented and blackened, by affixing to it a wrong name.

THE third state is that of *quality*, in which the dispute turns upon the justice of an action. And here the defendant does not deny he did the thing, he is charged with; but asserts it to be right and equitable, from the circumstances of the case, and the motives which induced him to it.

AND first, he sometimes alleges, the reason of doing it was in order to prevent some other thing of worse consequence, which would otherwise have happened. We have an instance of this in the life of Epaminondas, who, with two other generals, joined in the command with him, marched the Theban army into Pelopon-

nefus against the Lacedaemonians ; but by the influence of a contrary faction at home, their commissions were superseded, and other generals sent to command the army. But Epaminondas being sensible, that if he obeyed this order at that time, it would be attended with the loss of the whole army, and consequently the ruin of the state, refused to do it; and having persuaded the other generals to do the like, they happily finished the war, in which they were engaged; and upon their return home, Epaminondas, taking the whole matter upon himself, on his trial was acquitted¹. The arguments proper in this case are taken from the justice, usefulness, or necessity of the action. The accuser therefore will plead, that the fact was not just, profitable, nor necessary, considered either in itself, or comparatively with that, for the sake of which it is said to have been done. And he will endeavour to shew, that what the defendant assigns, for the reason of what he did, might not have happened, as he pretends. Besides, he will represent of what ill consequence it must be, if such crimes go unpunished. The defendant, on the other hand, will argue from the same heads, and endeavour to prove

¹ Nepos
in vit. 7.

prove the fact was just, useful, or necessary. And he will further urge, that no just estimate can be made of any action, but from the circumstances which attend it; as the design, occasion, and motives for doing it; which he will represent in the most favorable light to his own cause, and endeavour to set them in such a view, as to induce others to think, they could not but have done the same, in the like circumstances.

AGAIN, the cause of an action is sometimes charged by the defendant upon the party, who received the damage, or some other person, who either made it necessary, or enjoined him to do it. The first of these was Milo's plea for killing Clodius, because he assaulted him, with a design to take away his life. Here the fact is not denied, as in the case of Roscius, above mentioned, under the *conjectural* state; but justified from the reason of doing it. For that an assassinator might justly be killed, Cicero shews both from law and reason ^{1. 1} Cap. 4. The accuser therefore in such a case will, if there be room for it, deny the truth of this allegation. So the friends of Clodius affirmed, that Milo was the aggressor, and not Clodius; which Cicero in his defense

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of Milo principally labours to refute. In the second case the prosecutor will say, no one ought to offend, because another has offended first; which defeats the course of public justice, renders the laws useless, and destroys the authority of the magistrate. The defendant, on the other hand, will endeavour to represent the danger and necessity of the case, which required an immediate remedy, and in that manner; and urges, that it was vain and impracticable to wait for redress in the ordinary way, and therefore no ill consequence can arise to the public. Thus Cicero in defending Sextius, who was prosecuted for a riot, in bringing armed men into the forum, shews that his design was only to repel force with force; which was then necessary, there being no other means left for the people to assemble, who were excluded by a mob of the contrary party¹. Of the third case we have also an example in Cicero, who tells us, that, *in making a league between the Romans and Samnites, a certain young nobleman was ordered by the Roman general to hold the swine (designed for a sacrifice); but the senate afterwards disapproving the terms, and delivering up their general to the Samnites, it was moved, whether this young*

man

¹ Cap. 35.

man ought not likewise to be given up¹. LECT. IX.

Those, who were for it, might say; that to allege the command of another is not a sufficient plea for doing an ill action.

¹ De Invent.

Lib. ii.

c. 30.

And this is what the Roman law now expressly declares². But in answer to that it might be replied; that it was his duty to obey the command of his general, who

² L. 1.

§. 13. ff.

de vi et vi armat.

was answerable for his own orders, and not those, who were obliged to execute them; and therefore to give up this young nobleman, would be to punish one person for the fault of another.

LASTLY, a fact is sometimes rather excused, than defended, by pleading that it was not done designedly, or with any ill intent. This is called *concession*, and contains two parts, *apology* and *intreaty*. The former represents the matter as the effect of inadvertency, chance, or necessity. Aristotle gives us an example of inadvertency or imprudence in a woman at Athens, who gave a young man a love potion, which killed him; for which she was tried, but acquitted³. Tho afterwards this was made criminal by the Roman law⁴. The case of Adrastus, as related by Herodotus, is an instance of chance; who being intrusted by Craesus with the care of his son, as they

³ Mag. Moral.

Lib. i.

c. 17.

⁴ L. 38.

§. 5. ff. de poenis.

LECT.
IX.¹ Lib. i.
c. 43.² Philipp. i.
c. 5.

they were hunting, killed him accidentally with a javelin, which he threw at a boar ¹. It is necessity, when a person excuses his making a default, from stress of weather, sickness, or the like. Thus Cicero pleaded his illness, contracted by the fatigue of a long journey, as an excuse for not appearing in the senate upon the summons of Mark Antony; who threatened to oblige him to it by pulling his house down ². But what the defendant here attributes to inadvertency, chance, or necessity, the opposite party will attribute to design, negligence, or some other culpable reason; and represent it as a matter injurious to the public, to introduce such precedents; and also produce instances, if that can be done, where the like excuses have not been admitted. On the other hand, the defendant will insist on his innocence, and shew the hardship and severity of judging mens actions rather by the event, than from the intention: that such a procedure makes no difference between the innocent and the guilty; but must necessarily involve many honest men in ruin and destruction, discourage all virtuous and generous designs, and turn greatly to the prejudice of human society. He will also consider the instances

alleged by the accuser, and shew the difference between them and his own case. LECT. IX.

And lastly, he will have recourse to intreaty, or a submissive address to the equity and clemency of the court, or party offended, for pardon; as Cicero has done in his oration to Caesar, in favor of Ligarius.

THESE instances are sufficient to shew the nature of the arguments suited, to judicial discourses, which are deduced from a variety of the general topics.

LECTURE X.

Of the Character and Address of an Orator.

LECT.
X.

HAVING in several discourses considered and explained the first part of invention, which furnishes the orator with such arguments, as are necessary for the proof of his subject; I am next to shew what are the proper means to conciliate the minds of his hearers, to gain their affection, and to recommend both himself, and what he says to their good opinion and esteem. For the parts of invention are commonly thus distinguished; that the first respects the *subject* of the discourse, the second the *speaker*, and the third the *hearers*. Now the second of these, which is what I am at present to explain, is by Quintilian called, a *propriety of manners*. And in order to express this, it is necessary, as he tells us, *that every thing appear easy and natural, and the disposition of the speaker be discovered by his words*¹. We may form an easy conception of this from the conduct of such persons, who are most nearly concerned in each others welfare. As when

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. vi.
c. 2.

relations or freinds converse together upon any affairs of importance, the temper and disposition of the speaker plainly shews itself by his words and manner of address. And what nature here directs to without colouring or disguise, the orator is to endeavour to perform by his art. Tho indeed, if what a person sais, be inconsistent with his usual conduct and behaviour at other times ; he cannot expect it should gain much credit, or make any deep impression upon his hearers. Which may be one reason, why the antient rhetoricians make it so necessary a qualification in an orator, that he be a good man ; since he should always be consistent with himself, and, as we say, talk in character. And therefore it is highly requisite, that he should not only gain the skill of assuming those qualities, which the nature and circumstances of his discourse require him to express ; but likewise, that he should use his utmost endeavours to get the real habits implanted in his mind. For as by this means they will be always expressed with greater ease and facility ; so by appearing constantly in the course of his life, they will have more weight and influence upon particular occasions.

Now

LECT.
X.

Now there are four qualities, more especially suited to the character of an orator, which should always appear in his discourses, in order to render what he says acceptable to his hearers; and these are, *Wisdom, Integrity, Benevolence, and Modesty.*

WISDOM is necessary, because we easily give into those, whom we esteem wiser and more knowing than ourselves. Knowledge is very agreeable and pleasant to all, but few make very great improvements in it, either by reason they are employed in other necessary affairs, and the mind of man cannot attend to many things at once; or because the way to knowledge at first is hard and difficult, so that persons either do not care to enter upon the pursuit of it, or if they do, they are many times soon discouraged, and drop it, for want of sufficient resolution to surmount its difficulties. Such therefore, who either cannot, or do not care to give themselves the trouble of examining into things themselves, must take up with the representation of others; and it is an ease to them to hear the opinion of persons, whom they esteem wiser than themselves. No one loves to be deceived, and such who are fearful of being misled, are pleased to meet with a person, in whose wisdom,

wisdom, as they think, they can safely trust. The character of wisdom therefore is of great service to an orator, since the greater part of mankind are swayed by authority, rather than arguments.

BUT this of itself is not sufficient, unless the opinion of *Integrity* be joined with it. Nay, so far from it, that the greater knowledge and understanding a man is supposed to have, unless he likewise have the character of an honest man, he is often the more suspected. For knowledge without honesty is generally thought to dispose a person, as well as qualify him, to deceive. Quintilian, in treating upon *Narration*, has a very remarkable passage to this purpose, which I shall here transcribe. *I must not omit, saith he, how much the authority of the speaker gives credit to what he relates, which is to be gained principally by his life, and partly from his manner of speaking. For the more grave and honest this appears to be, what he affirms must necessarily carry with it the greater weight. In this part therefore especially all suspicion of design is to be avoided, that nothing seem counterfeit, nothing feigned; but all things to flow rather from the nature of the subject, than the art of the speaker. But this we cannot away with,*

LECT. with, who think our art lost, if it does not
 X. appear; whereas it ceases to be art, when it
 does appear¹. And what Quintilian ob-
 serves here with respect to *Narration*, the
 best writers all recommend as necessary
 thro the whole conduct of an orator.

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. iv.
c. 2.

AND to both these qualities the appearance of kindness and *Benevolence* should likewise be added. For tho a person have the reputation of wisdom and honesty, yet if we apprehend, he is either not well affected to us, or at least regardless of our interest, we are in many cases apt to be jealous of him. Mankind are naturally swayed by their affections, and much influenced thro love or freindship; and therefore nothing has a greater tendency to induce persons to credit what is said, than intimations of affection and kindness. Freinds are mutually concerned for each other's interest; and for that reason we readily harken to those, who, we think, wish us well, because we are persuaded they speak sincerely. Indeed, in some cases, our interest may happen to be the same with his, who, we may apprehend, in other respects has no great regard for us; and then we may beleive he will do that for his own sake, which he would not have done

done for ours. For nothing more closely unites men to one another, than common interest. The best orators have been always sensible, what great influence the expressions of kindness and benevolence have upon the minds of others, to induce them to believe the truth of what they say; and therefore they frequently endeavour to impress them with the opinion of it. Thus Demosthenes begins his celebrated oration for Ctesiphon. *It is my hearty prayer, saith he, to all the deities, that this my defence may be received by you with the same affection, which I have always expressed for you, and your city.* And it is a very fine image of it, which we have in Cicero, where, in order to influence the judges in favor of Milo, he introduces him speaking thus, as became a brave man, and a patriot, even upon the supposition he should be condemned by them: *I bid my fellow citizens adieu; may they continue flourishing and prosperous; may this famous city be preserved, my most dear country, however it has treated me; may my fellow citizens enjoy peace and tranquillity without me, since I am not to enjoy it with them, tho I have procured it for them; I will withdraw, I will be gone*¹.

¹ Pro Milon. c. 34.

THE fourth and last *quality* above mentioned, as necessary to the character of an orator, is *Modesty*. And it is certain, that what is modestly spoken, is generally better received, than what carries in it an air of boldness and confidence. Most persons, tho ignorant of a thing, do not care to be thought so, and would have some deference paid to their understanding. But he who delivers himself in an arrogant and assuming way, seems to upbraid his hearers with ignorance, while he does not leave them to judge for themselves, but dictates to them, and as it were demands their assent, to what he says; which is certainly a very improper method to win upon them. For not a few, when convinced of an error in such a way, will not own it; but will rather adhere to their former opinion, than seem forced to think right, when it gives another the opportunity of a triumph. For, as Quintilian rightly observes: *The mind of man has naturally something in it that is sublime, haughty, and impatient of a superior. And therefore men readily help and assist the conquered, and such who submit; because in that they act as superiors: for when emulation ceases, humanity takes place. But he who extols himself, above what he ought, is*
looked

looked upon to depress and despise others, and not so much to raise himself, as lessen them; LECT. X.

which excites envy¹. A prudent orator¹ therefore will behave himself with modesty, that he may not seem to insult his hearers; and will set things before them in such an ingaging manner, as may remove all prejudice, either from his person, or what he asserts. But at the same time, firmness and resolution is as necessary as modesty, that he may appear to confide in the justice and truth of his cause. For to speak timorously, and with hesitation, destroys the credit of what is offered; and so far as the speaker seems to distrust, what he says himself, he often induces others to do the like. ¹ Inst. orat. Lib. ii. c. 2.

BUT, as has been said already, great care is to be taken, that these characters do not appear feigned and counterfeit. For what is fictitious, can seldom be long concealed. And if this be once discovered, it makes all that is said suspected, how specious soever it may otherwise appear. This is very handsomly expressed by Virgil, where he introduces Juno thus speaking to Venus, and pretending a reconciliation with Aeneas:

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But shall celestial discord never cease?

'Tis better ended in a lasting peace.

You stand possess'd of all your soul desir'd,

Poor Dido with consuming love is fir'd;

Your Trojan with my Tyrian let us join,

So Dido shall be yours, Aeneas mine,

One common kingdom, one united line.

Eliza shall a Dardan lord obey,

And lofty Carthage for a dow'r convey¹.

¹ *Aen.*
Lib iv.
v. 98.

What could appear more fair and advantageous, than this proposal? But yet it would not take. Venus does not credit it, because she perceives the fraud, and, as the poet adds,

closely smiles

At her vain project, and discover'd wiles.

If men always loved truth for its own excellency, it would be sufficient to propose it clearly and plainly; nor would the assistance of art be necessary, in order to induce them to embrace it. But it frequently happens, that truth clashes with what men account their interest, and for that reason they will not regard it. An ungrateful truth will either not be heard, or soon discarded. And many times, where persons cannot contradict, what is offered; yet, if that contradict their settled opinions, they will still suppose it may not be

be true. Nor is it a difficult thing for persons to bring themselves to such a belief, while they forbear calmly and seriously to consider the arguments offered on the other side. And since matters are thus, it is often necessary for the orator to have recourse to art, in order to obtain that, which otherwise he cannot come at. For this purpose therefore, it is very serviceable to accommodate his discourse to the temper and inclination of his audience, that while they willingly attend to what is pleasing and agreeable to them, they may at the same time likewise be induced to entertain those things, which, proposed in another manner, would have been less attended to, or heard with prejudice. As physicians sometimes gild over bitter pills, to please the palate, and by that means benefit the patient. And for this end, it is further necessary, that the orator should know the world, and be well acquainted with the different tempers and dispositions of mankind. Nor indeed can any one reasonably hope to succeed in this province, without well considering the circumstances of time and place, with the sentiments and dispositions of those, to whom he speaks; which, according to Aristotle,

LECT. X. may be distinguished four ways, as they discover themselves by the several *affections, habits, ages, and fortunes* of mankind¹. And each of these require a different conduct and manner of address.

¹ De rhetor. Lib. ii. c. 14, &c.

THE *affections* denote certain emotions of the mind, which, during their continuance, give a great turn to the disposition. For love prompts to one thing, and hatred to another. The like may be said of anger, lenity, and the rest of them; as I shall shew, when I come to treat of them particularly².

² See Lect. XI.

PERSONS differ likewise according to the various *habits* of their mind. So a just man is inclined one way, and an unjust man another; a temperate man to this, and an intemperate man to the contrary.

AND as to the several *ages* of men, Aristotle has described them very accurately, and how persons are differently affected in each of them. I shall content myself with the substance of what he says, to prevent being tedious. He divides the lives of men, considered as hearers, into three stages; youth, middle age, and old age. Young men, he says, have generally strong passions, and are very eager to obtain, what they desire; but are likewise

very

very mutable, so that the same thing does not please them long. They are ambitious of praise, and quick in their resentments. Lavish of their money, as not having experienced the want of it. Frank and open, because they have not often been deceived; and credulous for the same reason. They readily hope the best, because they have not suffered much, and are therefore not so sensible of the uncertainty of human affairs; for which reason they are likewise more easily deceived. They are modest from their little acquaintance with the world. They love company and chearfulness, from the briskness of their spirits; and think well of their freinds. They imagine they know more than they do, and for that reason, are apt to be too positive. In a word, they generally excede in what they do, love violently, hate violently, and act in the same manner thro the rest of their conduct. The disposition of old men is generally contrary to the former. They are cautious, and enter upon nothing hastily; having in the course of many years been often imposed upon, having often erred, and experienced the prevailing corruption of human affairs; for which reason they are likewise

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suspicious, and moderate in their affections, either of love or hatred. They pursue nothing great and noble, and regard only the necessaries of life. They love money, having learnt by experience the difficulty of getting it, and how easily it is lost. They are fearful, which makes them provident. Commonly full of complaints from bodily infirmities, and a deficiency of spirits. Please themselves rather with the memory of what is past, than any future prospect, having so short a view of life before them, in comparison of what is already gone; for which reason also they love to talk of things past, and prefer them to what is present, of which they have but little relish, and know they must shortly leave them. They are soon angry, but not to excess. Lastly, they are compassionate, from a sense of their own infirmities, which makes them think themselves of all persons most exposed. Persons of a middle age, betwixt these two extremes, as they are freed from the rashness and temerity of youth, so they have not yet suffered the decays of old age. Hence in every thing they generally observe a better conduct. They are neither so hasty in their assent as the one, nor so minutely scrupulous as the other,

other, but weigh the reasons of things. LECT.

X.

They regard a decency in their actions, are careful and industrious; and as they undertake what appears just and laudable upon better and more deliberate consideration, than young persons; so they pursue them with more vigor and resolution, than those who are older.

As to the different *fortunes* of mankind, they may be considered as noble, rich, or powerful; and the contrary to these. Those of high birth, and noble extraction, are generally very tender of their honor, and ambitious to increase it; it being natural for all persons to desire an addition to those advantages, of which they find themselves already possessed. And they are apt to consider all others as much their inferiors, and therefore expect great regard and deference should be shewn them. Riches, when accompanied with a generous temper, command respect from the opportunities they give of being useful to others; but they usually elate the mind, and occasion pride. For as money is commonly said to command all things, those, who are possessed of a large share of it, expect others should be at their beck; since they enjoy that, which all desire, and most persons
make

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X.

make the main pursuit of their lives to obtain. But nothing is more apt to swell the mind, than power. This is what all men naturally covet, even when perhaps they would not use it. But the views of such persons are generally more noble and generous, than of those, who only pursue riches, and the heaping up of money. A state contrary to these gives a contrary turn of mind, and in lower life, persons dispositions usually differ according to their station and circumstances. A citizen and a courtier, a merchant and a foldier, a scholar and a peasant, as their pursuits are different, so is generally their turn and disposition of mind.

It is the orator's business therefore to consider these several characters, and circumstances of life, with the different bias and way of thinking they give to the mind; that he may so conduct himself in his behaviour and manner of speaking, as will render him most acceptable, and gain him the good esteem of those, to whom he addresses.

L E C.

LECTURE XI.

Of the Passions.

THE third and last part of rhetorical LECT. XI.
 invention relates to the *Passions*, of
 which I am now to discourse. And as it is
 often highly necessary for the orator, so it
 requires his greatest skill, to ingage these
 in his interest. Quintilian calls this, *The*
*soul and spirit of his art*¹. And doubtless,
 nothing more discovers its empire over the
 minds of men, than this power to excite,
 appease, and sway their passions, agreeably
 to the design of the speaker. Hence we
 meet with the characters of *admirable, di-*
vine, and other splendid titles, ascribed to
 eloquence by antient writers. It has in-
 deed been objected by some, that whatever
 high encomiums may be given of this art
 by the admirers of it; it is however dis-
 ingenuous to deceive and impose upon
 mankind, as they seem to do, who, by in-
 gaging their passions, give a bias to their
 minds, and take them off from the con-
 sideration of the truth; whereas every thing
 should be judged of from the reasons
 brought to support it, by the evidence of
 which

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. vi.
 c. 2.

LECT. which it ought to stand or fall. But in
 XI. answer to this, it may be considered, that
 all fallacy is not culpable. We often deceive children for their good, and physicians sometimes impose on their patients to come at a cure. And why therefore, when persons will not be prevailed with by reason and argument, may not an orator endeavour, by ingaging their passions, to persuade them to that, which is for their advantage? Besides, Quintilian makes it a necessary qualification of an orator; that he be an honest man, and one who will not abuse his art¹. But since those of a contrary character will leave no methods untried, in order to carry their point; it is requisite for those, who design well, to be acquainted with all their arts, without which they will not be a match for them. As in military affairs, it is highly advantageous for the general of an army to get himself informed of all the designs and stratagems of the enemy, in order to counteract them. Indeed this part of oratory is not necessary at all times, nor in all places. The better prepared persons are, to consider truth, and act upon the evidence of it, the less occasion there appears for it. But the greater part of mankind, either do not duly weigh the force

of

¹ *Inst. orat.**Lib. xii.*

¶ 1.

of arguments, or refuse to act agreeably to their evidence. And where this is the case, that persons will neither be convinced by reason, nor moved by the authority of the speaker; the only way left to put them upon action, is to ingage their passions. For the passions are to the mind, what the wind is to a ship, they move, and carry it forward; and he who is without them, is in a manner without action, dull and lifeless. There is nothing great or noble to be performed in life, wherein the passions are not concerned. The stoics therefore, who were for eradicating the passions, both maintained a thing in itself impossible; and if it was possible, would be of the greatest prejudice to mankind. For while they appeared such zealous assertors of the government of reason, they scarce left it any thing to govern; for the authority of reason is principally exercised in ruling and moderating the passions, which, when kept in a due regulation, are the springs and motives to virtue. Thus hope produces patience, and fear industry, and the like might be shewn of the rest. The passions therefore are not to be extirpated, as the stoics asserted, but put under the direction and conduct of reason. Indeed where

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where they are ungovernable, and instead of obeying command, they are, as some have fitly called them, *diseases of the mind*, and frequently hurry men into vice, and the greatest misfortunes of life. Just as the wind, when it blows moderately, carries on the ship; but if it be too boisterous and violent, may overset her. The charge therefore brought against this art, for giving rules to influence the passions, appears groundless and unjust; since the proper use of the passions is not to hinder the exercise of reason, but to ingage men to act agreeably to reason. And if an ill use be sometimes made of this, it is not the fault of the art, but the artist. So moralists explain the nature both of virtues and vices, that men may know better how to practise one, and avoid the other; but if their precepts happen to have a different effect, they are not answerable for that.

BUT that an orator may be enabled to manage this part of his province to the best advantage, it is necessary he should, in some measure, be acquainted with the nature, causes, and objects of the passions. Now the passions, as defined by Aristotle, are, *Commotions of the mind, under the influence of which men think differently concerning*

cerning the same things¹. Thus a thing LECT. XI. appears good to him, who desires it; tho it may not appear so to another, or to the ¹ De rhetor. Lib. ii. c. 1. same person at a different time. Writers

are not agreed as to the number of the passions. But I shall wave this dispute, as the more proper business of philosophy, and only consider them, as they come under the cognizance of the orator. And that I may procede in some order, I shall treat of them, as they may be separately refered, either to *demonstrative, deliberative,* or *judicial* discourses; tho they are not wholly confined to any of them.

To the *demonstrative* kind, we may refer *Joy* and *Sorrow*, *Love* and *Hatred*, *Emulation* and *Contempt*.

Joy is an elation of the mind, arising from a sense of some present good. Such a reflection naturally creates a pleasant and agreeable sensation, which ends in a delightful calm and serenity. This is heightened by a description of former evils, and a comparison between them and the present felicity. Thus Cicero endeavours to excite in the minds of his fellow citizens the highest sense of joy and delight at Catiline's departure from Rome, by representing to them the imminent danger,
which

LECT. which threatened both them and the city,
 XI. while he continued among them.

¹ In Catil.

Orat. ii.

c. 1.

SORROW, on the contrary, is an uneasiness of mind, arising from a sense of some present evil. This passion has generally a place in funeral discourses. And it may be heightened like the former by comparison, when any past happiness is set in opposition to a present calamity. Hence Cicero aggravates the sorrow at Rome, occasioned by the death of Metellus, from his character, and great services to the public while living ².

² Pro Coel.

c. 24.

LOVE excites us to esteem another for some excellency, and to do him all the good in our power. It is distinguished from *Freindship*, which is mutual; and therefore love may continue, where freindship is lost: that is, the affection may remain on one side. And when we assist a person from no other motive, but to do him a kindness, Aristotle calls this *good will* ³.

³ De rebe-

tor. Lib.ii.

c. 9.

Love takes its rise from a variety of causes. Generosity, benevolence, integrity, gratitude, courtesy, and other social virtues, are great incitements to love any one indued with such qualities. And persons generally love those, who are of a like disposition with themselves, and pursue the same

same views. It is therefore the cheif art LECT.
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of a flatterer to suit himself in every thing
to the inclination of the person, whose
good graces he courts. When the orator
would excite this affection towards any
person, it is proper to shew, that he is
possessed of some at least, if not all these
agreeable qualities. When the conspirators
with Catiline were to be brought to justice,
Cicero was very sensible of the envy he
should contract on that account, and how
necessary it was for him to secure the love
of the Roman senate for his support and
protection in that critical juncture. And
this he endeavours to do in his fourth
oration against Catiline, by representing to
them, in the most pathetic manner, that
all the labors he underwent, the difficul-
ties he conflicted with, and the dangers to
which he was exposed, on that account,
were not for his own sake, but for their
safety, quiet, and happiness¹.

¹ Cap. 1.

HATRED is opposed to love, and pro-
duced by the contrary dispositions. And
therefore persons hate those, who never
did them any injury, from the ill opinion
they have of their base and vitious incli-
nations. So that the way to excite this
passion is, by shewing that any one has

LECT. XI. committed some heinous fact, with an ill intent. And the more nearly affected persons are by such actions, in what they account of the greatest concern, the higher in proportion their hatred rises. Since life therefore is esteemed the most valuable good, Cicero endeavours to render Mark Antony odious to the citizens of Rome, by describing his cruelty ¹.

¹ Philipp.
iv. c. 5.

EMULATION is a disquiet, occasioned by the felicity of another, not because he enjoys it, but because we desire the like for ourselves. So that this passion is in itself good and laudable, as it engages men to pursue those things, which are so. For the proper objects of emulation are any advantages of mind, body, or fortune, acquired by study or labor. And persons are generally excited to an emulation of those, with whom they converse. So children are often ambitious of the like virtues or honors, which they see in their relations or friends. And therefore it was a very proper question of Andromache to Aeneas, concerning Ascanius, which we have in Virgil:

What hopes are promis'd from his blooming years?

² Aen.
Lib. iii.
v. 342.

How much of Hector's soul in him appears?

Emu-

Emulation therefore is excited by a lively representation of any desirable advantages, which appear to be attainable, from the examples of others, who are, or have been possessed of them. But where the felicity of another occasions an uneasiness, not from the want of it, but because he enjoys it; this passion is called *Envy*, which the ancients describe as an hideous monster, feeding upon itself, and being its own tormentor¹. Aristotle observes, that it most usually affects such persons, who were once upon a level with those they envy². For most men naturally think so well of themselves, that they are uneasy to see those, who were formerly their equals, advanced above them. But as this is a base and vitious passion, the orator is not to be informed how to excite it, but how to lessen or remove it. And the method prescribed by Cicero for this purpose is, to shew that the things, which occasioned it, have not happened to the envied person undeservedly; but are the just reward of his industry or virtue; that he does not so much convert them to his own profit or pleasure, as to the benefit of others; and that the same pains and difficulties are necessary to preserve them, with which they were at first acquired³.

LECT.
XI.

¹ Ovid.
Met. Lib. i.
v. 760.
Athenaeus,
Lib. i.
c. 10.

² De rhetor. Lib. ii.
c. 12.

³ De orat.
Lib. ii.

CONTEMPT is opposed to *Emulation*, and arises from misconduct in things, not of themselves vicious. As where a person either acts below his station and character; or affects to do that, for which he is not qualified. Thus Cicero endeavours to expose Caecilius, and bring him into contempt of the court, for pretending to rival him in the accusation of Verres, for which
 'Cap. 12. he was altogether unfit'.

To *deliberative* discourses may be referred *Fear, Hope, and Shame*.

FEAR arises from the apprehension of some great and impending evil. For the greatest evils, while they appear at a distance, do not much affect us. Such persons occasion fear, who are possessed with power, especially if they have been injured, or apprehend so. Likewise those who are addicted to do injuries, or who bear us an ill will. And the examples of others, who have suffered in a like case, or from the same persons, help to excite fear. From the circumstances therefore either of the thing, or person, it will not be difficult for the orator to offer such arguments, as may be proper to awaken this passion. So Demosthenes, when he would persuade the Athenians to put themselves in a condition
 of

of defence against king Philip, enumerates the several acts of hostility already committed by him, against the neighbouring states¹. And because mens private concerns generally more affect them, than what relates to the public; it is proper sometimes to shew the necessary connection these have with each other, and how the ruin of one draws the other after it.

¹ Philipp.
iii.

THE contrary passion to *Fear* is *Hope*, which arises, either from a prospect of some future good, or the apprehension of safety from those things, which occasion our fear. Young persons are easily induced to hope the best, from the vigor of their spirits. And those, who have escaped former dangers, are encouraged to hope for the like happy success for the future. The examples of others also, especially of wise and considerate men, have often the same good effect. To find them calm and sedate, when exposed to the like dangers, naturally creates confidence, and the hopes of safety. But nothing gives persons that firmness and steadiness of mind, under the apprehension of any difficulties, as a consciousness of their own integrity and innocence. Let dangers come from what quarter they will, they are best prepared

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to receive them. They can calmly view an impending tempest, observe the way of its approach, and prepare themselves in the best manner to avoid it. In Cicero's oration for the Manilian law, he encourages the Roman citizens to hope for success against Mithridates, if they chose Pompey for their general, from the many instances of his former successes, which he there enumerates. We find in history, that artful men have frequently made use of omens and prodigies with the populace, either to awaken or expel their fears, and that with the greatest success. But such arguments are not much regarded by wise and prudent men. In the time of the civil wars between Caesar and Pompey, when the affairs of Pompey's party were very much broken and shattered; one who was in that interest, endeavoured to animate the rest, and excite them to push on the war with vigor, from a lucky omen (as it was then thought) of seven eagles, which were observed to settle in their camp. But Cicero, who was then present, and knew very well the vanity of such reasoning, immediately replied: *That such a happy incident might indeed prove of service to them, if they were to fight with jackdaws* ¹.

¹ Plat. in
Cic. Cicer.

SHAME arises from the apprehension of those things, that hurt a person's character. LECT. XI.

Modesty has been wisely implanted in mankind by the great author of nature, as a guardian of virtue, which ought for this reason to be cherished with the greatest care; because, as Seneca has well observed, *if it be once lost, it is scarce ever to be recovered*¹.

¹ *In Agamemnon.*

Therefore the true cause or foundation of shame is any thing base or vicious; for this wounds the character, and will not bear reflection. And he must arrive at no small degree of insensibility, who can stand against such a charge, if he be conscious to himself that it is just. Therefore to deter persons from vicious actions, or to expose them for the commission of them, the orator endeavours to set them in such a light, as may most awaken this passion, and give them the greatest uneasiness by the reflection. And because the bare representation of the thing itself is not always sufficient for this purpose; he sometimes inforces it by enlarging the view, and introducing those persons, as witnesses of the fact, for whom they are supposed to have the greatest regard. Thus when some of the Athenians, in an arbitration about certain lands, which had

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been refered to them by the contending parties, proposed it as the shortest way of deciding the controversy, to take the possession of them into their own hands; Cydias, a member of the assembly, to dissuade them from such an unjust action, desired them to imagine themselves at that time in the general assembly of the states of Greece (who would all hear of it shortly) and then consider how it was proper to act¹. But where persons labour under an excess of modesty, which prevents them from exerting themselves in things fit and laudable, it may sometimes be necessary to shew, that it is faulty and ill grounded. On the other hand, *immodesty* or impudence, which consists in a contempt of such things, as affect the reputation, can never be too much discouraged and exposed. And the way of doing this is, to make use of such arguments, as are most proper to excite shame. We have a very remarkable instance of it in Cicero's second Philippic, wherein he affixes this character upon Mark Antony, thro every scene of his life,

¹ Arist.
De Rhet.
Lib. ii.

ε. 8. §. 4.

I COME now to those passions, which may be refered to *judicial* discourses. And

these

these are *Anger* and *Lenity*, *Pity* and *Indignation*. LECT. XI.

ANGER is a resentment, occasioned by some affront, or injury, done without any just reason. Now men are more inclined to resent such a conduct, as they think they less deserve it. Therefore persons of distinction and figure, who expect a regard should be paid to their character, can the less bear any indications of contempt. And those who are eminent in any profession or faculty, are apt to be offended, if reflections are cast, either upon their reputation, or art. Magistrates also, and persons in public stations, sometimes think it incumbent on them to resent indignities, for the support of their office. But nothing sooner inflames this passion, than if good services are rewarded with slights and neglect. The instance of *Narsites*, the Roman general, is remarkable in this kind; who, after he had been very successful in his wars with the *Goths*, falling under the displeasure of the emperor *Justin*, was removed from the government of *Italy*, and received by the empress with this taunt: *That he must be sent to weave among the girls.* Which so provoked him, that he said, he would weave such a web, as they should never

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never be able to unravel. And accordingly he soon after brought down the Longobards, a people of Germany, into Italy, where they settled themselves in that part of the country, which from them is now called Lombardy¹. The time and place, in which an injury was done, and other circumstances that attended it, may likewise contribute very much to highten the fact. Hence Demosthenes, in his oration against Midias, endeavours to aggravate the injury of being struck by him, both as he was then a magistrate, and because it was done at a public festival. From hence it appears, that the persons, who most usually occasion this passion, are such, who neglect the rules of decency, contemn and insult others, or oppose their inclinations; as likewise the ungrateful, and those who violate the ties of freindship, or requite favors with injuries. But when the orator endeavours to excite anger, he should be careful not to excede due bounds in aggravating the charge, lest what he sais, appear rather to procede from prejudice, than a strict regard to the demerit of the action.

¹ Paul.
Diacon.
De gest.
Long.
Lib. ii.
6. 5.

LENITY is the remission of anger. The designs of mens actions are principally to be

be regarded; and therefore what is done ignorantly, or thro inadvertency, is sooner forgiven. Also to acknowledge a fault, submit, and ask pardon, are the ready means to take off resentment. For a generous mind is soon cooled by submission. Besides he, who repents of his fault, does really give the injured party some satisfaction, by punishing himself; as all repentance is attended with grief, and uneasiness of mind: and this is apt very much to abate the desire of revenge. As, on the contrary, nothing is more provoking, than when the offender either audaciously justifies the fact, or confidently denies it. Men are likewise wont to lay aside their resentment, when their adversaries happen by some other means to suffer, what they think a sufficient satisfaction. Lastly, easy circumstances, a lucky incident, or any thing, which gives the mind a turn to mirth and pleasure, has a natural tendency to remove anger. For anger is accompanied with pain and uneasiness, which very ill suit joy and cheerfulness. The orator therefore, in order to assuage and pacify the minds of his auditors, will endeavour to lessen their opinion of the fault, and by that means to take off the edge of their resentment. And

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to this purpose, it will be proper either to represent, that the thing was not designed; or that the party is sorry for it; or to mention his former services; as also to shew the credit and reputation, which will be gained by a generous forgiveness. And this last topic is very artfully wrought up by Cicero, in his address to Caesar, in favor of Ligarius.

PITY arises from the calamities of others, by reflecting that we ourselves are liable to the like misfortunes. So that evils, considered as the common lot of human nature, are principally the cause of *pity*. And this makes the difference between *pity* and *goodwill*, which, as I have shewn already, arises merely from a regard to the circumstances of those, who want our assistance. But considering the uncertainty of every thing about us, he must seem in a manner divested of humanity, who has no compassion for the calamities of others; since there is no affliction, which happens to any man, but either that, or some other as great, may fall upon himself. But those persons are generally soonest touched with this passion, who have met with misfortunes themselves. And by how much greater the distress is, or the person appears less deserving it; the higher

higher pity does it excite : for which reason LECT. XI.
persons are generally most moved at the
misfortunes of their relations and freinds,
or those of the best figure and character.
The orator therefore, in order to excite the
greater pity, will endeavour to highten the
idea of the calamity, from the several cir-
cumstances, both of the thing itself, and
the person who labours under it. A fine
example of this may be seen in Cicero's
defence of Muraena ¹.

INDIGNATION, as opposed to *pity*, is an ¹ Cap. 40.
Ec.
uneasiness at the felicity of another, who
does not seem to deserve it. But this re-
spect only external advantages, such as
riches, honors, and the like ; for virtues
cannot be the object of this passion. Ari-
stotle therefore sais, *that pity and indigna-
tion are generally to be found in the same
persons, and are both evidences of a good dis-
position* ². Now the orator excites this ² De rbe-
tor. Lib. ii.
c. 11.
passion, by shewing the person to be un-
worthy of that felicity which he enjoys.
And as, in order to move compassion, it is
sometimes of use, to compare the former
happy state of the person, with his pre-
sent calamity ; so here, the greater indig-
nation is raised, by comparing his former
mean circumstances with his present ad-
vancement :

LECT. vancement: as Cicero does in the case of
XI.

Vatinius¹.

¹ In *Vatin.*

c. 5, &c.

THESE are the passions, with which an orator is principally concerned. In addressing to which, not only the greatest warmth and force of expression is often necessary; but he must likewise first endeavour to impress his own mind with the same passion, he would excite in others, agreeably to that of Horace:

My grief with others just proportion bears,

² *Art. Poet.*

v. 102.

*To make me weep, you must be first in tears*².

I HAVE NOW finished the first part of oratory, namely *Invention*; and shall proceed to the second, which is *Disposition*, in my next discourse.

LEC.

LECTURE XII.

*Of Disposition in general, and particularly
of the Introduction.*

IN treating upon the *division* of oratory, LECT.
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I shewed, that it consists of four parts; *Invention, Disposition, Elocution, and Pronunciation.* And as I then proposed to consider each of these in their order, having explained the first of them in several discourses, I shall now procede to the second, which is *Disposition*. For agreeably to the similitude I formerly observed between the arts of speaking and building, as *Invention* supplies the orator with necessary materials; so *Disposition* directs him how to place them in the most proper and suitable order. And, as in both arts, the first consideration of the artist is to collect and prepare his materials, so the next is to put them together¹. *Disposition* therefore, considered as a part of oratory, naturally follows *Invention*. And what is here chiefly intended by it is, the placing the several parts of a discourse in a just method, and dependance upon each other. Tho indeed the several things contained under each part,

¹ See
Lect. III.

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part, require likewise a suitable order and disposition, as will be shewn in their proper place. Order and regularity is always pleasant and agreeable; we admire it in nature, and it is no less beautiful in art, and particularly in discourse. For, as that judicious writer Quintilian has well observed: *A discourse that wants disposition, must necessarily be confused, and without connection, liable to frequent tautologies, and omissions, and, like one wandering in the dark, be conducted by chance, rather than design*¹. And

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. vii.
prooem.

want of order is certainly a very great prejudice to a discourse in other respects. For what is methodically delivered, is heard with more attention, better understood, and longer retained. But as *Invention* requires thought, and a lively imagination, so judgment and prudence are necessary in *Disposition*.

WRITERS are not all agreed in determining the parts of an oration; tho the difference is rather in the manner of considering them, than in the things themselves. Aristotle mentions four; *Introduction, Proposition, Proof, and Conclusion*².

² *De rhetor.*
Lib. iii.
c. 13.

Two of these, that is, *Proposition* and *Proof*, are always necessary. For in every discourse there ought to be some subject proposed, which

which must afterwards be proved or illustrated. The other two seem to have been introduced, not so much from necessity, as from other considerations. For as the tempers of mankind are exceeding various, it is often necessary to prepare the way for a candid reception of a discourse, by first gaining their benevolence, and attention; and after the matter has been fully represented, and supported by proper arguments, it is further requisite to engage their passions in the pursuit of what has been offered. For these reasons therefore, the use of the *Introduction* is to make way for a kind and attentive hearing, and the design of the *Conclusion* is to gain that by an address to the passions, which perhaps could not be done by cool reasoning. Quintilian makes five parts, *Introduction*, *Narration*, *Confirmation*, *Refutation*, and *Conclusion* ¹. But Cicero enlarges them to six; ¹ *Inst. orat. Lib. iii. c. 9.* namely, *Introduction*, *Narration*, *Proposition*, *Confirmation*, *Confutation*, and *Conclusion* ². Tho Aristotle may be supposed ² *De Invent. Lib. i. c. 14.* to include *Narration* under *Proposition*, and both *Confirmation* and *Confutation* under *Proof*; as, on the contrary, Quintilian seems to have included *Proposition* under *Narration*. However, I shall choose to follow

VOL. I. N Cicero's

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Cicero's division, as most full and explicit; and treat upon each part in the order now mentioned. Not but that this order is sometimes changed by the best orators, and for good reasons, as will be shewn hereafter.

THE first part of a discourse is the *Introduction*, the design of which is to prepare the minds of the hearers for a suitable reception of the remaining parts, that are to follow. And for this end, three things are requisite; that the orator gain the *good opinion* of his hearers, that he secure their *attention*, and give them some *general notion* of his subject. I shall speak to each of these heads separately, begining with *Benevolence*.

Now the topics made use of for gaining the esteem and *good opinion* of the hearers, are *Persons*, or *Things*.

THE *Persons* are chiefly the speaker himself, or those to whom he addresses. When the orator introduces his discourse with his own person, he will be careful to do it with modesty, and seem rather to extenuate his virtues and abilities, than to magnify them. And where the nature of the subject may seem to require it, he will endeavour to shew, that some just and good
reason

reason induced him to ingage in it. We have a very fine example of this, in Cicero's *oration* for the poet Aulus Licinius Archias, which begins thus: *If I have any natural genius, which I am sensible how small it is; or any ability in speaking, wherein I own I have been very conversant; or any skill acquired from the study and precepts of the best arts, to which my whole life has been devoted: this Aulus Licinius has, in a particular manner, a right to demand of me the fruit of all these things. For as far back as I can remember, and call to mind what passed in my youth, to the present time, he has been my cheif adviser and encourager, both to undertake and pursue this course of studies.* When the orator sets out with the persons of those, to whom the discourse is made, it is not unusual to commend them for their virtues, and those especially, which have a more immediate relation to the present subject. Thus Cicero begins his oration of thanks for the pardon of Marcellus, with an encomium upon the mildness, clemency, and wisdom of Caesar, to whom it was addressed. But sometimes he expresses his gratitude for past favors; as Cicero has done in his orations, both to the people and senate of

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Rome, after his return from banishment.

And at other times he declares his concern for them and their interest; in which manner Cicero begins his fourth oration against Catiline, which was made in the senate.

I perceive, says he, that all your countenances and eyes are turned on me; I perceive that you are solicitous, not only for your own danger, and that of the state, but for mine likewise, if that should be removed. Your affection for me is pleasant in misfortunes, and grateful in sorrow; but I adjure you to lay it aside, and forgetting my safety, consider yourselves and your children. But in judicial cases, both the character of the person, whose cause he espouses, and that of the adverse party, likewise furnishes the orator with arguments for Benevolence. The former, by commemorating his virtues, dignity, or merits; and sometimes his misfortunes, and calamities. So Cicero in his defence of Flaccus, begins his oration in commending him on the account of his services done to the public, the dignity of his family, and his love to his country. And Demosthenes, in his oration against Midias, sets out with a recital of his vices, in order to recommend his own cause to the favorable opinion of the court. And
Cicero,

Cicero, in his defence of Quintius, with the same view, joins his antagonist Hortensius with Nevius the plaintiff: *Both those things, saith he, at present make against us, which bear the chief sway in this city, the greatest interest, and the greatest eloquence. As I am concerned at the one, so I fear the other. For as I am somewhat apprehensive, lest the eloquence of Hortensius should prejudice what I say; so I very much dread, lest the interest of Nevius should prove hurtful to Quintius* ¹.

¹ Cap. I.

THE other topic above mentioned, for gaining Benevolence, was Things. And these are principally taken from the subject; as its Justice, Importance, Advantage, or Pleasure. Thus Cicero recommends the cause of Rabirius, whom he defended, from the justice of it, when he saith: *No crime, envy, vice, or inveterate, reasonable, and heavy resentments of his fellow citizens, have brought Caius Rabirius in danger of his life; but a design to take away that power and authority, which has been delivered to us from our ancestors, that neither the authority of the senate, the commands of the consul, nor the consent of good men, should be able to withstand those, who aim at the ruin and destruction of the state* ². Again, in his ² Cap. I.

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oration for the recovery of his house, made to the priests, to whom that cause was committed, he represents the importance of it, with the same design: *If a weighty cause has at any time come under the cognizance and decision of the priests of the Roman people; this truly is so great, that the dignity of the whole state, the safety of all the citizens, their lives, liberty, religious rights, both public and private, goods, fortunes, and habitations, seem all to be committed and intrusted to your wisdom, integrity, and power*¹. And at the entrance of his charge against Verres before the senate, he endeavours to recommend it to their good opinion, from the advantage it might bring to themselves. *I have, says he, undertaken this cause with the greatest approbation and expectation of the Roman people, not to increase the envy of your order, but to remove the common infamy, under which it lies.* But in his oration for the Manilian law, he proposes the same thing, from the pleasure of the subject. *It affords me, says he, a particular delight and satisfaction, that in speaking from this place, to which I have not been accustomed, I am furnished with such a subject, in which no one can want matter of discourse.* For I am to speak of
the

the singular and excellent virtues of Cneius Pompey; in treating upon which, it is more difficult to know how to end, than where to begin¹. But tho I have represented these several ways of gaining Benevolence separately, that they might appear in a clearer light; yet several of them are frequently made use of by orators in the same introduction.

THE second thing proposed in the introduction, is, to gain the *Attention* of the hearers. And in speaking of this head, Cicero says: *We shall be heard attentively by one of these three things; if we propose what is great, necessary, or for the interest of those, to whom the discourse is addressed*². So that according to him, the topics of *Attention* are much the same, with those of *Benevolence*, when taken from the subject. And indeed, people are naturally led to attend either to those things or persons, of which they have entertained a favorable opinion. But in order to gain this point, the orator sometimes thinks it proper to request the attention of his audience. Thus Cicero, in his defence of Cluentius, after having shewn the heinousness of the charge against him, concludes his introduction in the following manner, speaking

¹ Cap. 1.

² Orat
Partit.
c. 8.

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to the judges: *Wherefore I intreat, that while I briefly and clearly reply to a charge of many years standing, you will, according to your usual custom, give me a kind and attentive hearing*¹. And again, in his second Philippic, addressing himself to the senate: *But as I must say something for myself, and many things against Mark Antony; one of these I beg of you, that you will bear me kindly, while I speak for myself; and the other I will undertake for, that when I speak against him, you shall bear me with attention*². But tho the introduction be the most usual and proper place for gaining attention; yet the orator finds it convenient sometimes to quicken and excite his hearers in other parts of his discourse, when he observes they flag, or has something of moment to offer.

¹ Cap. 3.² Cap. 5.

THE third thing required in an introduction, is, some *general account* of the subject of the discourse. This is always necessary, which the two others are not. And therefore it must be left to the prudence of the orator, when to use or omit them, as he shall judge proper, from the nature of his discourse, the circumstances of his hearers, and how he stands with them. But some account of the subject is what

I

cannot

cannot be neglected. For every one expects to be soon informed of the design of the speaker, and what he proposes to treat of. Nor when they are all made use of, is it necessary they should always stand in the order I have here placed them. Cicero sometimes enters immediately upon his subject, and introduces the other heads afterwards. As in his third oration against Catiline, made to the body of the Roman people, which begins thus: *You see that the state, all your lives, estates, fortunes, wives and children, and this seat of the greatest empire, the most flourishing and beautiful city, having by the favor of heaven towards you, and my labors, counsels, and dangers, been this day rescued from fire and sword, and the very jaws of destruction, are preserved and restored to you.* And then he proceeds to recommend himself to their esteem and benevolence, from the consideration of these benefits.

THESE are the heads, which commonly furnish matter for this part of a discourse. But orators often take occasion from the time ¹, place ², largeness of the assembly ³, or some other proper circumstance ⁴, to compliment their hearers, recommend themselves, or introduce the subject, upon which

¹ Cic. *Pro Catilio, & Philipp. v.*
² *Pro Leg. Man. & Pro reg. Dejotaro.*
³ *Philipp. iv.*
⁴ *Pro Milon.*

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which they are about to treat. Instances of each of these may be met with in several of Cicero's orations. And sometimes they set out with some remarkable custom, comparison, similitude, or other ornament, which they accommodate to the occasion of their discourse. So Pliny begins his panegyric upon the emperor Trajan with an antient custom. *Our ancestors, saies he, have very well and prudently appointed, that both our actions and speeches should begin with prayers; since men can enter upon nothing in a proper and becoming manner, without the assistance, direction, and favor of the deities. And by whom ought that custom to be more regarded and practised, than by the consul? or on what occasion, than when by order of the senate, and authority of the state, we are ingaged to return thanks to the best of princes? And Isocrates enters upon his celebrated panegyric in praise of his countrymen, the Athenians, with the following comparison: I have often wondered, what could be their design, who brought together these assemblies, and instituted the gymnical sports, to propose so great rewards for bodily strength; and to vouchsafe no honor to those, who applied their private labors to serve the public, and*
so

so cultivated their minds as to be serviceable to others, to whom they ought to have shewn greater regard. For altho the strength of a champion was doubled, no benefit would from thence accrue to others; but all enjoy the prudence of one man, who will hearken to his advice. But when the subject will admit of it, the orator will sometimes introduce his discourse in a merry and facetious manner. As Cicero has done in his defence of Ligarius, which begins thus: *My kinsman Quintus Tubero has brought a new crime before you, Caius Caesar, and to this day unheard of, that Quintus Ligarius was in Africa.* But such freedoms are scarce to be ventured upon, unless by speakers of an established reputation and authority; which was the case of Cicero at that time. Moreover, in some cases, orators have recourse to a more covert and artful way of opening their subject, endeavour to remove jealousies, apologize for what they are about to say, and seem to refer it to the candor of the hearers to judge of it as they please. Cicero appears to have been a perfect master of this art, and used it with great success. I shall recite one example of it, from his seventh Philippic, where he seems to express the greatest

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greatest concern, lest what he was about to say, should give any offence to the senate, to whom he was speaking: *I, sais he, who always declared for peace, and to whom peace among ourselves, as it is wished for by all good men, was in a particular manner desirable; who have employed all my industry in the forum, in the senate, and in the defence of my freinds, whence I have arrived to the highest honors, a moderate fortune, and what reputation I enjoy; I therefore, who owe what I am to peace, and without it could not have been the person I am, be that what it will, for I would arrogate nothing to myself; I speak with concern and fear, how you will receive what I am going to say; but I beg and intreat you from the great regard I have always expressed for the support and advancement of your honor, that if any thing said by me should at first appear harsh or unfit to be received, you will notwithstanding please to hear it without offence, and not reject it, till I have explained myself: I then, for I must repeat it again, who have always approved of peace, and promoted it, am against a peace with Mark Antony* ¹. This is called *Insinuation*, and may be necessary, where a cause is in itself doubtful, or may be thought so from the received notions

* Cap. 3.

notions of the hearers, or the impressions already made upon them by the contrary side. An honest man would not knowingly engage in a bad cause; and yet thro prevailing prejudice that may be so esteemed, which is not so in itself. In these cases therefore great caution and prudence are necessary to give such a turn to things, and place them in that view, as may be least liable to offence. And because it sometimes happens, that the hearers are not so much displeased at the subject, as the person, Quintilian's rule seems very proper, when he says: *If the subject displeases, the character of the person should support it; and when the person gives offence, he should be helped by the cause*¹.

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. iv.
c. 1.

I HAVE done with the several things requisite to form an introduction; but before I conclude, it may not be amiss to add a few remarks proper to be observed in its composition. And first, it ought to appear easy and natural, and so connected with the rest of the discourse, as the head to the body. Again, it should be suited to the length of the discourse; lest otherwise, as we say, the porch should not appear proportioned to the building. The language of it should also be just, easy, and pleasant.

For

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XII.

For the orator has not yet secured his hearers, and a little matter may give them a distaste. Whereas afterwards, when their minds are warmed and engaged in his favor, a small slip will be sooner overlooked, or more easily forgiven. And therefore Quintilian facetiously compares a faulty introduction to a scarred face; which is presently discerned, and very disagreeable. But further, it ought neither to be wholly without passions, nor too violent and impetuous. Soft and smooth language, with an easy and modest address, insensibly win upon the hearers; when a more vehement and boisterous attack upon them at first may possibly alarm them, excite their suspicion, and preclude all access to their minds. Lastly, it ought not to be too general, or so formed, as may equally serve both parties, or be turned by the contrary party to his advantage.

BUT altho the introduction be the first part of a discourse, yet it is not what the orator should first think of, and form in his mind; but when he has laid the whole scheme of what he designs to say in his thoughts, then is the proper time to consider in what manner to introduce it. And those, who take the contrary method, seem

liable

liable to this inconvenience among others, LECT.
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that instead of suiting the introduction to the body of their discourse, they are many times obliged to accommodate their discourse to the introduction; and in order to prevent being inconsistent with themselves, are forced to say, not what they would, but what will best agree with those things they had said before.

I SHALL only add, that as the introduction is not an essential part of a discourse, so it is sometimes omitted by the best orators. We find instances of it in Cicero, as in his first invective against Catiline, and that against Piso, where he begins immediately with his subject, without any previous address to his audience. Nay, sometimes this is not only unnecessary, but would be very improper; as where the hearers are already apprised of the subject, and expect brevity; or in cases that require dispatch. Such are many of the speeches we meet with in Livy, and other historians, made by generals to their armies, and upon other emergent occasions.

LECTURE XIII.

*Of Narration.*LECT.
XIII.

THE orator having prepared his hearers to receive his discourse with candor and attention, and acquainted them with his general design in the *Introduction*, before he proceeds directly to his subject, often finds it necessary to give some account of what preceded, accompanied, or followed upon it. And this he does in order to enlarge the view of the particular point in dispute, and place it in a clearer light. This is called *Narration*, the nature and properties of which I now propose to explain.

NARRATION then is a recital of something done, in the order and manner in which it was done. Hence it is easy to perceive, what those things are, which properly enter into a narration. And such are the cause, manner, time, place, and consequences of an action; with the temper, fortune, views, ability, associates, and other circumstances of those concerned in it. Not that each of these particulars is necessary in every narration; but so many
of

of them at least, as are requisite to set the matter in a just light, and make it appear credible. Besides, in relating a fact, the orator does not content himself with such an account of it, as is barely sufficient to render what he says intelligible to his hearers; but describes it in so strong and lively a manner, as may give the greatest evidence to his relation, and make the deepest impression upon their minds. And if any part of it appears at present less probable, he promises to clear up and remove any remaining doubts in the progress of his discourse. For the foundation of his reasoning afterwards is laid in the narration, from whence he takes his arguments for the confirmation. And therefore it is a matter of no small importance, that this part be well managed; since the success of the whole discourse so much depends upon it.

THERE are four properties required in a good narration; that it be *short, clear, probable, and pleasant*¹. I shall speak to each of these in their order.

¹ Cic.
Orat. Part.
c. 9.

AND first, the *brevity* of a narration is not to be judged of barely from its length: for that may be too long, which contains but a little; and that too short, which

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comprehends a great deal. Wherefore this depends upon the nature of the subject, since some things require more words to give a just representation of them, and others fewer. That may properly therefore be called a short narration, which contains nothing, that could well have been omitted; nor omits any thing, which was necessary to be said. Now in order to avoid both these extremes, care should be taken not to go further back in the account of things, nor to trace them down lower, than the subject requires; to say that only in the general, which does not need a more particular explication; not to assign the causes of things, when it is enough to shew they were done; and to omit such things which are sufficiently understood, from what either preceded, or was consequent upon them. So historians frequently satisfy themselves with relating how things were ordered to be done, and leave their readers to conclude, they were accordingly executed, or had answerable events. But the orator should be careful, lest while he endeavours to avoid prolixity, he run into obscurity. Horace was very sensible of this danger, when he said:

¹Art. Poet.

v. 25.

By striving to be short, I grow obscure¹.

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THE second property of a narration therefore is *perspicuity*, which may justly be esteemed the cheif excellency of language. For as the design of speech is to communicate our thoughts to others, that must be its greatest excellence, which contributes most to this end, and that doubtless is *perspicuity*. As *perspicuity* therefore is requisite in all discourse, so it is particularly serviceable in a narration, which contains the substance of all that is to be said afterwards. Wherefore if this be not sufficiently understood, much less can those things, which receive their light from it. Now the following things render a narration clear and plain: proper and significant words, whose meaning is well known and determined; short sentences, tho full and explicit, whose parts are not perplexed, but placed in their just order; proper particles to join the sentences, and shew their connexion, and dependance on each other; a due regard to the order of time, and other circumstances necessary to be expressed; and lastly, suitable transitions.

See *Lib.*
XXII.

THE third property of a narration is *probability*. And things appear probable, when the causes assigned for them appear natural; the manner, in which they are

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described, is easy to be conceived; the consequences are such, as might be expected; the characters of the persons are justly represented; and the whole account is well attested, consistent with itself, and agreeable to the general opinion. Simplicity likewise in the manner of relating a fact, as well as in the stile, without any reserve or appearance of art, contributes very much to its credibility. For truth loves to appear naked and open, stript of all coloring or disguise. The conspiracy of Catiline was so daring and extravagant, that no one, but such a desperado, could ever have undertaken it with any hopes of success. However Cicero's account of it to the senate was so full and exact, and so well suited to the character of the person, that it presently gained credit¹. And therefore, when upon the conclusion of Cicero's speech, Catiline, who was present, immediately stood up, and desired they would not entertain such hard thoughts of him, but consider how much his family had always been attached to the public interest, and the great services they had done the state; their resentments rose so high, that he could not be heard; upon which he

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¹ *In Catil.*
c. 1.

immediately left the city, and went to his associates ¹. LECT. XIII.

THE last thing required in a narration is, that it be *pleasant* and entertaining. And this is more difficult, because it does not admit of that accurate composition, and pompous dress, which delight the ear, and recommend some other parts of a discourse. For it certainly requires no small skill in the speaker, while he endeavours to express every thing in the most natural, plain, and easy manner, not to grow flat, and tiresome. For Quintilian's remark is very just, that, *the most experienced orators find nothing in eloquence more difficult, than what all, who hear it, fancy they could have said themselves* ². And the reason of this seems very obvious. For as all art is an imitation of nature, the nearer it resembles that, the more perfect it is in its kind. Hence unexperienced persons often imagine that to be easiest, which suits best with those natural ideas, to which they have been accustomed; till, upon trial, they are convinced of their mistake. Wherefore to render this part of a discourse pleasant and agreeable, recourse must be had to variety, both in the choice of words, and turns of the expression. And therefore

¹See Flor. Lib. iv. c. 1. & ibi Camert.

²Inst. orat. Lib. iv. c. 2.

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questions, admirations, interlocutions, imagery, and other familiar figures, help very much to diversify and inliven a narration, and prevent it from becoming dull and tedious, especially when it is carried on to any considerable length.

HAVING given a breif account of the nature and properties of a narration, I shall now procede to consider the uses of it.

LAUDATORY orations are usually as it were a sort of continued narration, set off and adorned with florid language and fine images, proper to grace the subject, which is naturally so well fitted to afford pleasure and entertainment. Wherefore a separate narration is more suited to *deliberative* and *judicial* discourses. In Cicero's oration for the Manilian law (which is of the former kind) the design of the narration is to shew the Roman people the necessity of giving Pompey the command of the army against king Mithridates, by representing the nature of that war, which is done in the following manner. *A great and dangerous war, sais he, threatens your revenues and allies from two very powerful kings, Mithridates and Tigranes; one of whom not being pursued after his defeat, and the other*
pro-

provoked, think they have an opportunity to seize Asia. Letters are daily brought from those parts to worthy gentlemen of the equestrian order, who have large concerns there in farming your revenues; they acquaint me, as freinds, with the state of the public affairs, and danger of their own; that many villages in Bithynia, which is now your province, are burnt down; that the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, which borders upon your revenues, is intirely in the enemies power; that Lucullus, after several great victories, is withdrawn from the war; that he who succedes him, is not able to manage it; that all the allies and Roman citizens wish and desire the command of that war may be given to one particular person; and that he alone, and no other, is dreaded by the enemies. You see the state of the case, now consider what ought to be done¹. Here is an unhappy scene of affairs, which seemed to call for immediate redress. The causes and reasons of it are assigned, in a very probable manner, and the account well attested by persons of character and figure. And what the consequences would be, if not timely prevented, no one could well be ignorant. The only probable remedy suggested in general is, the committing that

Cap. 2.

LECT.
XIII.

affair to one certain person, which he afterwards shews at large could be no other than Pompey. But in Cicero's defence of Milo (which is of the *judicial* kind) the design of the narration, which is greatly commended by Quintilian, is to prove, that in the combat between Clodius and Milo, the former was the aggressor. And in order to make this appear, he gives a summary account of the conduct of Clodius the preceding year, and from the course of his actions and behaviour shews the inveterate hatred he bore to Milo, who obstructed him in his wicked designs. For which cause he had often threatened to kill him, and given out, that he should not live beyond such a time. And accordingly he went from Rome without any other apparent reason, but that he might have an opportunity to attack him in a convenient place near his own house, by which he knew Milo was then obliged to pass. Milo was in the senate that day, where he staid till they broke up, then went home, and afterwards set forward on his journey. When he came to the place, in which he was to be assaulted, Clodius appeared every way prepared for such a design, being on horseback, and attended with

with a company of desperate ruffians, ready to execute his commands. Whereas Milo was with his wife in a chariot, wrapped up in his cloak, and attended with servants of both sexes. These were all circumstances, which preceded the fact. And as to the action itself, with the event of it, the attack, as Cicero says, was begun by the attendants of Clodius, from an higher ground, who killed Milo's coachman. Upon which, Milo throwing off his cloak, leaped out, and made a brave defence, against Clodius's men, who were got about the chariot. But Clodius in the heat of the skirmish, giving out that Milo was killed, was himself slain by the servants of Milo, to avenge, as they thought, the death of their master. Here seems to be all the requisites proper to make this account credible. Clodius's open and avowed hatred of Milo, which proceeded so far as to threaten his life, the time of his leaving Rome, the convenience of the place, his habit and company so different from those of Milo, joined with his known character of a most profligate and audacious wretch, could not but render it very probable, that he had formed that design to kill Milo. And which of them began the attack,

attack, might very reasonably be credited from the advanced ground, on which Clodius and his men were placed; the death of Milo's coachman at the beginning of the combat; the skirmish afterwards at the chariot; and the reason of Clodius's own death at last, which does not appear to have been intended, till he had given out that Milo was killed. It would be easy to shew, that all the other properties of a fine narration are likewise to be found in this. But that could not be done without transcribing the whole; which would be too long to recite here, and therefore I can only refer to it as such, upon the authority of Quintilian.

BUT a distinct and separate narration is not always necessary in any kind of discourse. For if the matter was well known before, a set and formal narrative will be tedious to the hearers. Or if one party has done it already, it is needless for the other to repeat it. But there are three occasions especially, in which it may seem very requisite; when it will bring light to the subject, when different accounts have already been given out concerning it, or when it has been misrepresented by the adverse party. If the point in controversy
be

be of a dubious nature, or not sufficiently known to the hearers, a distinct account of the matter, with the particular circumstances attending it, must be very serviceable, in order to let them into a true state of the case, and enable them to judge of it with greater certainty. At the time of the Mithridatic war, Pompey had so large a share in the administration of affairs, and his power was so great, that some good friends to the constitution began to grow uneasy at it. And therefore had not Cicero first represented the greatness and danger of that war, and the necessity of committing it to Pompey, as the only general then equal to so important a trust; it would have been very difficult for him to prevail with the Roman people to make choice of him. And in the case of Milo so many stories had been raised, and such different relations industriously divulged by the friends of Clodius concerning that action; that Cicero could not but think it necessary to obviate them, by so large and particular a narrative of the fact. Moreover, where the opposite party has set the matter in a false light by some artful and invidious turn, or loaded it with any odious circumstances, it seems no less necessary that

that endeavours should be used to remove any ill impressions, which otherwise might remain upon the minds of the hearers, by a different and more favorable representation. And if any thing can be fixed upon to make the contrary account appear absurd or incredible, it ought particularly to be remarked. Thus Cicero in his defence of Sextus Roscius, shews that he was many miles distant from Rome, at the time he was charged to have killed his father there. Now, saith he, *while Sextus Roscius was at Ameria, and this Titus Roscius [his accuser] at Rome, Sextus Roscius [the father] was killed at the baths on mount Palatine, returning from supper. From whence I hope there can be no doubt, who ought to be suspected of the murder. And was not the thing plain of itself, there is this further suspicion to fix it upon the prosecutor, that after the fact was committed, one Manlius Glaucia, an obscure fellow, the freedman, client, and familiar of this Titus Roscius, first carried the account of it to Ameria, not to the son of the deceased, but to the house of Titus Capito his enemy. And the fact being done in the evening, this messenger arrived at Ameria by break of day, having rode fifty six miles in a chaise in ten*
hours

hours by night, to carry this acceptable news¹. LECT. XIII.

With more to the same purpose. But what I bring it for is to shew the use, ¹ Cap. 7. which Cicero makes of this narration, for retorting the crime upon the prosecutors.

BUT the orator should be very careful in conducting this part, to avoid every thing which may prejudice the cause he espouses. Falsehood and a misrepresentation of facts are not to be justified; but no one is obliged to say those things, which may hurt himself. I shall just mention one instance of this from Cicero, where he has shewn great skill in this respect, in pleading before Caesar, for the pardon of Ligarius, who had joined with Pompey in the civil war. For Ligarius having been represented by the adverse party as an enemy to Caesar, and so esteemed by Caesar himself; Cicero very artfully endeavours in his narration to take off the force of this charge, by shewing, that when the war first broke out, he refused to ingage in it, which he would not have done, had he borne any personal hatred to Caesar. Quintus Ligarius, sais he, before there was any suspicion of a war, went into Africa as a legate to the proconsul Caius Considius, in which office he so approved himself, both to

LECT. the Roman citizens and allies, that when
 XIII. Confidius left the province, the inhabitants
 would not be satisfied he should leave the government in the hands of any other person. Therefore Quintus Ligarius having excused himself in vain for some time, accepted of the government against his will, which he so managed during the peace, that both the citizens and allies were greatly pleased with his integrity and justice. The war broke out on a sudden, which those in Africa did not hear of, till it was begun; but upon the news of it, partly thro inconsiderate haste, and partly from blind fear, they looked out for a leader, first for their own safety, and then as they were affected; when Ligarius thinking of home, and desirous to return to his friends, would not be prevailed on to ingage in any affairs. In the mean time, Publius Accius Varus, the pretor, who was formerly governor of Africa, coming to Utica, recourse was immediately had to him, who very eagerly took upon himself the government. If that can be called a government, which was conferred on a private man, by the clamor of the ignorant multitude, without any public authority. Ligarius therefore, who endeavoured to avoid every thing of that kind, ceased to
 1 Cap. 1. act soon after the arrival of Varus 1. Here
 Cicero

Cicero ends his narrative. For tho Ligarius afterwards joined with Pompey's party, yet to have mentioned that, which was nothing more than what many others had done, whom Caesar had already pardoned, could have served only to increase his displeasure against him. And therefore he doubtless shewed great skill in so managing his account, as to take off the main force of the accusation, and by that means make way for his pardon, which he accordingly obtained.

L E C.

LECTURE XIV.

*Of the Proposition.*LECT.
XIV.

IN every just and regular discourse, the speaker's intention is to prove or illustrate something. And when he lays down the subject, upon which he designs to treat, in a distinct and express manner, this is called the *Proposition*. But as I shewed before concerning the *Introduction*, that it is the last thing, which comes under the consideration of the orator, tho it be first pronounced¹; so the proposition is what first employs his thoughts, altho it usually follows both the introduction and narration in the order of the discourse. For this is the basis and foundation of his whole design, and his main view is to support and maintain it thro his whole oration. It is therefore necessary, in the first place, that this be duly weighed, and represented to his mind in all the different views, in which he can place it; that he well consider the nature of it, the several parts of which it consists, and the particular force of each part. By this means he will be the better inabled to offer such arguments, as may be proper

¹ See
Lect. XII.

proper in its defence; and to refute any objections, which may be brought against it. For, as it sometimes happens, that persons, by wanting a command of language, are at a loss to convey their thoughts to others, even of such things, whereof they themselves have very right sentiments; so it must be much more difficult for any one to demonstrate that clearly to another, of which he has only a confused and imperfect notion himself. And therefore Isocrates says: *I have been used to tell my hearers, that they ought first to consider, how the subject and each part of it is to be treated; and when that has been duly weighed and examined, then to think of arguments, and a proper dress to support and recommend it, that it may answer the end we propose by it*¹. This was certainly very good advice, for unless the speaker be master of his subject, and every branch of it, the most he can hope to do, is to entertain his hearers with fine language, and a florid harangue, not much to the purpose.

¹ Epist. 6.
ad Jasonis
liberos.

ORATORS use several ways in laying down the subject of their discourses. Sometimes they do it in one general proposition. We have an instance of this in Cicero's *speech to the senate*, the day after

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Caesar was killed (as it is given us by Dion Cassius ¹) in which his design was to persuade them to peace and unanimity. *This, saies he, being the state of our affairs, I think it necessary that we lay aside all the discord and enmity, which have been among us, and return again to our former peace and agreement.* And then he procedes to offer his reasons for this advice.

¹ Lib. xliv.
p. 250.
ed. Leun-
clav.
See also
Fabric.
Bibl. Lat.
Tom. i.
p. 148.
ed. 4to.

AT other times, to give a clearer and more distinct view of their discourse, they subjoin to the proposition the general heads of argument, by which they endeavour to support it. This method Cicero uses in his *seventh Philippic*, where he saies: *I who have always commended and advised to peace, am against a peace with Mark Antony. But why am I averse to peace? Because it is base, because it is dangerous, and because it is impracticable. And I beseech you to hear me with your usual candor, while I make out these three things* ².

² Cap. 3.

BUT when the subject relates to several different things, which require each of them to be separately laid down in distinct propositions, it is called a *Partition*. Tho some have made two kinds of *Partition*; one of which they call *Separation*, and the other *Enumeration*. By the former of these, the

the orator shews in what he agrees with LECT.
XIV.
his adversary, and wherein he differs from

him. So in the case I formerly mentioned, of a person accused of sacrilege for stealing private money out of a temple, he who pleads for the defendant sais: *He owns the fact; but it being private money, the point in question is, whether this be sacrilege* ^{1 See}

And in the cause of Milo, Cicero speaking of Clodius sais: *The point which now comes before the court, is not, whether he was killed, or not, that we confess; but whether justly or unjustly* ^{2. See} LECT. IX.

Now in reality here is ^{1 Cap. 11.} no partition, since the former branch of the proposition is what is agreed upon, and given up; and consequently it is only the latter, that remains to be disputed.

It is called *Enumeration*, when the orator acquaints his hearers with the several parts of his discourse, upon which he designs to treat. And this alone properly speaking is a *Partition*. Thus Cicero states his plea

in his defence of Muraena: *I perceive the accusation consists of three parts: the first respects the conduct of his life; the second his dignity; and the third contains a charge of bribery* ^{3. See} Cap. 5. But as it is frequent with him in every part of his discourse, not barely to inform his hearers, but likewise

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to endeavour so to influence their minds, as may best answer his design ; sometimes he discovers a peculiar air of modesty in dividing and laying down the several branches of his subject. For by this means, while he seems as it were distrustful of himself, and to appeal to them for the equity of his proceedings ; he artfully removes all suspicion of design to suppress any thing, which might make against himself ; or to advance what was improper. In his defence of Sextus Roscius, he thus bespeaks the judges : *As far as I am able to perceive, there are three things, which make against Roscius ; the crime he is charged with, the boldness, and the power of his adversaries. And of each of these I think it will be proper for me to speak, tho not in the same manner : for the first belongs to my province, the other two the Roman people have enjoined upon you : I must clear him of the crime ; and it will depend on you to check the insolence, and break the pernicious and insufferable power* ¹ *of those men, as soon as possible* ². But elsewhere, when he thinks it for his purpose, he takes the contrary method, and addresses either his adversary, the judges, or the whole audience with that frankness, as if he was already assured of his cause.

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We have a remarkable instance of this in his defence of Quintius, where he saies: I will do what I have always observed you to do, Hortensius, I will divide my whole cause into certain parts. You always do this, because you always can do it; I shall do it in this case, because I think I can. What nature inables you to do at all times, that my cause inables me to do at present. I shall prescribe to myself certain bounds and limits, which I cannot excede, if I would: that I myself may be at a certainty what to speak to; and you, what to answer; and you likewise, Caius Aquilius, may be apprised before hand, what you are to hear. We deny, Sextus Nevius, that you was admitted to the possession of the estate of Publius Quintius by the pretor's edict. This is what we have ingaged to contest with you. And first, I shall shew, that you had no just cause to desire the pretor would admit you to the possession of the estate of Publius Quintius; then, that you could not possess it by the edict; and lastly, that you did not so possess it. And I beseech you, Caius Aquilius, and the rest of the judges, that you would be careful to remember what I have promised; for by this means you will better understand what I say, and more easily prevent me from exceeding

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those bounds I have marked out for myself.
 I deny that he had any foundation to solicit for possession: I deny that he could have possession by the edict: and I deny that he had possession by it. And when I have proved ¹ these three things, I shall conclude ¹. That air of assurance, which Cicero here discovers in stating the cases, and his addressing in so frank a manner, both to his antagonist, and the judges, was doubtless designed to intimidate the one, and induce the other to a favorable opinion of what he proposed to say.

¹ Cap. 10.

THERE are three things requisite in a good *Partition*; that it be *short*, *complete*, and consist but of a *few members*.

A *PARTITION* is said to be *short*, when each proposition contains in it nothing more, than what is necessary. So that the brevity here required is different from that of a narration; for that consists chiefly in things, this in words. And, as Quintilian justly observes, brevity seems very proper here, where the orator does not shew what he is then speaking of, but what he designs to discourse upon ¹.

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. iv.
 c. 5.

AGAIN, it ought to be *complete* and perfect. And for this end, care must be taken to omit no necessary part in the enumeration.

BUT

BUT however there should be as few heads, as is consistent with the nature of the subject. The antient rhetoricians prescribe three or four at the most. And I do not remember that Cicero ever exceeds that number. But it is certain, the fewer they are, the better, provided nothing necessary be omitted. For as it is the design of the partition to give the hearers a summary view of the several things, on which the orator proposes to treat, which they may carry in their minds thro the whole discourse; the fewer they are, the better they will be able to retain them, and too large a number is apt to introduce that confusion, which partition is designed to prevent.

I HAVE been hitherto speaking only of those heads, into which the subject, or general argument of the discourse, is at first divided. For it is sometimes convenient to divide these again, or at least some of them, into several parts or members. And when this happens, it is best done, as the speaker comes to each of them, in the order at first laid down; by which means the memory of the hearers will be less burdened, than by a multitude of particulars at one and the same time.

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time. Thus Cicero in his *oration for the Manilian law*, comprises what he designs to say, under three general heads. First, *sais he, I shall speak of the nature of the war, then of its greatness, and lastly, about the choice of a general.* And when he comes to the first of these, he divides it again into four branches, and shews, *how much the glory of the Romans, the safety of their allies, their greatest revenues, and the fortunes of many of their citizens, were all concerned in that war*¹. The second head, in which he considers the greatness of the war, has no division. But when he comes to the third head, concerning the choice of a general, he divides that likewise into four parts, and shews, that so many virtues are necessary in a consummate general, such an one as was proper to have the management of that war, namely: *skill in military affairs, courage, authority, and success*²; all which he attributes to Pompey. And this is the scheme of that celebrated oration. But in making the partition, it is of great service so to dispose the several parts, that they may appear to have a natural dependence upon each other. For, as by this means, what goes before will give light to that which follows; so, on the other hand,

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it will receive strength and support from it. And the several heads ought to be treated on in the same order, wherein they were at first laid down, from which the hearers form to themselves a scheme of the discourse.

As the properties above mentioned are necessary to a good partition, so whatever is contrary to them, must be a fault. But there are likewise some other mistakes incident to a partition, which ought to be avoided. And first, care should be taken not to insert any thing superfluous. And therefore, as Quintilian informs us, some have blamed Cicero's partition in his *defence of Cluentius* on this account. Cluentius had formerly prosecuted his father in law for a design to poison him, and got him convicted. But afterwards lay under the reproach of having bribed some of the judges in that prosecution. And being now himself prosecuted upon a like charge of poison, Cicero thought it requisite to clear him of the former scandal. And this he proposes to do under three heads, by shewing, *that no one was ever prosecuted upon better evidence than his father in law; that some of his accomplices had been convicted before him; and that he had bribed*

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Cap. 4.

*the judges, and not Cluentius*¹. Now if this last head could be proved, the two former were thought by some to be superfluous. But Cicero had doubtless his reasons to insist on them at that time, tho they might not be so obvious afterwards. Again, it is wrong to mix things of a different order. As if a person should say: *My design is to treat of virtue, justice, and temperance.* For justice and temperance are two particular virtues, and therefore ought not to be placed in the same order with virtue in general. But further, some divide their subject into two parts; and propose to treat upon it *negatively* and *positively*; by shewing first what it is not, and then what it is. But while they are employed to prove what it is not, they are not properly treating upon that, but something else; which seems as irregular, as it is unnecessary. For he who proves what a thing is, does at the same time shew what it is not. However in facts there is a sort of division by affirmation and negation, which may sometimes be conveniently used. As if a person, charged with killing another, should thus state his defence: *I had done right if I had killed him, but I did not kill him.* Here indeed, if the latter
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can be plainly made to appear, it may seem needless to insist upon the former.

But if that cannot be so fully proved, but there may be room left for suspicion, it may be proper to make use of both: for all persons do not see things in the same light, and he who beleives the fact, may likewise think it just; while he who thinks it unjust, may not beleive it, but rather suppose, had it really been committed by the party, he would not have denied it, since he looked upon it as defensible. And this method of proceeding Quintilian compares to a custom often used in traffic, when persons make a large demand at first, in order to gain a reasonable price. Cicero uses this way of reasoning, in his *defence of Milo*, but in the contrary order, that is, he first answers the charge, and then justifies the fact, upon the supposition that the charge was true. For he proves first, that Clodius was the aggressor, and not Milo, as the contrary party had asserted; and then to give the greater advantage to his cause, he proceeds to shew, that if Milo had been the aggressor, it would however have been a glorious action to take off such an abandoned wretch, who was not only a common enemy

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. iv.
c. 5.

² *Cap. 12.*

my to mankind, but had likewise often threatened his life.

A good and just partition is attended with considerable advantages. For it gives both light and ornament to a discourse. And it is also a great relief to the hearers, who, by means of these stops and rests, as I may call them, are much better enabled to keep pace with the speaker without confusion, and by casting their thoughts either way, from what has been said, both know, and are prepared for what is to follow. And as persons in travelling a road, with which they are acquainted, go on with greater pleasure and less fatigue, because they know how far it is to their journey's end; so to be apprised of the speaker's design, and the several parts of his discourse, which he proposes to treat on, contributes very much to relieve the hearer, and keep up his attention. This must appear very evident to all, who consider how difficult it is to attend long and closely to one thing, especially when we do not know how long it may be, before we are like to be released. Whereas, when we are before hand acquainted with the scheme, and the speaker proceeds regularly from one thing to another, opportunity

nity is given to ease the mind, by relaxing the attention, and recalling it again when necessary. LECT. XIV.

BUT some orations, especially of the *demonstrative* kind, do not require any particular proposition, being, as I observed in my last discourse, little more than a continued narrative or illustration of the subject. Of this sort is that of Cicero, in which he *returns thanks to Caesar*, in the name of the senate, *for pardoning Marcellus*; and his *invective against Piso*; as likewise Pliny's *panegyric in praise of the emperor Trajan*. Not but that such discourses are disposed in a regular order, and under proper heads, tho they are not laid down at first in distinct propositions. Thus Cicero, in his *oration for Marcellus*, first commends the clemency of Caesar, and then removes his suspicions of any designs formed against him. And the *invective against Piso* likewise contains two parts, his public and private views; as Pliny's *panegyric* does the public and private virtues of Trajan, which he there highly extols. Besides, as Quintilian observes¹, orators sometimes avoid laying down any direct proposition, when the chief thing they have in view, may be disagreeable to those,

to

¹*Inst. orat.*
Lib. iv.
c. 5.

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to whom they address ; for which reason they take them off from attending to it, till they have first prepared them for it, by offering something else, which, when proved, the other may with less difficulty be admitted. Cicero makes use of this art in his *defence* of Ligarius, where his chief design was to persuade Caesar, that Ligarius had not acted against him in the late war from any personal enmity. However he does not directly undertake the proof of this, which he was sensible, would have been an ungrateful subject ; but endeavours to convince him of it as a necessary consequence of his conduct at that time, as was shewn more at large in my last discourse. Again, at other times orators omit something in their partition, which they design in a particular manner to impress upon their hearers, and afterwards introduce it, by saying: *But I must not omit, or I must by no means forget :* or some such expression, that may excite their regard and closer attention to it ; which will be the more easily gained, by the sudden and unexpected manner of proposing it. But as this does not often happen, it must be left to the prudence of the speaker, when it may be proper to make use of it.

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LECTURE XV.

Of Confirmation by Syllogism and Enthymem.

THE orator having acquainted his LECT.
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hearers in the *Proposition* with the subject, on which he designs to discourse, usually proceeds either to prove or illustrate, what he has there laid down. For some discourses require nothing more than an enlargement or illustration, to set them in a proper light, and recommend them to the hearers. For which reason likewise they have often no distinct proposition, as was observed in my last lecture. But where arguments are brought in defence of the subject, this is properly *Confirmation*. For, as Cicero defines it, *Confirmation is that, which gives proof, authority and support to a cause by reasoning* ¹. And for this end, ^{De Invent. Lib. i. c. 24.} if any thing in the proposition seems obscure, or liable to be misunderstood, the orator first takes care to explain it, and then goes on to offer such arguments for the proof of it, and represent them in such a light, as may be most proper to gain the assent of his hearers. But we must distinguish

LECT. XV. distinguish here between the *Arguments* themselves, and *Argumentation*, or the various ways of reasoning from them. Tho in common speech, the word *Argument* is often used for both. But *Arguments*, in the strict sense of the word, are the medium, by which other things are proved, and belong to *Invention*, which as I have formerly shewn, directs to the several topics or heads, from whence they may be taken¹.

¹ See
Lect. V.

My present business therefore is to treat of *Argumentation*, or the several forms and methods of reasoning made use of by orators. For there are different ways of reasoning suited to different arts. The mathematician treats his subject after another manner than the logician, and the orator in a method different from them both. Now as to these forms of reasoning used by orators, the Greek writers make them four; *Syllogism*, *Entbymem*, *Induction*, and *Example*. But Cicero reduces them to two, which he calls *Ratiocination* and *Induction*; comprizing both *Syllogism* and *Entbymem* under *Ratiocination*, and *Example* under *Induction*: so that the difference lies chiefly in their manner of dividing them. I shall follow the division of the Greeks, as more plain and distinct.

A SYLLOGISM then (for I shall begin with that) is a form of reasoning, which consists of three propositions, the last of which is deduced from the two former. The first of these is called the *major Proposition*, or, for brevity, the *Major*; the second, the *minor Proposition*, or *Minor*; and the third, the *Conclusion*. But as the last is opposed to the other two jointly, they are called the *Premises*, and this the *Conclusion*. So we may reduce Cicero's argument, by which he endeavours to prove, that Clodius assaulted Milo, and not Milo Clodius, to a syllogism in this manner:

He was the aggressor, whose advantage it was to kill the other.

But it was the advantage of Clodius to kill Milo, and not Milo's to kill him.

Therefore Clodius was the aggressor, or he assaulted Milo.

The thing to be proved was, that Clodius assaulted Milo, which therefore comes in the conclusion: and the argument, by which it is proved, is taken from the head of profit or advantage. Thus the logician would treat this argument, and if either of the premises was questioned, he would support it with another syllogism. But

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this short and dry way of reasoning does not at all suit the orator, who, not only for variety changes the order of the parts, begining sometimes with the minor, and at other times with the conclusion, and ending with the major; but likewise cloaths each part with such ornaments of expression, as are proper to inliven the subject, and render it more agreeable and entertaining. And he frequently subjoins, either to the major proposition, or minor, and sometimes to both, one or more arguments to support them; and perhaps others to confirm or illustrate them, as he thinks it requisite. Therefore as a logical syllogism consists of three parts or propositions, a rhetorical syllogism frequently contains four, and many times five parts. And Cicero reckons this last the most complete¹. But all that is said in confirmation of either of the premises, is accounted but as one part. This will appear more evident by examples: and therefore I shall endeavour to explain it by an instance or two from Cicero. By a short syllogism then he thus proves, that the Carthaginians were not to be trusted: *Those who have often deceived us, by violating their engagements, ought not to be trusted. For if we receive any damage*
by

¹ De invent. Lib. i.
c. 37.

by their treachery, we can blame no body but ourselves. But the Carthaginians have often so deceived us. Therefore it is madness to trust them¹. Here the major pro-

¹ De invent. Lib. ii.
c. 93.

position is supported by a reason. The minor needed none; because the treachery of the Carthaginians was well known. So that this syllogism consists of four parts. But by a syllogism of five parts he proves somewhat more largely and elegantly, that the world is under the direction of a wise governor. The major is this: *Those things are better governed, which are under the direction of wisdom, than those which are not.* This he proves by several instances: *A house managed with prudence has every thing in better order, and more convenient, than that which is under no regulation. An army commanded by a wise and skilful general, is in all respects better governed, than one which has a fool or a madman at the head of it. And the like is to be said of a ship, which performs her course best under the direction of a skilful pilot.* Then he proceeds to the minor thus: *But nothing is better governed than the universe.* Which he proves in this manner: *The rising and setting of the heavenly bodies keep a certain*

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determined order ; and the several seasons of the year do not only necessarily return in the same manner, but are suited to the advantage of the whole ; nor did the vicissitudes of night and day ever yet become prejudicial, by altering their course. From all which he concludes, That the world must be under the direction of a wise governor¹. In both these examples, the regular order of the parts is observed. I shall therefore produce another, in which the order is directly contrary ; for begining with the conclusion, he proceeds next to the minor proposition, and so ends with the major. This method is not uncommon with Cicero, but the example I shall fix on, is in his defence of Coelius. His design is to prove that Coelius had not led a loose and vicious life, with which his enemies had charged him. And this he does, by shewing he had closely followed his studies, and was a good orator. This may probably at first sight appear but a weak argument ; tho to him who considers, what Cicero every where declares necessary to gain that character, it may perhaps be thought otherwise. The sense of what he says here may be reduced to this syllogism.

¹ De Invent. Lib. i.
c. 34.

Those

Those who have pursued the study of oratory, so as to excel in it, cannot have led a loose and vicious life.

But Coelius has done this.

Therefore his enemies charge him wrongfully.

But let us hear Cicero himself. He begins, as I said, with the conclusion, thus : *Coelius is not chargeable with profuseness, extravagancy, contracting of debts, or intemperance, a vice which age is so far from abating, that it rather increases it. Nay, he never ingaged in amours, and those pleasures of youth, as they are called, which are soon thrown off, as reason prevails. Then he proceeds to the minor, and shews from the effects, that Coelius had closely applied himself to the best arts, by which he means those necessary for an orator : You have now heard him make his own defence, and you formerly heard him ingaged in a prosecution (I speak this to vindicate, not to applaud him) you could not but perceive his manner of speaking, his ability, his good sense, and command of language. Nor did he only discover a good genius, which will oftentimes do much of itself, when it is not improved by industry ; but what he said (if my affection for him did not bias my judgement) appeared*

to be the effect of learning, application, and study. And then he comes to the major: But be assured, that those vices charged upon Coelius, and the studies upon which I am now discoursing, cannot meet in the same person. For it is not possible that a mind disturbed by such irregular passions, should be able to go thro what we orators do, I do not mean only in speaking, but even in thinking. And this he proves by an argument taken from the scarcity of good orators. Can any other reason be imagined, why so few, both now, and at all times, have ingaged in this province, when the rewards of eloquence are so magnificent, and it is attended with so great delight, applause, glory, and honor? All pleasures must be neglected; diversions, recreations, and entertainments omitted; and even the conversation of all our freinds must in a manner be laid aside. This it is which deters persons from the labor and study of oratory;

† Cap. 19 not their want of genius, or education¹. But sometimes, as I hinted above, several arguments, and those of a different kind, are brought to support each proposition, which draw out the syllogism to a great length. Nay sometimes a whole discourse shall be formed upon one principal syllogism. It is necessary therefore to observe, what

what the orator chiefly designs to prove; and for what end every particular argument is offered; and whether it be immediately connected with either of the propositions, or with something brought to support them: for the propositions may both be true, and the conclusion fairly deduced from them; tho some of the reasons brought to support them, considered separately, appear weak and inconclusive. For in popular discourses, orators often intersperse some things in the course of their reasoning, which they know to be agreeable to the sentiments of their hearers, tho in themselves of less weight, and which they would not offer upon other occasions.

BUT orators do not often use complete syllogisms, but most commonly *Entbymems*, which make the second kind of reasoning, I proposed to explain. Now an *Entbymem* is an imperfect syllogism, consisting of two parts; the *Conclusion*, and one of the *Premises*. And in this kind of syllogism, that proposition is omitted, whether it be the major or minor, which is sufficiently manifest of itself, and may easily be supplied by the hearers. But the proposition that is expressed, is usually called the *Antecedent*,

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and the conclusion the *Consequent*. So if the major of that syllogism be omitted, by which Cicero endeavours to prove, that Clodius assaulted Milo, it will make this *Enthymem*:

The death of Milo would have been an advantage to Clodius.

*Therefore Clodius was the aggressor ;
or, therefore he assaulted Milo*¹.

¹ Pro Mi-
lon. c. 12.

In like manner that other syllogism above mentioned, by which he shews that the Carthaginians ought not to be trusted, by omitting the minor, may be reduced to the following *Enthymem*:

*Those who have often broke their faith,
ought not to be trusted.*

*For which reason the Carthaginians
ought not to be trusted.*

Every one would readily supply the minor, since the perfidiousness of the Carthaginians was known to a proverb. But it is reckoned a beauty in *Enthymems*, when they consist of contrary parts : because the turn of them is most acute and pungent. Such is that of Micipsa in Sallust : *What stranger will be faithful to you, who are an enemy to your freinds*² ? And so likewise that of Cicero for Milo, speaking of Clodius : *You sit as avengers of his death ;*
whose

² Bell Jug.
c. 10.

*whose life you would not restore, did you think it in your power*¹. Orators manage *Entbymems* in the same manner they do *fyllogisms*, that is, they invert the order of the parts, and confirm the proposition by one or more reasons: and therefore a rhetorical *Entbymem* frequently consists of three parts, as a *fyllogism* does of five. Tho strictly speaking, a *fyllogism* can consist of no more than three parts, and an *Entbymem* but of two; and the arguments brought to support either of the propositions constitute so many new *Entbymems*, of which the part they are designed to prove is the conclusion. I will endeavour to illustrate this by the following example:

*An honest man thinks himself under the highest obligations to his country.
Therefore he should shun no danger to serve it.*

In this *Entbymem* the major is wanting, which would run thus: *He who is under the highest obligations to another, should shun no danger in order to serve him.* This last proposition is founded upon the common principle of gratitude, which requires, that to the utmost of our power, a return should be made in proportion to the kindness received.

ceived. And this being a maxim generally allowed, it is omitted by the orator. But now this *Entbymem*, consisting of the minor and conclusion, might be managed in some such manner as this, begining with the conclusion: *An honest man ought to shun no danger, but readily expose his life for the safety and preservation of his country.* Then the reason for this conduct might be added, which is the antecedent of the *Entbymem*, or minor of the syllogism: *For he is sensible, that his obligations to his country are so many, and so great, that he can never fully requite them.* And this again might be confirmed by an enumeration of particulars: *He looks upon himself indebted to his country for every thing he enjoys, for his freinds, relations, all the pleasures of life, and even for life itself.* Now the orator, as I have said, calls this one *Entbymem*, tho in reality there are two. For the second reason or argument added to the first becomes the antecedent of a new *Entbymem*, of which the first reason is the consequent. And if these two *Entbymems* were expressed separately in the natural order of the parts, the former would stand thus: *An honest man thinks himself under the highest obligations to his country. Therefore he ought to shun no dan-*
ger

ger for its preservation. The latter thus: *An honest man esteems himself indebted to his country for every thing he enjoys. Therefore he thinks he is under the highest obligations to it. The same thing might be proved in the like way of reasoning, by arguments of a different kind. From comparison thus: As it would be thought base and ungrateful in a son not to hazard himself for the preservation of his father; an honest man must certainly esteem it so, when his country is in danger. Or from an example in this manner: An honest man in like circumstances would propose to himself the example of Decius, who freely gave up his life for the service of his country. He gave up his life indeed, but did not lose it; for he cannot be said to have lost his life, who lives in immortal honor. And orators frequently intermix such arguments to adorn and illustrate their subject, with others taken from the nature and circumstances of things. And now, if we consider a little this method of reasoning, we shall find it the most plain and easy imaginable. For when any proposition is laid down, and one or more reasons subjoined to prove it, each reason joined with the proposition makes a distinct *Enthymem*, of which the proposition is the conclusion.*

Thus

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Thus Cicero in his seventh Philippic, lays down this as the foundation of his discourse.

That he is against a peace with Mark Antony.

For which he gives three reasons: *Because it is base, because it is dangerous, and because*

¹ *Cap. 3.* *it is impracticable*¹. These severally joined with the proposition form three *Entbymems*, and upon each of these he discourses separately, which make up that oration. And this method is what persons for the most part naturally fall into, who know nothing of the terms *Syllogism* or *Entbymem*. They advance something, and think of a reason to prove it, and another perhaps to support that, and so far as their invention will assist them, or they are masters of language, they endeavour to set what they say in the plainest light, give it the best dress, embellish it with proper figures, and different turns of expression, and, as they think convenient, illustrate it with similitudes, comparisons, and the like ornaments, to render it most agreeable, till they think what they have advanced sufficiently proved. As this method of arguing therefore is the most plain, easy and natural; so it is what is most commonly used in oratory. Whereas a strict syllogistical way of discoursing is dry and jejune, cramps the mind, and does not admit

admit of those embellishments of language, which are a great advantage to the orator: for which reason he seldom uses complete syllogisms, and when he does, it is with great latitude. However syllogistical reasoning is very useful, tho not in popular discourses: for every argument may be reduced to a syllogism, and if it will not hold in that form, there is certainly some flaw in it, which by that means will most easily be discovered.

I HAVE now gone thro the two first ways of reasoning made use of by orators; there are two others yet remaining, but these I must defer to my next discourse.

LECTURE XVI.

*Of Confirmation by Induction and Example.*LECT.
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THAT there are different ways of reasoning, suited to different arts, was shewn in my last discourse. The forms made use of by orators are four; *Syllogism, Enthymem, Induction, and Example*: the two first of which I then explained, and shall now procede to consider the other two, begining with *Induction*.

Now it is called *Induction*, when one thing is infered from several others, by reason of the similitude between them. And this way of reasoning is often very useful in popular discourses. For many persons are sooner moved by examples, and similitudes, than by arguments taken from the nature of things. Every one either endeavours to think right, or at least would be esteemed so to do. But it is often no easy matter to take in the force of an argument, especially for those, who have not been accustomed to examine things closely, and weigh them duly in their minds. And therefore when this cannot be done without some pain and uneasiness to the mind,

till

till it become habitual by practice; it is not to be wondred at, if such persons are best pleased with that way of reasoning, by which they imagine they can form a judgement of things with the greatest ease and facility. But tho inductions are made from all kinds of similitudes; yet those usually carry the greatest force with them, which are drawn from like facts. Such is that of Cicero in his *oration for the Manilian law*. For when some persons objected to Pompey's being intrusted with the Mithridatic war, as a thing not customary to put such an accession of power into the hands of one man: Cicero removes that objection, by producing several instances of the like nature, and particularly shews, that more new honors had already been conferred on Pompey, than upon any other Roman citizen before him, which had all been employed to the advantage of the state. *I will not, sais he, take notice that two very great wars, the Punic and Carthaginian, were both managed by one general; and two very powerful cities, which threatned this empire most, Carthage and Numantia, both destroyed by the same Scipio. I will not observe, that both you and your fathers thought fit to place the safety of*

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the government alone in Caius Marius, and that the same person should carry on the war with Jugurtha, with the Cimbrians, and the Teutons. You remember how many new powers have already been conferred on Pompey; which he then proceeds to enumerate, and from thence infers, that the objection of novelty was no just reason against his being intrusted with the conduct of that important

*Pro Leg.
Man. c. 20.*

war. And as to other similitudes, it may thus be shewn by *Induction*, that virtuous habits are gained and improved by practice: Bodily strength is increased and confirmed by daily exercise. All manual arts are acquired by repeated trials and experiments. The liberal sciences are also attained by constant study and application. And in like manner the mind is formed to virtue, and improved in it, by the continued practice of right actions.

BUT there is one particular form of *Induction*, called *Socratic*; because Socrates very frequently used that way of reasoning. It proceeds by several questions, which being separately granted, the thing designed to be infered is afterwards put, which, by reason of its similitude with the several cases allowed before, cannot be denied. But this is a captious way of reasoning,

ning, for while the respondent is not aware of what is designed to be infered, he is easily induced to make those concessions, which otherwise he would not. Besides, it is not so well suited to continued discourses, as to those which are interlocutory; and therefore we meet with it ofteneft in the *Socratic dialogues* both of Plato and Xenophon. However it may be made use of in oratory by a figure called *Subjection*¹, when the same person first puts the question, and then makes the answer. So in the famous *cause of Epaminondas*, general of the Thebans, who was accused for refusing to surrender his command to his successor, appointed by the state, till after he had engaged the enemy, and given them a total defeat. Cicero thus represents his accuser pleading for the words of the law against Epaminondas, who alleged the intention of it in his defence: *Should Epaminondas add that exception to the law, which, he sais, was the intention of the writer, namely: Except any one refuse to give up his command, when it is for the interest of the public he should not, Would you admit of it? I beleive not. Should you yourselves, which is a thing most remote from your justice and wisdom, to screen*
VOL. I. R him,

¹ See Lect. XXXII. in Hypobole.

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him, order this exception to be added to the law, without the command of the people, *Would the Thebans suffer it to be done? No certainly. Can it be right then to come into that, as if it was written, which it would be a crime to write? I know it cannot be agreeable to your wisdom to think so*¹.

¹ De Invent. Lib. i.
c. 33.

I COME now to the fourth and last manner of reasoning above mentioned, and that is *Example*. But rhetoricians use this word in a different sense from the common acceptance. For that is usually called an example, which is brought either to prove or illustrate some general assertion. As if any one should say, that *human bodies may be brought to sustain the greatest labors by use and exercise*; and in order to prove this should relate, what is said of Milo of Croton, that *by the constant practice of carrying a calf several furlongs every day, he could carry it as far after it was grown to its full size*². But in oratory the word *Example* is used for any kind of similitude: or, as Vossius defines it, *When one thing is infered from another, by reason of the likeness which appears between them*³. Hence it is called an *imperfect Induction*, which infers something from several others of a like nature. But, as was observed before,

in

² Erasmi.
Chil.
p. 193.

³ Orat.
Partit.
Lib. iii.

c. 7. §. 16.

in speaking of induction, so likewise in examples, those have the greatest force in reasoning, which are taken from facts. Now facts may be compared with respect to some agreement or similitude between them, which in themselves are either equal or unequal. Of the former kind this is an instance: *Cato acted as became a patriot, and a lover of his country's liberty, in opposing the arms of Caesar; and therefore so did Cicero.* The reason of the inference is founded in the parity of the case, which equally concerned all good subjects of the Roman government at that time. For all were alike obliged to oppose a common enemy, who endeavoured to subvert the constitution, and subject them to his own arbitrary power. But tho an example consists in the comparison of two single facts, yet several persons may be concerned in each fact. Of this kind is that which follows: *As Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus, acted illegally in the first triumvirate, by ingrossing the sole power into their own hands, and by that means violating the public liberty; so likewise did Augustus, Mark Antony, and Lepidus, in the second triumvirate, by pursuing the same measures.* But when Cicero defends Milo

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for killing Clodius, from the like instances of Ahala Servilius, Scipio Nafica, Lucius Opimius, and others, that is not an example, but an induction; because one thing is there infered from its similitude to several others. But when a comparison is made between two facts that are unequal, the inference may be either from the greater to the less, or from the less to the greater. From the greater to the less in this manner: *Caesar had no just pretensions to the Roman government, and therefore much less had Antony.* The reason lies in the difference between the two persons. Caesar had very much enlarged the bounds of the Roman empire by his conquests, and greatly obliged the populace by his generosity; but as he had always acted by an authority from the senate and people of Rome, these things gave him no claim to a power over them. Much less then had Antony any such pretence, who always acted under Caesar, and had never performed any signal services himself. Cicero has described the difference between them in a very beautiful manner in his *second Philippic*, thus speaking to Antony: *Are you in any thing to be compared to him? He had a genius, sagacity, memory, learning,*

care,

care, thought, diligence; he had performed great things in war, tho detrimental to the state; he had for many years designed to get the government into his hands, and obtained his end by much labor and many dangers; he gained over the ignorant multitude by public shows, buildings, congiaries, and feasts; obliged his freinds by rewards, and his enemies by a shew of clemency. In a word, he subjected a free state to slavery, partly thro fear, and partly compliance. I can liken you to him for ambition of power, but in other things you are in no respect to be compared with him¹. By a comparison from the¹ *Cap. 45.* less to the greater, Cicero thus argues against Catiline: *Did the brave Scipio, when a private man, kill Tiberius Gracchus, for attempting to weaken the state; and shall we consuls bear with Catiline endeavouring to destroy the world by fire and sword²?* ^{*2 In Catil. i. c. 1.*} The circumstances of these two cases were very different; and the comparison runs between a private man, and a consul intrusted with the highest authority; between a design only to raise a tumult, and a plot to destroy the government: whence the orator justly infers, that what was esteemed lawful in one case, was much more so in the other. The like way of

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reasoning is sometimes used from other similitudes, which may be taken from things of all kinds, whether animate or inanimate. Of the former sort is that of Cicero speaking of Muraena, when candidate for the consulship, after he had himself gone thro that office: *If it is usual, sais he, for such persons, who are safely arrived in port, to give those, who are going out, the best account they can, with relation to the weather, pirates, and coasts; because thus nature directs us to assist those, who are entering upon the same dangers, which we ourselves have escaped: how ought I, who now after a great storm am brought within a near prospect of land, to be affected towards him, who, I perceive, must be exposed to the greatest tempests of the state?* He alludes to the late disturbances and tumults occasioned by the conspiracy of Catiline, which had been so happily suppressed by him in the time of his consulship. Of the latter kind is that of Quintilian: *As the ground is made better and more fruitful by culture, so is the mind by instruction.* There is both a beauty and justness in this simile.

1 Pro
Muraen.
c. 2.

* Inst. orat.
Lib. viii.
c. 3.

BUT comparisons are sometimes made between facts and other things, in order

to

to infer some difference or opposition between them. In comparing two facts, on the account of some disagreement and unlikeness, the inference is made from the difference between one and the other in that particular respect only. As thus : *Tho it was not esteemed cruelty in Brutus to put his two sons to death, for endeavouring to betray their country ; it might be so in Manlius, who put his son to death, only for ingaging the enemy without orders, tho he gained the victory.* The difference between the two facts, lies in the different nature of the crime. The sons of Brutus entered into a conspiracy to betray their country, and tho they miscarried in it, yet the intention and endeavours they used to accomplish it were criminal in the highest degree. But young Manlius could only be charged with rashness. His design was honorable, and intended for the interest of his country ; only it was irregular, and might have proved of ill consequence to military discipline. Now in all such cases, the force of the argument is the stronger, the greater the difference appears. But the same facts, which differ in one respect, may agree in many others. As in the example

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here mentioned, Brutus and Manlius were both magistrates as well as fathers; they both killed their sons, and that for a capital crime by the Roman law: in any of which respects they may be compared in a way of similitude. As, *If Brutus might lawfully put his son to death for a capital crime; so might Manlius.* But now contrary facts do not only differ in some certain respect, but are wholly opposite to each other; so that what is affirmed of the one, must be denied of the other; and if one be a virtue, the other is a vice. Thus Cicero compares the conduct of Marcellus and Verres in a way of opposition. *Marcellus, says he, who had engaged, if he took Syracuse, to erect two temples at Rome, would not beautify them with the spoils he had taken: Verres, who had made no vows to honor and virtue, but to Venus and Cupid, endeavoured to plunder the temple of Minerva. The former would not adorn the gods with the spoils of other deities: the latter carried the ornaments of Minerva, a virgin, into the house of a strumpet¹.* If therefore the conduct of Marcellus was laudable and virtuous, that of Verres must bear the contrary character. But this way of reasoning has likewise place in other

¹ In Verr.
iv. c. 55.

respects. Thus Cicero in the quarrel between Caesar and Pompey, advised to peace from the difference between a foreign and domestic war: That the former might prove beneficial to the state; but in the latter, which ever side conquered, the public must suffer. And thus the ill effects of intemperance may be shewn in a way of opposition. That as temperance preserves the health of the body, keeps up the vigor of the mind, and prolongs life; so excess must necessarily have the contrary effects.

FROM what has been said upon these heads of *Induction* and *Example*, they appear to consist of three parts; the thing designed to be proved, that which is brought to prove it, and the similitude or dissimilitude between them according to the nature of the inference. And great care must be taken, that what is introduced, on the account of which it is expected some other thing should be granted, be itself very plain and evident. The similitude likewise or dissimilitude between that, and the thing it is brought to prove, ought to be no less obvious. For in every induction and example, the thing or things, from a comparison with which we infer

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our conclusion, carries in it the force of a medium or argument, and the whole induction or example has the nature of an *Entbymem* or imperfect syllogism. However rhetoricians have thought fit to separate these from other *Entbymems*, because they seemed to require a distinct and particular explication.

Thus I have given a breif account of the principal ways of reasoning commonly made use of by orators. And it is very proper to vary them in a discourse, and not keep too close to the same form; for a want of variety in this, as well as in other cases, will soon create a disrelish. As to the disposition of arguments, or the order of placing them, some advise to put the weaker, which cannot wholly be omitted, in the middle; and such as are stronger, partly in the begining, to gain the esteem of the hearers, and render them more attentive; and partly at the end, because what is last heard, is likely to be retained longest: but if there are but two arguments, to place the stronger first, and then the weaker; and after that to return again to the former, and insist principally upon that. But this must be left to the prudence of the speaker, and the nature of the subject.

ject. Tho to begin with the strongest, and so gradually descend to the weakest, can never be proper, for the reason last mentioned. Nor ought arguments to be crowded too close upon one another; for that takes off from their force, as it breaks in upon the attention of the hearers, and does not leave them sufficient time duly to consider them. Nor indeed should more be used than are necessary, because the fewer they are, the more easily they are remembered. And the observation of a great master of eloquence upon this subject is certainly very just, that, *Arguments ought rather to be weighed, than numbered* ¹.

¹ Cic.
De orat.
Lib. ii.
c. 76.

LECTURE XVII.


*Of Confutation.*LECT.
XVII.

CONFIRMATION, of which I last discoursed, is often attended with a *Confutation* of what either has been, or may be advanced to the contrary. And in treating of *Disposition*, rhetoricians generally place this after *Confirmation*, which seems agreeable to the natural method of thinking upon any subject. For persons first endeavour to find out such arguments, as are proper to maintain that side of a question, which they espouse, before they consider, what objections may be offered against it. Tho in speaking it may be requisite to vary the order, according to the nature of the discourse. And the method prescribed by Quintilian is this, that, *If we bring a charge, we should first prove it, and then answer objections; but if we stand upon the defence, we ought to begin with confutation*¹. And there seems to be good reason for this different procedure. For he who either speaks alone, or first, endeavours to support what he says with reason and arguments; and till that be done,

¹*Inst. orat.*
Lib. v.
c. 13.

done, there is no room to move objections. But, on the contrary, to confute what another has before offered, is sometimes sufficient to carry a cause. And when it is otherwise, it is however frequently necessary to take off the force of what has been advanced, in order to make way for a candid reception of the opposite opinion. Wherefore, unless there be some particular reason to the contrary, it seems generally most commodious to follow this method, which from several orations of Cicero appears to have been his usual custom.

THE forms of reasoning are the same here, as have been already explained under *Confirmation*. And therefore what I propose at present, is only to give a breif account of the different ways of *Confutation* made use of by orators, which is often the more difficult task; because he, who is to prove a thing, comes usually prepared; but he, who is to confute it, is frequently left to a sudden answer. For which reason in *judicial* cases Quintilian sais: *It is as much easier to accuse, than to defend; as it is to make a wound, than to heal it*¹. There-^{Ubi su-}fore not only a good judgement, but a^{pra.} readiness of thought also, seems necessary for this province. But in all disputes it is

LECT. is of the greatest consequence to observe,
XVII.  where the stress of the controversy lies.

For without attending to this, persons may cavil about different matters without understanding each other, or deciding any thing. And in confutation, what the adversary has advanced ought carefully to be considered, and in what manner he has expressed himself. As to the things themselves; whether they immediately relate to the matter in dispute, or are foreign to it. Those things that are foreign to the subject, may either be past over in silence, or in a very few words shewn to be insignificant. And there ought likewise to be a distinction made between such things as relate to the subject, according to their importance. Those that appear to have no great weight, should be slightly remarked. For to insist largely upon such matters is both tiresome to the hearers, and apt to bring the judgement of the speaker into question. And therefore things of that nature are generally better turned off with an air of neglect, a pungent question, or an agreeable jest; than confuted by a serious and laboured answer. But those things, which relate to the merits of the cause, may be confuted either by con-

tradicting

tradicting them, or by shewing some mistake in the reasoning, or their invalidity when granted.

THINGS may be contradicted several ways. What is apparently false, may be expressly denied. Thus Cicero in his defence of Cluentius: *When the accuser had said, that the man fell down dead, after he had drunk off his cup; denies, that he died that day*¹. And things which the adversary cannot prove, may likewise be denied. Of which we have also an instance in Cicero, who first upbraids Mark Antony as guilty of a breach not only of good breeding, but likewise of freindship, for reading publicly a private letter he had sent him. And then adds: *But what will you say now, if I should deny that ever I sent you that letter? How will you prove it? By the hand writing? In which I confess you have a peculiar skill, and have found the benefit of it. But how can you make it out? For it is in my secretary's hand. I cannot but envy your master, who had so great a reward for teaching you to understand just nothing. For what can be more unbecoming not only an orator, but even a man, than for any one to offer such things, which if the adversary denies, he has nothing more*

Cap. 60.

LECT. XVII.

¹ Philipp.
ii. c. 4.² Quint.
Inst. orat.
Lib. v.
c. 13.

to say ¹? It is an handsome way of contradicting a thing, by shewing, that the adversary himself maintained the contrary. So when Oppius was charged with defrauding the soldiers of their provisions, Cicero refutes it, by proving, that the same persons charged Oppius with a design to corrupt the army by his liberality ². An adversary is never more effectually silenced, than when you can fasten contradictions upon him; for this is stabbing him with his own weapon. Sometimes a thing is not in express terms denied, but represented to be utterly incredible. And this method exposes the adversary more than a bare denial. So when some persons reproached Cicero with cowardice, and a shameful fear of death; he recites their reasons in such a manner, that any one would be inclined to think the charge entirely false. *Was it becoming me, saies he, to expect death, with that composedness of mind, as some have imagined? Well, and did I then avoid it? Nay, was there any thing in the world that I could apprehend more desirable? Or when I had done the greatest things in such a crowd of ill minded persons about me, do you think banishment, and death, were not always in my view? and continually*

usually sounding in my ears, as my certain fate, while I was so employed? Was life desirable, when all my friends were in such sorrow, and myself in so great distress, deprived of all the gifts both of nature and fortune? Was I so unexperienced, so ignorant, so void of reason and prudence? Had I never seen, nor heard any thing in my whole life? Did all I had read, and studied avail nothing? What? did not I know that life is short, but the glory of generous actions permanent? When death is appointed for all, does it not seem eligible, that life, which must be wrested from us, should rather be freely devoted to the service of our country, than reserved to be worn out by the decays of nature. Was not I sensible, there has been this controversy among the wisest men, that some say, the minds of men and their consciousness utterly perish at death; and others, that the minds of wise and brave men are then in their greatest strength and vigor, when they are set free from the body? The first state is not greatly to be dreaded, to be void of sense; but the other, of enjoying larger capacities, is greatly to be desired. Therefore since I always aimed at dignity, and thought nothing was worth living for without it; how should I, who am

LECT. XVII. *past the consulship, and did so great things in it, be afraid to die¹? Thus far Cicero.*

¹ *Pro Sext.*
c. 21.

There is likewise an ironical way of contradicting a thing, by retorting that and other things of the like nature upon the adverse party. Thus Cicero in his *oration against Vatinius* says: *You have objected to me, that I defended Cornelius, my old friend, and your acquaintance. But pray why should I not have defended him? Has Cornelius carried any law contrary to the omens? Has he violated any law? Has he assaulted the consul? Did he take possession of a temple by force of arms? Did he drive away the tribune, who opposed the passing a law? Has he thrown contempt upon religion? Has he plundered the treasury? Has he pillaged the state?*

² *Cap. 2.* *No, these, all these, are your doings²? Such an unexpected return is sometimes of great service to abate the confidence of an adversary.*

A SECOND way of *Confutation* is, by observing some *flaw* in the reasoning of the adverse party. I shall endeavour to illustrate this from the several kinds of reasoning, treated of before under *Confirmation*. And first as to *Syllogisms*, they may be refuted either by shewing some mistake in the premises, or that the conclusion

clusion is not justly deduced from them. So when the Clodian party contended, that Milo ought to suffer death for this reason, because he had confessed that he had killed Clodius, that argument reduced to a syllogism, would stand thus :

He who confesses he has killed another, ought not to be allowed to see the light.

But Milo confesses this.

Therefore he ought not to live.

Now the force of this argument lies in the major or first proposition, which Cicero refutes by proving, that the Roman people had already determined contrary to what is there asserted : *In what city, saïs he, do these men dispute after this weak manner ? In that wherein the first capital trial was in the case of the brave Horatius, who, before the city enjoyed perfect freedom, was saved by the suffrages of the Roman people, tho he confessed, that he killed his sister with his own hand* ¹. But when Cicero accused Verres for male administration in his government of Sicily, Hortensius, who defended him, being sensible the allegations brought against him could not be denied, had no other way left to bring him off, but by pleading his military virtues in abatement, which at that time were much

Pro Milon. c. 3.

LECT. wanted, and very serviceable to the state.
XVII. The form of the argument was this :

That the Romans then wanted good generals.

That Verres was such.

And consequently, that it was for the interest of the public he should not be condemned.

But Cicero, who knew his design, states the argument for him in his charge, and then answers it by denying the consequence, since the crimes of Verres were of so heinous a nature, that he ought by no means to be pardoned, on the account of any other qualifications. Tho indeed he afterwards refutes the minor or second proposition, and shews that he had not merited the character of a good general¹. *Enthymems* may be refuted, either by shewing that the antecedent is false, or the consequent not justly infered from it. As thus, with respect to the former case :

¹ Lib. 5.
in Verr.
c. 1.

A strict adherence to virtue has often proved detrimental.

Therefore virtue ought not constantly to be embraced.

Here the antecedent may be denied. For virtue is always beneficial to those, who steadily adhere to it, both in the present
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satisfaction it affords them, and the future rewards they may certainly expect from it. And as to the latter case in this manner:

She is a mother.

Therefore she loves her children.

Now as the certainty of that inference depends upon this general assertion, That all mothers love their children, which is not true, the mistake of the reasoning may be shewn from the instance of Medea and others, who destroyed their own children. As to *Induction* and *Example*, by which the truth or equity of a thing is proved from its likeness to one or more other things, the reasoning in either is invalid, if the things so compared can be shewn not to have that similitude or agreement, on which the inference is founded. One instance therefore may serve for both. As when Cicero, after the death of Caesar, pleaded for the continuance of his laws, but not of those, which were made afterwards by Mark Antony. Because tho both were in themselves invalid, and impositions upon the public liberty; yet some of Caesar's were useful, and others could not be set aside without disturbance to the state, and injuring particular persons; but

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those

LECT. those of Antony were all detrimental to
XVII. the public ¹.

¹ *Philipp.*
i. c. 9.

THE last method of *Confutation* before mentioned was, when the orator does in some sense *grant* the adversary his argument, and at the same time shews its *invalidity*. And this is done by a variety of ways, according to the different nature of the subject. Sometimes he allows what was said may be true, but pleads, that what he contends for is necessary. This was the method, by which Hortensius proposed to bring off Verres, as I have already shewn from Cicero, whose words are these, addressing himself to the judges: *What shall I do? which way shall I bring in my accusation? where shall I turn myself? for the character of a brave general is placed like a wall against all the attacks I can make. I know the place, I perceive where Hortensius intends to display himself. He will recount the hazards of war, the necessities of the state, the scarcity of commanders; and then he will intreat you, and do his utmost to persuade you, not to suffer the Roman people to be deprived of such a commander, upon the testimony of the Sicilians; nor the glory of his arms to be sullied by a charge of avarice* ². At other times the orator pleads, that

² in *Verr.*
Lib. v.
c. 1.

that altho the contrary opinion may seem to be attended with advantage, yet that his own is more just or honorable. Such was the case of Regulus, when his freinds endeavoured to prevail with him to continue at Rome, and not return to Carthage, where he knew he must undergo a cruel death. But as this could not be done without violating his oath, he refused to hearken to their persuasions ¹. ¹ See

Another way of *Confutation* is, by retorting ^{Lect. VIII.} upon the adversary his own argument. Thus Cicero in his *defence of Ligarius* sais: *You have, Tubero, that which is most desirable to an accuser, the confession of the accused party; but yet such a confession, that he was on the same side that you, Tubero, chose yourself, and your father too, a man worthy the highest praise: Wherefore, if there was any crime in this, you ought first to confess your own, before you attempt to fasten any upon Ligarius* ². The orator ² ^{Cap. 1.} takes this advantage, where an argument proves too much, that is, more than the person designed it for, who made use of it. Not much unlike this is, what they call *Inversion*, by which the orator shews, that the reasons offered by the opposite party make for him. So when Caecilius

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urged,

LECT.
XVII.

urged, that the province of accusing Verres ought to be granted to him; and not to Cicero, because he had been his treasurer in Sicily, at the time those crimes were committed, with which he was charged, and consequently knew most of that affair: Cicero turns the argument upon him, and shews, for that very reason he was the most unfit of any man to be intrusted with his prosecution; since having been concerned with him in his crimes, he would certainly do all in his power to conceal, or lessen them¹. Again, sometimes the charge is acknowledged, but the crime shifted off to another. Thus when Sextius was accused of sedition, because he had got together a body of gladiators, and brought them into the forum, where a warm engagement happened between them and Clodius's faction; Cicero owns the fact, but charges the crime of sedition upon Clodius's party in being the aggressors². Another method made use of for the same purpose is, to alleviate the charge, and take off the force of it, by shewing, that the thing was not done with that intention, which the adversary insinuates. Thus Cicero in his *defence of king Dejotarus*,

¹ *In Caecil.*
c. 18.

² *Pro Sext.*
c. 36.

owns

owns he had raised some forces, tho not to invade the Roman territories, as had been alleged, but only to defend his own borders, and send aid to the Roman generals¹. Some other ways might be mentioned, especially in *judicial* cases; but I have formerly treated so largely upon them in their proper place, that I need not here repeat them.

¹ Cap. 8.

I HAVE hitherto been speaking of the methods of *Confutation* used by orators, in answering those arguments, which are brought by the contrary party. But sometimes they raise such objections themselves, to what they have said, as they imagine may be made by others; which they afterwards answer, the better to induce their hearers to think, that nothing considerable can be offered against what they have advanced, but what will admit of an easy reply. I shall endeavour to illustrate this by one instance. When Cicero, at the request of the Sicilians, had undertaken the accusation of Verres, it came under debate, whether he, or Cæcilius, who had been Verres's quæstor in Sicily, should be admitted to that province. Cicero therefore in order to set him

LECT.
XVII.

him aside, among other arguments, shews his incapacity for such an undertaking, and for that end recounts at large the qualifications necessary for an orator. Which he represents to be so many and great, that he thought it necessary to start the following objection, to what he had himself said upon that subject. *But you will say perhaps: Have you all these qualifications?* To which he thus replies: *I wish I had; but it has been my constant study from my youth to gain them. And if from their greatness and difficulty I have not been able to attain them, who have done nothing else thro my whole life; how far do you imagine, you must be from it, who never thought of them before; and even now, when you are entering upon them, have no apprehension, what, and how great they are?*¹ This is an effectual way of defeating an adversary, when the objection is well founded, and clearly answered. But I shall have occasion to consider this matter more largely hereafter, under the figure *Prolepsis*, to which it properly relates.

¹In Caecil.
c. 12.

As to the order and disposition of the arguments, proper to be used in confutation:

tion: whether to follow the adverse party, LECT.
XVII.
or alter his method, and range them in
a different manner, as likewise whether
to attack the weakest, or strongest argu-
ments first; these things must be left to
the discretion of the speaker.

L E C-

LECTURE XVIII.

*Of the Conclusion.*LECT.
XVIII.

IN speaking, says Cicero, nature itself prescribes this method, to say something before we come to our subject, then to propose the subject, after that to support it by our own arguments, and refute those brought against it, and so to conclude¹. And in this order I proposed to treat of the several parts, which constitute a complete and regular discourse; and have accordingly gone thro each of them, except the last, namely, the *Conclusion*, which at present remains to be considered. Now as the design of the *Introduction* is to prepare the hearers for a favorable regard and attention, to what the speaker proposes to say; so in the *Conclusion* his view is to prevail with them, to fall in with what he has said. And agreeably to the methods proper for this purpose, rhetoricians make the *Conclusion* of a discourse to consist of two parts: *Recapitulation*, and *an address to the Passions*.

¹ De orat.
Lib. ii.
c. 76.

RECAPITULATION is a summary account of what the speaker has before offered in maintenance of his subject; and
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is designed both to refresh the memory of the hearers, and to bring the principal arguments together into a narrow compass, that they may appear in a stronger light. Now there are several things necessary to a good repetition.

AND first, it must be short and concise, since it is designed to refresh the memory, and not to burden it. For this end therefore the chief things only are to be touched upon; those on which the cause principally depends, and which the orator is most desirous should be regarded by his hearers. Now these are the general heads of the discourse, with the main arguments brought to support them. But either to insist particularly upon every minute circumstance, or to inlarge upon those heads, which may be thought proper to mention, carries in it not so much the appearance of a repetition, as of a new discourse.

AGAIN, it is convenient in a repetition to recite things in the same order, in which they were at first laid down. By this means the hearers will be enabled much better to keep pace with the speaker, as he goes along; and if they happen to have forgot any thing, they will the more readily recall it. And besides, this method

appears

LECT.
XVIII.

appears most simple and open, when the speaker reviews what he has said in the same manner it was before delivered, and sets it in the clearest light, for others to judge of it. And hence he sometimes uses such expressions as these: *This I have shewn*: and, *This I hope, has been made very evident*¹. And, at other times, as it were appealing to his hearers, he inquires: *Whether any thing has been omitted*: or, *If he has not fully made out his point*. But tho a repetition contains only the same things, which had been more largely treated of before; yet it is not necessary they should be expressed in the same words. Nay this would many times be tiresome, and unpleasant to the hearers; whereas a variety of expression is grateful, provided the sense be the same. Besides every thing ought now to be represented in the strongest terms, and in so lively a manner, as may at the same time both entertain the audience, and make the deepest impression upon their minds. We have a very exact and accurate example of repetition in Cicero's oration for Quintius. Cicero was then a young man, and seems to have kept more closely to the rules of art, than afterwards, when by use and practice he had gained

¹ Cic.
De Invent.
Lib. i.
c. 52.

gained a greater freedom of speaking. I LECT.
formerly cited the partition of this speech XVIII.

upon another occasion ¹, which runs thus: See
We deny, Sextus Nevius, that you was put Lect. XIV.
into the possession of the estate of P. p. 213.

*Quintius, by the pretor's edict. This is the
dispute between us. I will therefore show
first, that you had no just cause to apply to
the pretor for possession of the estate of P.
Quintius: Then, that you could not pos-
sess it by the edict: And lastly, that you did
not possess it. When I have proved these
three things I will conclude.* Now Cicero

begins his conclusion with a repetition of
those three heads, and a summary account
of the several arguments he made use of
under each of them ². But I am obliged ² Cap. 28.

here to refer to the original, and must for-
bear to give a translation of it, by reason
of its length. In his *oration for the Ma-
nilian law*, his repetition is very short. He
proposed in the partition to speak to three
things: *The nature of the war against king
Mithridates, the greatness of it, and what
sort of general was proper to be intrusted
with it* ³. And when he has gone thro

each of these heads, and treated upon ³ See
them very largely, he reduces the substance Lect. XIV.
of what he had said to this general and
short

short account: Since therefore the war is so necessary, that it cannot be neglected; and so great, that it requires a very careful management; and you can intrust it with a general of admirable skill in military affairs, of singular courage, the greatest authority, and eminent success: do you doubt to make use of this so great blessing, conferred and bestowed upon you by heaven, for the preservation and enlargement of the Roman state?

¹ Cap. 16. *Indeed this repetition is made by Cicero, before he proceeds to the confutation, and not at the end of his discourse, where it is usually longer, and more particular; however this may serve to shew the nature of such a recital.*

BUT sometimes a repetition is made, by running a comparison between the speaker's own arguments, and those of the adverse party; and placing them in opposition to each other. And this method Cicero takes in the conclusion of his third oration upon the Agrarian law. ² *And here sometimes the orator takes occasion to find fault with his adversary's management, in these and such like expressions: This part he has entirely dropt. To that he has given an invidious turn, or a false coloring. He leaves arguments, and flies to intreaties; and*

not

not without good reason, if we consider the LECT. XVIII.
weakness of his cause ¹.

BUT when the discourse is very long, and the arguments insisted on have been many, to prevent the hearers growing out of patience by a more particular recital, the orator sometimes only just mentions such things, which he thinks of least consequence, by saying that, he *omits* or *passes over them*, till he comes to what is of greater moment, which he represents more fully. This method Cicero has taken in his *defence of Cluentius*; where, having run over several lesser heads in the manner now described, he then alters his expression, and introduces what was of more importance, by saying: *What I first complain of, is that wickedness, which is now discovered.* And so he proceeds more particularly to recite those things, which immediately related to Cluentius ². And this ² *Cap. 66.*
is what the writers upon this art call *Preterition*. But thus much may serve for repetition or *Recapitulation*.

I NOW proceed to the other part of the conclusion, which consists in *an address to the Passions*. Indeed the orator sometimes endeavours occasionally to work upon the passions of his hearers in other parts of

LECT.
XVIII.

his discourse, but more especially in the conclusion, where he is warmest himself, and labours to make them so. For the main design of the *Introduction* is to conciliate the hearers, and gain their attention; of the *Narration*, *Proposition*, and *Confirmation* to inform them; and of the *Conclusion* to move them. And therefore, to use Quintilian's words: *Here all the springs of eloquence are to be opened. It is here we secure the minds of the hearers, if what went before was well managed. Now we are past the rocks and shallows, all the sails may be hoisted. And as the greatest part of the conclusion consists in illustration, the most pompous language, and strongest figures have place here*¹. Now the passions, to which the orator more particularly addresses, differ according to the nature of the discourse. In *demonstrative* orations, when laudatory, love, admiration, and emulation are usually excited; but in *invec-*
tives hatred, envy, and contempt. In *de-*
liberative subjects, either the hope of gratifying some desire is set in view; or the fear of some impending evil. And in *judicial* discourses, almost all the passions have place, but more especially resentment and pity; insomuch that most of the antient
 rhe-

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. vi.
 c. 1.

rhetoricians mention only these two. But LECT. XVIII.
 I have treated upon the nature of the pas-
 sions, and the methods suited both to ex-
 cite and allay them, in a former discourse¹; See Lect. XI.
 and therefore at present I shall only add
 a few general observations, which may not
 be improper in this place, where the skill
 of the orator in addressing to them is more
 especially required.

Now the objects of the *Passions* are ei-
 ther *Things* or *Persons*, and orators make
 use of both, for putting in motion these
 springs of the human mind. With re-
 gard to *Things*, the nature and circum-
 stances of them are to be considered; and
 different passions applied to, in order to
 induce people either to pursue or avoid
 them. *Persons* may be considered either
 as agents or patients. In the former sense,
 different regards are due to them, accor-
 ding to the different qualities, with which
 they are possessed, and a suitable course of
 actions. So because virtue excites esteem,
 and vice hatred; answerable regards are
 paid to virtuous, or vicious men. But in
 considering them as patients, whatever be-
 falls them according to their demerits, be
 the thing good or ill, others are generally
 pleased; and if the contrary happens, it

gives them an uneasiness. So that if some good thing accrues to one, who does not deserve it, it causes indignation; and where a misfortune happens to a good man, it occasions pity. And thus persons are apt to be affected with respect to the circumstances of others. But every one is naturally inclined to think well of himself, that every prosperous occurrence is but answerable to his merit, and that every misfortune comes undeservedly. And sometimes there is joined with the occurrence the consideration of the agent, or person, who occasioned it; and the design in doing it is often more regarded, than the thing itself. The orator therefore will observe what circumstances either of things, or persons, or both, will furnish him with motives, proper to apply to those passions, he desires to excite in the minds of his hearers. Thus Cicero in his *orations for Plancus and Sylla*, moves his hearers from the circumstances of the men; but in his *accusation of Verres* very frequently from the barbarity and horrid nature of his crimes; and from both in his *defence of Quintius*.

BUT the same passion may be excited by very different methods. This is plain from the writings of those Roman satyrists, which

which are yet extant; for they have all the same design, and that is to ingage men to a love of virtue, and hatred of vice; but their manner is very different, suited to the genius of each writer. Horace endeavours to recommend virtue, by laughing vice out of countenance. Persius moves us to an abhorrence and detestation of vice, with the gravity and severity of a philosopher. And Juvenal by open and vehement invectives. So orators make use of all these methods in exciting the passions, as may be seen by their discourses, and particularly those of Cicero. But it is not convenient to dwell long upon the same passion. For the image thus wrought up in the minds of the hearers, does not last a great while, but they soon return to reflection. When the emotion therefore is once carried as high as it well can be, they should be left under its influence, and the speaker procede to some new matter, before it declines again^r. Moreover, orators sometimes endeavour to raise contrary passions to each other, as they are concerned for opposite parties. So the accuser excites anger and resentment, but the defendant pity and compassion. At other times, one thinks it sufficient to allay and

^r See Quint. *Inst. orat.* Lib. vi.

^{c. 1.}

LECT.
XVIII.

take off that passion, which the other has raised, and bring the hearers to a calm and sedate consideration of the matter before them.

BUT this especially is to be regarded, that the orator express the same passion himself, with which he endeavours to affect others, and that not only in his action, and voice, but likewise in his language; and therefore his words, and manner of expression, should be suited to that perturbation and disorder of mind, which he designs to represent. However a decency and propriety of character is always carefully to be observed. For as Cicero very well remarks: *A neglect of this is not only very culpable in life, but likewise in discourse. Nor do the same things equally become every speaker, or every audience; nor every time, and every place*¹. And therefore he greatly commends that painter, who designing to represent in a picture the sacrifice of Iphigenia, Agamemnon's daughter, drew Calchas the priest with a sad countenance; Ulysses, her father's great friend, more dejected; and her uncle Menelaus, most disconsolate; but threw a veil over the face of Agamemnon himself, as being unable to express that excess of sorrow, which he thought

¹ Orat.
Cap. 21.

thought was proper to appear in his countenance¹. And this justness of character is admirably well observed by Cicero himself, in his *defence of Milo*. For as Milo was always known to be a man of the greatest resolution, and most undaunted courage, it was very improper to introduce him, as the usual method then was in capital cases, moving pity, and begging for mercy. Cicero therefore takes this part upon himself, and what he could not do with any propriety in the person of Milo, he performs in his own, and thus addresses the judges: *What remains, but that I intreat and beseech you, that you would shew that compassion to this brave man, for which he himself does not solicit, but I, against his inclination, earnestly implore and request. Do not be less inclined to acquit him, if in this our common sorrow, you see no tear fall from Milo's eyes; but perceive in him the same countenance, voice, and language, as at other times, steady and unmoved. Nay I know not whether for this reason you ought not much sooner to favour him. For if in the contests of gladiators, persons of the lowest condition and fortune in life, we are wont to be displeased with the timorous, and suppliant, and those who beg for their life; but interpose*

¹ *Ibid.*
c. 22.

in favor of the brave, and courageous, and such who expose themselves to death; and we shew more compassion to those, who do not sue for it, than to such who do: with how much greater reason ought we to act in the same manner towards the bravest of our fellow citizens? And as these words were agreeable to his own character, while soliciting in behalf of another; so immediately after he introduces Milo speaking like himself, with a generous and undaunted air: These words of Milo, sais he, quite sink and dispirit me, which I daily hear from him. Farewell, farewell, my fellow citizens farewell; may you be happy, flourish, and prosper; may this renowned city be preserved, my most dear country, however it has treated me; may it continue in peace, tho I cannot continue in it, to whom it owes its peace. I will retire,

¹ Cap. 34. *I will be gone.*

BUT as persons are commonly more affected with what they see, than what they hear, orators sometimes call in the assistance of that sense in moving the passions. For this reason it was usual among the Romans in judicial cases, for accused persons to appear with a dejected air, and a sordid garb, attended by their parents, children, or other relations and freinds, with the like dress and

and aspect; as likewise to shew their scars, wounds, bloody garments, and other things of the like nature, in open court. So when upon the death of Caesar Mark Antony harangued the populace, he at the same time exposed to their view the garment, in which he was staked, fixed upon a pole; at which sight they were so enraged, that immediately they ran with lighted torches to set fire to the houses of the conspirators¹. But this custom at last became so common, and was sometimes so ill conducted, that the force of it was greatly abated, as we learn from Quintilian². However, if the Romans proceeded to an excess on the one hand; the strictness of the Areopagites at Athens may perhaps be thought too rigid on the other. For in that court, if the orator began to say any thing, which was moving, an officer immediately stood up, and bad him be silent³. There is certainly a medium between these two extremes, which is sometimes not only useful, but even necessary. For, as Quintilian very justly says: *It is necessary to apply to the passions, when those things which are true, just, and of common benefit, cannot be come at any other way*⁴.

¹ Suet. in
Vit. c. 84.

² Inst. orat.
Lib. vi.
c. 1.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

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To conclude in an handsom and decent manner, is doubtless of great consequence to an orator; since, as we say: *It is the end, which crowns the work.* And it can neither be for the advantage of his cause, nor his own character, to be cold and lifeless, where the greatest warmth and spirit is necessary. But a set and distinct conclusion is not always requisite. For to what end should he make a recital, where his discourse is but short, or consists but of a few particulars? Nor is it at all proper to inflame the passions on light subjects, or where the hearers are already ingaged in his favor. And besides to overact a thing is often of ill consequence, and apt to raise a jealousy of some wrong design. Wherefore in this, and all other cases, the rules of art must submit to the conduct of reason and prudence; lest by being misapplied, they both fail in their intention, and lose their esteem.

L E C-

LECTURE XIX.

Of Digression, Transition, and Amplification.

THE number, order, and nature of LECT.
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the parts, which constitute a complete and regular oration, I have endeavoured to explain in several preceding lectures. But there are two or three things yet remaining, very necessary to be known by an orator, which seem most properly to come under the second branch of his art. And these are *Digression, Transition, and Amplification*, upon each of which I shall now treat; not that they are connected with each other, but because I think all, that is requisite to be said concerning them, may be comprised in one discourse.

DIGRESSION then, as defined by Quintilian, is, *A going off from the subject we are upon to some different thing, which may however be of service to it*¹. We have a very beautiful instance of this in Cicero's *defence of Coelius*, who was accused of having first borrowed money of Clodia, and then ingaging her servants to poison her. Now as the proof of the fact depended upon several circumstances, the orator examines

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. iv.
c. 3.

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amines them separately; and shews them to be all highly improbable. *How, saith he, was the design of this poison laid? Whence came it? how did they get it? by whose assistance, to whom, or where was it delivered?* Now to the first of these queries he makes the accuser give this answer: *They say Coelius had it at home, and tried the force of it upon a slave provided on purpose, whose sudden death proved the strength of the poison.* Now, as Cicero represents the whole charge against Coelius as a fiction of Clodia, invented out of revenge for some slights he had put upon her; to make this the more probable he insinuates, that she had poisoned her husband, and takes this opportunity to hint it, that he might shew how easy it was for her to charge another with poisoning a servant, who had done the same to her own husband. But not contented with this, he steps out of his way, and introduces some of the last words of her husband Metellus, to render the fact more barbarous and shocking, from the admirable character of the man. This digression is brought in immediately upon the words I last read from Cicero, in the following manner: *O immortal gods, why do you sometimes wink at the greatest crimes*
of

of mankind, or delay the punishment of them to futurity! For I saw, I myself saw (and it was the dolefullest scene of my whole life) when Q. Metellus was taken from the bosom of his country; and when he, who thought himself born to be serviceable to this state, within three days after he had appeared with such advantage in the senate, in the forum, and every where in public, was snatched from us in the flower of his age, and prime of his strength and vigor. At which time, when he was about to expire, and his mind had lost the sense of other things, still retaining a concern for the public, he looked upon me, as I was all in tears, and intimated in broken and dying words, how great a storm hung over the city, and threatened the whole state, often striking the wall, which separated his house from that of Quintus Catulus, and frequently calling both upon him and me, and seeming to grieve not so much at the approach of his own death, as that both his country and I should be deprived of his assistance. Had he not been wickedly taken off on a sudden, how would he after his consulship have withstood the fury of his kinsman, Publius Clodius, who, while in that office, threatened, in the hearing of the senate, to kill him with his own hand, when he first began

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began to break out. And will this woman dare to come out of those doors, and talk of the force of poison? will not she fear, lest the house itself should speak the villainy? will not she dread the conscious walls, nor that sad and mournful night? But I return to

Cap. 24. the accusation. And then he proceeds to consider, and refute the several circumstances of the accusation. What I have therefore cited here, was no part of his argument; but having mentioned the charge of poison, he immediately takes occasion to introduce it, in order to excite the indignation of the hearers against Clodia, and invalidate the prosecution, as coming from a person of her character. *Digression* cannot properly be said to be a necessary part of a discourse, but it may sometimes be very convenient, and that upon several accounts.

As first, where a subject is of itself flat and dry, or requires close attention, it is of use to relieve and unbend the mind by something agreeable and entertaining. For which reason Quintilian observes, that the orators of his time generally made an excursion in their harangues upon some pleasing topic, between the narration and the proof. But he condemns the practice, as

too general; for while they seemed to think it necessary, it obliged them sometimes to bring in things trifling and foreign to the purpose ¹. Besides, a *Digression* is confined to no one part of a discourse, but may come in any where, as occasion offers; provided it fall in naturally with the subject, and be made some way subservient to it. We never meet with it in Cicero, without some evident and good reason. I have already shewn the use he makes of it, in the example above mentioned. So in his *prosecution of Verres*, for his barbarous and inhuman outrages against the Sicilians, he takes an occasion to launch out into a beautiful description of the island, and to recount the advantages, which accrued from it to the Romans. His subject did not necessarily lead him to this, but his view in it was to highten and aggravate the charge against Verres ².

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¹ *Inst. orat.*
² *Lib. iv.*
^{c. 3.}

² *Lib. ii.*
init.

AGAIN, as a *Digression* ought not to be made without sufficient reason, so neither should it be too frequent. And he who never does it, but where it is proper and useful, will not often see occasion for it. Frequently to leave the subject, and go off to other things, breaks the thread of the dis-

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discourse, and is apt to introduce confusion. Indeed some kinds of writing admit of a more frequent use of digressions than others. In history they are often very serviceable. For as that consists of a series of facts, and a long continued narrative without variety is apt to grow dull and tedious; it is necessary at proper distances to throw in something entertaining, in order to invigorate it, and keep up the attention. And accordingly we find the best historians often embellish their writings with descriptions of cities, rivers, and countries, as likewise with the speeches of eminent persons upon important occasions, and other ornaments, to render them the more pleasing and delightful. Poets still take a greater liberty in this respect; for as their principal view is most commonly to please, they do not attend so closely to connection; but as an image offers itself, which may be agreeably wrought up, they bring it in, and go off more frequently to different things, than other writers.

ANOTHER property of a *Digression* is, that it ought not to be too long, lest the hearers forget what preceded, before the speaker returns again to his subject. For a digression being no principal part of a
dis-

discourse, nor of any further use, than as it serves some way or other to inforce, or illustrate the main subject; it cannot answer this end, if it be carried to such a length, as to cause that either to be forgot, or neglected. And every one's memory will not serve him to connect together two parts of a discourse, which lie at a wide distance from each other. The better therefore to guard against this, it is not unusual with orators, before they enter upon a digression of any considerable length, to prepare their hearers, by giving them notice of it, and sometimes desiring leave to divert a little from the subject. And so likewise at the conclusion they introduce the subject again by a short transition. Thus Cicero in the example cited above, when he has finished his digression concerning the death of Metellus, proceeds to his subject again with these words: *But I return to the accusation.*

INDEED we find orators sometimes, when sore pressed, and the cause will not bear a close scrutiny, artfully run into digressions with a design to divert the attention of the hearers from the subject, and turn them to a different view. And in such cases, as they endeavour to be unobserved, so

LECT. XIX. they do it tacitly without any transition, or intimation of their design; their business being only to get clear of a difficulty, till they have an opportunity of entering upon some fresh topic. I do not mention this as a conduct proper for imitation, tho it is fit to be remarked, in order to guard against it.

BUT as *Transitions* are often used not only after a *Digression*, but likewise upon other occasions, I shall explain the nature of them a little more particularly. A *Transition* therefore is, *A form of speech, by which the speaker in a few words tells his hearers both what he has said already, and what he next designs to say*¹. Where a discourse consists of several parts, this is often very proper in passing from one to another, especially when the parts are of a considerable length; for it assists the hearers to carry on the series of the discourse in their mind, which is a great advantage to the memory. It is likewise a great relief to the attention, to be told when an argument is finished, and what is to be expected next. And therefore we meet with it very frequently in history. But I consider it at present only as made use of by orators. Cicero, as I have had occasion

¹ Voss.
Inst. orat.
Lib. v.
c. 6. §. 3.

to observe formerly, divides his *oration* for the *Manilian law* into three parts, and proposes to speak, *first of the nature of the war against king Mithridates, then of its greatness, and lastly of the choice of a general* ¹. And when he has gone thro the ¹ *Cap. 2.* first head, which is pretty long, he connects it with the second, by this short transition: *Having shewn the nature of the war, I shall now speak a few things of its greatness* ². And again, at the conclusion ² *Cap. 8.* of his second head, he reminds his hearers of his method in the following manner: *I think I have sufficiently shewn the necessity of this war from the nature of it, and the danger of it from its greatness. What remains is to speak concerning the choice of a general, proper to be intrusted with it* ³. ³ *Cap. 10.* And in his *second oration against Catiline*, who had then left Rome, having at large described his conduct and designs, he adds: *But why do I talk so long concerning one enemy, and such an one; who owns himself an enemy, and whom I do not fear, since, what I always desired, there is now a wall between us; and say nothing of those, who conceal themselves, who remain at Rome, and are among us* ⁴. And then he proceeds to ⁴ *Cap. 8.* give an account of the other conspirators.

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BUT sometimes in passing from one thing to another, a general hint of it is thought sufficient to prepare the hearers, without particularly specifying what has been said, or is next to follow. Thus Cicero in his *second Philippic* says: *But those things are old, this is yet fresh*¹. And again: *But I have insisted too long upon trifles, let us come to things of greater moment*². And at other times, for greater brevity, the transition is imperfect, and mention made only of the following head, without any intimation of what has been said already. As in Cicero's *defence of Muraena*, where he says: *I must now proceed to the third part of my oration concerning the charge of bribery*³. And soon after: *I come now to Cato, who is the support and strength of this charge*⁴.

THE third and last head, to which I proposed to speak, is *Amplification*. Now by *Amplification* is meant not barely a method of enlarging upon a thing; but so to represent it in the fullest and most comprehensive view, as that it may in the liveliest manner strike the mind, and influence the passions. Cicero speaking of this, calls it, *The greatest commendation of eloquence*; and observes, *that it consists not only in magnifying*

fyng and bightening a thing, but likewise LECT. XIX.
in extenuating and lessening it ¹. But tho De Orat. Lib. iii.
 it consists of these two parts, and may be c. 26.
 applied either way, yet to amplify is not
 to set things in a false light; but to paint
 them in their just proportion and proper
 colors, suitable to their nature, and qua-
 lities. Rhetoricians have observed several
 ways of doing this, the cheif of which I
 shall here mention.

ONE is to ascend from a particular thing
 to a general. Thus Cicero in his *defence*
of Archias, having commended him as an
 excellent poet, and likewise observed, that
 all the liberal arts have a connection with
 each other, and a mutual relation between
 them, in order to raise a just esteem of
 him in the minds of his hearers, takes oc-
 casion to say many things in praise of po-
 lite literature in general, and the great
 advantages, that may be received from it.
You will ask me, sais he, why we are so de-
lighted with this man? Because he supplies
us with those things, which both refresh our
minds after the noise of the forum, and de-
light our ears, when wearied with contention.
Do you think we could either be furnished
with matter for such a variety of subjects,
if we did not cultivate our minds with lear-

ning; or bear such a constant fatigue, without affording them that refreshment. I own I have always pursued these studies; let those be ashamed, who have so given up themselves to learning, as neither to be able to convert it to any common benefit, nor discover it in public. But why should it shame me, who have so lived for many years, that no advantage or ease has ever diverted me, no pleasure allured me, nor sleep retarded me from this pursuit. Who then can blame me, or who can justly be displeased with me, if I have employed that time in reviewing these studies, which has been spent by others in managing their affairs, in the celebration of festivals, or other diversions, in refreshments of mind and body, in unseasonable banquets, in dice, or tennis? And this ought the rather to be allowed me, because my ability as an orator has been improved by these pursuits, which, such as it is, was never wanting to assist my friends. And if it be esteemed but small, yet I am sensible from what spring I must draw those things, which are of the greatest importance¹. With more to the same purpose, from which he draws this inference: shall I not therefore love this man? shall I not admire him? shall I not by all means defend him²?

¹ Cap. 6.² Cap. 8.

A CONTRARY method to the former is to descend from a general to a particular. As if any one, while speaking in commendation of eloquence, should illustrate what he says from the example of Cicero, and shew the great services he did his country, and the honors he gained to himself by his admirable skill in oratory. Our common way of judging of the nature and importance of things is from what we observe in particular instances, by which we form general notions concerning them. When therefore we consider the character of Cicero, and the figure he made in the world, it leads us to conclude, there must be something very admirable in that art, by which he became so celebrated. And this method he has taken himself in his *oration for the Manilian law*, where having first intimated the scarcity of good generals at that time among the Romans, he then describes the virtues of a complete commander as a proof of it, and shews how many and great qualifications are necessary to form such a character, as courage, prudence, experience, and success; all which he afterwards applies to Pompey ¹.

¹ Cap. 10.

A THIRD method is by an enumeration of parts. So when Cicero upon the defeat

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of Mark Antony before Mutina, proposed that a funeral monument should be erected in honor of the soldiers, who were killed in that battle, as a comfort to their surviving relations, he does it in this way, to give it the greater weight. *Since, says he, the tribute of glory is paid to the best and most valiant citizens by the honor of a monument, let us thus comfort their relations, who will receive the greatest consolation in this manner; their parents, who produced such brave defenders of the state; their children, who will enjoy these domestic examples of fortitude; their wives, for the loss of such husbands, whom it will be more fitting to extol than lament; their brethren, who will hope to resemble them no less in their virtues, than their aspect. And I wish we may be able to remove the grief of all these by our resolutions*. Such representations greatly enlarge the image of a thing, and afford the mind a much clearer view of it, than if it were contracted into one single proposition.

¹ Philipp.
xiv. c. 13.

AGAIN, another method not much unlike the former is, when any thing is illustrated from a variety of causes. Thus Cicero justifies his behaviour in retiring, and not opposing his enemies, when they
spirited

spirited up the mob in order to banish him, from the following reasons, which at that time determined him to such a conduct. *When, sais he, unless I was given up, so many armed fleets seemed ready to attack this single ship of the state, tossed with the tempests of seditions and discords, and the senate was now removed from the helm; when banishment, murder, and outrage were threatened; when some from an apprehension of their own danger would not defend me, others were incited by an inveterate hatred to all good men, others thought I stood in their way, others took this opportunity to express their resentment, others envied the peace and tranquillity of the state, and upon all these accounts I was particularly struck at: should I have chosen rather to oppose them (I will not say to my own certain destruction, but to the greatest danger both of you and your children) than alone to submit to, and undergo what threatened us all in common?* Such a number of reasons brought together must set a thing in a very strong and clear light. ^{Pro Sext. c. 20.}

THE like may be said of a number and variety of effects. Thus Cicero describes the force and excellence of oratory from its great and surprizing effects, when he sais:

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Nothing seems to me more excellent than by discourse to draw the attention of an whole assembly, delight them, and sway their inclinations different ways at pleasure. This in every free state, and especially in times of peace, and tranquillity, has been always in the highest esteem and reputation. For what is either so admirable, as for one only, or a very few, out of a vast multitude to be able to do that, which all have a natural power of doing? or so delightful to hear, as a judicious and solid discourse in florid and polite language? or so powerful and grand, as to influence the populace, the judges, the senate, by the charms of eloquence? Nay, what is so noble, so generous, so munificent, as to afford aid to supplicants, to support the afflicted, give safety, deliver from dangers, and preserve from exile? Or what is so necessary, as to be always furnished with arms to guard yourself, assert your right, or repel injuries? and not to confine our thoughts wholly to the courts of justice, or the senate; what is there in the arts of peace more agreeable and entertaining, than good language, and a fine way of speaking? For it is this especially, wherein we excel other animals, that we can discourse together, and convey our thoughts to each other by words. Who therefore would not esteem, and in a par-

particular manner endeavour to surpass others in that, wherein mankind principally excels brute beasts? But to procede to its cheif advantages: what else would have drawn men into societies; or taken them off from a wild and savage life, and softened them into a polite and civilized behaviour; or when settled in communities have restrained them by laws? LECT. XIX.

Who but after such a description must conceive the strongest passion for an art, attended with so many great and good effects? De Orat. Lib. i. c. 8.

A THING may likewise be illustrated by its opposite. So the blessings and advantages of peace may be recommended from the miseries and calamities of war. And thus Cicero endeavours to throw contempt upon Catiline and his party, by comparing them with the contrary side: *But if omitting all these things, with which we abound, and they want, the senate, the knights, the populace, the city, treasury, revenues, all Italy, the provinces, and foreign nations, if, I say, omitting these things, we compare the causes themselves, in which each side is engaged, we may learn from thence how despicable they are. For on this side modesty is engaged, on that impudence; on this chastity, on that lewdness; on this integrity, on that fraud; on this piety, on that profaneness;*

ness; on this constancy, on that fury; on this honor, on that baseness; on this moderation, on that unbridled passion; in a word equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, and all virtues contend with injustice, luxury, cowardise, rashness, and all vices; plenty with want, reason with folly, sobriety with madness, and lastly good hope with despair. In such a contest did men desert us, would not heaven ordain, that so many, and so great vices should be defeated by these most excellent virtues¹.

¹ In Catil.
ii. c. 11.

GRADATION is another beautiful way of doing this. So when Cicero would aggravate the cruelty and barbarity of Verres, for crucifying a Roman citizen; which was a sort of punishment only inflicted upon slaves; he chooses this way of doing it. *It is a crime, says he, to bind a Roman citizen, wickedness to whip him, and a sort of parricide to kill him; what then must I call it to crucify him? No name can sufficiently express such a villany².* And the images of things may thus be heightened, either by ascending, as in this instance, or descending, as in that which follows, relating to the same action of Verres: *Was I not to complain of, or bewail these things to Roman citizens, nor the friends of our state,*
nor

² Lib. v.
c. 66.

nor those who had heard of the Roman name, nay if not to men but beasts; or to go yet further, if in the most desert wilderness to stones and rocks; even all mute and inanimate creatures would be moved by so great and heinous cruelty ¹.

¹ Cap. 67.

AND to name no more, facts may be amplified from their circumstances, as time, place, manner, event, and the like. But instances of this would carry me too far, and therefore I shall only add, that as the design of *amplification* is not barely to prove or evince the truth of things, but also to adorn and illustrate them, it requires a florid and beautiful stile, consisting of strong and emphatical words, flowing periods, harmonious numbers, lively tropes, and bright figures. But the consideration of these things will come under the third part of oratory, namely *Elocution*, upon which I shall enter in my next discourse.

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*ness; on this constancy, on that fury; on this honor, on that baseness; on this moderation, on that unbridled passion; in a word equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, and all virtues contend with injustice, luxury, cowardise, rashness, and all vices; plenty with want, reason with folly, sobriety with madness, and lastly good hope with despair. In such a contest did men desert us, would not heaven ordain, that so many, and so great vices should be defeated by these most excellent virtues*¹.

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c. 66.

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LECTURE XX.

*Of Elocution in general, and particularly of
Elegance, and Purity.*

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¹ Orat.
c. 14.

CICERO tells us, *An orator ought to consider three things, what to speak, in what order, and in what manner*¹. As it is therefore the design of the art of rhetoric to prepare and form the orator, it ought to treat of each of these. On which account I have formerly had occasion more than once to observe its similitude with the art of building; in which the workman first collects his materials, then puts them together in their proper order, and lastly gives them such ornaments, as are suited to the nature of the structure. But since the manner of speaking respects both the *Language* and *Pronunciation*, this art is usually divided into four parts: *Invention*, which teaches what to speak; *Disposition*, which respects the order; *Elocution*, which regards the propriety and ornaments of language; and *Pronunciation*, which gives rules for a graceful delivery. I have hitherto, in the course of these lectures, treated upon the two first of these, and shall

shall now procede to the third, which is
Elocution.

Now *Elocution* directs us to suit both the words and expressions of a discourse to the nature of the subject, or to speak with propriety and decency. This faculty is in one word called *Eloquence*, and those persons, who are possessed of it, are therefore stiled *eloquent*. This has always been esteemed so necessary and essential to an orator, that some have placed the whole art of oratory only in *Elocution*. That it is the most difficult part is very certain, and so peculiar to it, that the rules for it are given no where else; but it is evident from what I have formerly said both upon *Invention* and *Disposition*, that this art contains many other things, besides what particularly relates to *Elocution*. And therefore when Cicero, in his *Book of a perfect orator*, tells us, that *to invent what things are proper to say, and to dispose them in a just order, are indeed great matters, and like the soul in the body; but yet more proper to prudence, than eloquence*; he immediately adds: *But what cause can be supported without prudence? Let the orator therefore, who would excel, be acquainted with the beads of invention* ¹. From whence it is ¹ Cap. 14.
plain,

plain, that Cicero did not think the whole art of an orator to consist in *Eloquence* or *Elocution*. But Quintilian has expressed himself more fully upon this head. I shall recite the passage, by which you will perceive his judgement concerning it. *Without elocution, saith he, invention and disposition are useless, and like a sword in the scabbard. This is therefore what is principally taught; this no one can arrive at, but by the help of art; this requires study, practice, and observation; this is the exercise of our whole life; by this one orator excels another; this gives one kind of eloquence the preference to another; what is either commendable, or culpable in oratory, is found here.* But he adds: *However the whole care is not to be employed about words. For I must declare against those, who neglect all concern about things, which are the nerves of a cause; and spend their whole age in a vain attendance to words. And this they do for the sake of being exact, which in my opinion is very ornamental in speaking; but when it appears natural, and without affectation*¹. Thus far Quintilian. It appears therefore from the authority of these great masters of oratory, that persons may run into an extreme either way. And a little observation will

con-

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. viii.
prooem.

convince us, that those orators, who attend only to the matter of their discourse, and the truth of their reasoning, and neglect all beauty and decency of expression; tho they inform their hearers, yet it is in such a way, as neither to delight, nor move them. And accordingly, as what is said gives them less entertainment, their attention must necessarily flag; by which means the main end designed is in proportion frustrated, which was *Persuasion*. And we often find that a speech set off with good language, and agreeable turns of expression, tho perhaps but weak arguments, engages the minds of the hearers, and is received with applause; while more just and close reasoning, but expressed in a coarse and unpolite manner, is less attended to, and disregarded. For many persons are of that make, that you must please their ears in order to impress their minds; and truth must be set off in a very agreeable dress, before it will be received by them. So that a due attention to words, and this part of oratory, seems necessary for all those, who would render what they say acceptable to others. But, on the other hand, to regard sounds only, and the flowers of language; and to be more soli-

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citous about the turn of a period, than the sense of it; is a sign of a weak mind, and trifling genius. And besides, an anxious concern about words cools the imagination, and checks the mind in its pursuits of things; and by that means commonly produces either a stiffness, or levity of expression. A medium therefore in this case is undoubtedly the best. And what Quintilian advises here is worth remarking. *Be as careful, says he, as you please about your language, only remember, that nothing is to be done merely for the sake of words; since words were first invented for the sake of things. And they seem to be most preferable, which best express our ideas, and most affect the minds of the hearers*¹. This part of oratory was much more cultivated by the antients, than it has been of late ages; and by none more than Cicero, who is generally largest upon it in his treatises upon this art. And in all his writings he appears to have been very exact and careful of his language; but always shews an equal regard to good sense, and solid reasoning. And therefore he tells us, that, *wisdom is the foundation of eloquence*². And in another place, that, *eloquence is nothing else, but copious and florid wisdom*³. And indeed where

¹ Ubi supra.

² Orat.
c. 21.

³ Orat.
Partit.
c. 23.

where these two do not meet, the one wants a necessary ornament to recommend it; and the other is of little value with wise men, tho it has often a considerable influence in popular harangues. But where they are united, they make one of the highest accomplishments of human nature.

ELOCUTION is twofold, *general* and *particular*. The former treats of the several properties and ornaments of language in common; the latter considers them, as they are made use of to form different sorts of stile. I shall begin with general elocution, which rhetoricians make to consist of three parts: *Elegance*, *Composition*, and *Dignity*. *Elegance* respects the purity, and clearness of the language. *Composition* regards the turn and harmony of the periods. And *Dignity* explains the nature and various kinds of tropes and figures. A discourse, which has all these properties suitably adjusted, must, with respect to the language, be perfect in its kind, and delightful to the hearers.

ELEGANCE, which makes the first part of *Elocution*, consists, as we have seen, in two things; *Purity*, and *Perspicuity*: and both these, as well with respect to single

LECT. words, as their construction in sentences,
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These properties in language give it the name of *elegant*; for a like reason that we call other things so, which are clean and neat in their kind. But in the common use of our tongue, we are apt to confound elegance with eloquence, and say, *a discourse is elegant*; when we mean by the expression, that it has all the properties of fine language.

Now by *purity* (upon which I propose to treat at present) we are to understand the choice of such words and phrases, as are suited and agreeable to the use of the language, in which we speak. And so grammarians reduce the faults, they oppose to it, to two sorts, which they call *barbarism* and *solecism*; the former of which respects single words, and the latter their construction. But I shall consider them jointly, and in a manner different from grammarians. For with them all words are esteemed pure, which are once adopted into a language, and authorised by use. And as to phrases, or forms of expression, they allow them all the same claim, which are agreeable to the analogy of the tongue. But in oratory neither all words, nor all expressions are so called, which occur in
any

any language; but such only, as come recommended by the authority of those, who speak or write with accuracy and politeness. Indeed it is a common saying, *that we should think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.* But the meaning of that expression is no more, than that we should speak agreeably to the common usage of the tongue, that every one may understand us; and not choose such words or expressions, as are either difficult to be understood, or may carry in them an appearance of affectation and singularity. But in order to set this matter in a clearer light, I shall here recount the principal things, which vitiate the purity of language.

AND first, it often happens, that such words and forms of speaking, as were introduced by the learned, are afterwards dropt by them, as mean and sordid, from a seeming baseness contracted by vulgar use. For polite and elegant speakers distinguish themselves by their discourse, as persons of figure do by their garb; one being the dress of the mind, as the other is of the body. And hence it comes to pass, that both have their different fashions, which are often changed; and as the vul-

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gar affect to imitate those above them in both, this frequently occasions an alteration, when either becomes too trite and common. But besides these fordid words and expressions, which are rendered so by the use of the vulgar; there is another sort first introduced by them, which is carefully to be avoided by all those, who are desirous to speak well. For the vulgar have their peculiar words and phrases, suited to their circumstances, and taken from such things, as usually occur in their way of life. Thus in the old comedians, many things are spoken by servants, agreeable to their character, which would be very unbecoming from the mouth of a gentleman. And we cannot but daily observe the like instances among ourselves.

AGAIN, this is common to language with all other human productions, that it is in its own nature liable to a constant change and alteration. For as Horace has justly observed :

All human works shall waste:

*Then how can feeble words pretend to
last ?*

¹ Art Poet.
v. 68.

Nothing could ever please all persons, or at least for any length of time. And there is nothing, from which this can less be

expected, than language. For as the thoughts of men are exceeding various, and words are the signs of their thoughts; they will be constantly inventing new signs to express them by, in order to convey their ideas with more clearness, or greater beauty. If we look into the different ages of the Latin writers, what great alterations and changes do we find in their language? How few now understand the remaining fragments of the *twelve tables*? Nay how many words do we meet with even in Plautus, the meaning of which has not yet been fixed with certainty by the skill of the best critics? And if we consider our own language, it will appear to have been in a manner intirely changed, from what it was a few ages since. To mention no others, our celebrated Chaucer is to most persons now almost unintelligible, and wants an expositor. And even since our own memory, we cannot but have observed, that many words and expressions, which a few years ago were in common use, are now in a manner laid aside and antiquated; and that others have constantly, and daily do succede in their room. So true is that observation of the same poet:

*Some words that have, or else will feel
decay,*

*Shall be restor'd, and come again in play;
And words now fam'd, shall not be fancied
long,*

*They shall not please the ear, nor move
the tongue;*

*As use shall these approve, and those con-
demn,*

*Use the sole rule of speech, and judge su-
preme¹.*

¹ *Ibid.*
w. 70.

We must therefore no less abstain from antiquated, or obsolete words and phrases, than from sordid ones. Tho all old words are not to be thought antiquated. By the former I mean such, which tho of an antient standing, are not yet entirely disused, nor their signification lost. It is the opinion of Quintilian, that these may sometimes be admitted, tho sparingly. *Not only the best judges, saith he, allow the use of old words; but they give both a majesty, and an agreeable pleasure to a discourse. For they have the authority of antiquity, and a kind of novelty from their disuse. But they ought neither to be frequent, nor glaring; because nothing is more distasteful than affectation: nor must they be such, as are entirely antiquated, and thro length of time wholly for-
got,*

got¹. We are not therefore in the opinion LECT. XX.
of this judicious writer, to be wholly de-
bared from the use of old words, especially ¹ Inst. orat. Lib. i. c. 6.
when they appear more significant, than

any others we can fix upon. But as to
phrases or expressions, greater caution seems
still necessary, and such as are old, should
doubtless, if at all, be used more sparingly.

The Latin tongue was brought to its grea-
test perfection in the reign of Augustus,
or somewhat sooner; and he himself stu-
died it very carefully. For, as Suetonius
tells us: *He applied himself to eloquence, and
the study of the liberal arts, from his child-
hood, with great diligence and labor. He
chose a manner of speaking, which was smooth
and elegant; and avoided the ill savour, as
he used to call it, of antiquated words. And
he was wont to blame Tiberius for his af-
fection of them*². In our own language,

such words are to be esteemed antiquated,
which the most polite persons have dropped,
both in their discourse, and writings; whose
example we should follow, unless we would
be thought to converse rather with the
dead, than the living.

BUT further, as on the one hand we
must avoid obsolete words and phrases; so
on the other, we should refrain from new
ones;

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ones; or such, whose use has not been yet sufficiently established, at least among those of the best taste. Custom rules here, but, as we have observed before, every custom is not to be followed: a distinction must be made between the use of the vulgar, and that of the learned. Quintilian has very well determined this matter, when he says: *We must settle first, what that is, which we call custom. Which, if it take its name from that, which most persons practise, it will be an ill guide, not only in language; but what is of greater consequence, in life. For when has the world been so happy, that what is right, has pleased the majority? Therefore that is not to be taken for a rule in language, which many have corruptly fallen into. But I shall call the consent of the learned the custom of language, as the consent of the good the custom of living*¹. A language is not the progeny of one age. It requires a much longer series of time to complete it, and bring it to perfection. And besides, there is a certain agreement and harmony both in the words, and modes of expression, proper to every language, by which it is distinguished from others. Therefore when any thing new is introduced, it often seems harsh at first,

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. i.
c. 6.

first, and displeasing to the ear; till time has softened it, and the use of the learned, as it were, wrought it into the language. The antient Romans, while their language continued in its purity, were very scrupulous of admitting any thing new into it, by which it might be vitiated. Nor would they presently submit to the greatest authority in this case. *So when Pomponius, who (as Suetonius informs us) was a most zealous defender of the purity of the Latin tongue, once excepted to an expression, which was used by the emperor Tiberius; and Atticus Capito attempted to defend it, by saying that it was Latin, or at least would then be so, since the emperor had used it: Capito is mistaken, replied Pomponius; for tho you, Caesar, can make men free, you cannot make words free*¹. Now words may be considered as new in two respects; either when they are first brought into a language, or when they are used in a new sense. As the former of these may sometimes leave us in the dark, by not being understood; so the latter are most apt to mislead us: for when we hear a word, that has been familiar to us, we are presently led to fix that idea to it, with which it

¹De illustr.
gram. 22.

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it has usually been attended. And therefore in both cases, some previous intimation may be necessary. Cicero, who perhaps enlarged the furniture of the Roman tongue more than any one person besides, appears always very cautious, how he introduces any thing new, and generally gives notice of it, when he attempts it; as appears in many instances scattered thro his works. What bounds we are now to fix to the purity of the Latin tongue, in the use of it, the learned are not well agreed. It is certain our furniture is much less, than when it was a living language, and therefore the greater liberty must of necessity be sometimes taken. So that their opinion seems not unadvisable, who direct us to make choice principally of what we are furnished with from the writers of the Augustan age, and where we cannot be supplied from them, to make use of such authors as lived nearest to them, either before, or since. And as to our own tongue, it is certainly prudent to be as careful, how we admit any thing into it, that is uncouth, or disagreeable to its genius; as the antient Romans were into theirs; for the perfection of a language

guage does in a great measure consist in a certain analogy, and harmony running thro the whole, by which it may be capable of being brought to a standard.

BUT besides those things already mentioned, any mistake in the sense of words, or their construction, is opposed to purity. For to speak purely, is to speak correctly. And such is the nature of these faults in elocution, that they are often not so easy to be observed by hearing, as by reading. Whence it is, that many persons are thought to speak better, than they write; for while they are speaking, many slips and inaccuracies escape disregarded, which in reading would presently appear. And this is more especially the case of persons unacquainted with arts and literature; who, by the assistance of a lively fancy, and flow of words, often speak with great ease and freedom, and by that means please the ear; when, at the same time, what they say, would not so well bear reading.

I SHALL only add, that a distinction ought likewise to be made between a poetic diction, and that of prose writers. For poets in all languages have a sort of

LECT. of peculiar dialect, and take greater liberties, not only in their figures, but also in their choice and disposition of words; so that what is a beauty in them, would often appear unnatural and affected in prose.

LECTURE XXI.

Of Perspicuity.

ELEGANCE, as I have already ob-
 served, consists of two parts, *Purity*
 and *Perspicuity*: the former of which ren-
 ders a discourse correct, and the latter
 makes it intelligible. As the one there-
 fore is agreeable and pleasant, the other is
 necessary, and for that reason principally
 to be regarded. For the most accurate
 and exact language is of little use, if it be
 not sufficiently clear; since it is much the
 same thing not to speak at all, and not to
 be understood, when we do speak. And
 therefore Quintilian seems very justly to
 place the chief excellency of speech in
 perspicuity¹. Tho to render a discourse
 entertaining, as well as clear, especially to
 persons of a good taste, both these pro-
 perties must be joined. They expect to
 be pleased, at the same time they are in-
 formed; and think, that the best sense
 always deserves the best language: but
 still the chief regard is to be had to per-
 spicuity.

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XXI.¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. viii.
c. 2.

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I TREATED of *Purity* in my last discourse, and shall therefore now procede to speak of *Perspiciuity*. And this, as well as the former, consists partly in *single words*, and partly in their *construction*.

As to *single words*, those are generally clearest and best understood, which are used in their proper sense. But it requires no small attention and skill to be well acquainted with the force and propriety of words; which ought to be duly regarded, since the perspicuity of a discourse depends so much upon it. Caesar seems plainly to have been of this mind, when he tells us, *The foundation of eloquence consists in the choice of words*¹. It may not be amiss therefore to lay down some few observations, by which the distinct notions of words, and their peculiar force may more easily be perceived. Indeed it is the business of a grammarian to give us all the different senses of words, and support them with good authorities; I shall therefore content myself with offering a few general hints, in order to regulate our choice in the use of them. Now all words may be divided into *proper words* and *tropes*. Those are called *proper words*, which are expressed in their proper and usual sense.

¹Ap. Cic.
De clar.
orat. c. 72.

And tropes are such words, as are applied to some other thing, than what they properly denote, by reason of some similitude, relation, or contrariety between the two things. So when a subtle artful man is called a *fox*, the reason of the name is founded in a similitude of qualities. If we say, *Cicero will always live*, meaning *his works*, the cause is transferred to the effect. And when we are told, *Caesar conquered the Gauls*, we understand that he did it with the assistance of his army; where a part is put for the whole from the relation between them. And when Cicero calls Antony, *a fine guardian of the state*, every one perceives, he means the contrary. But I shall explain the nature and use of tropes more fully hereafter in their proper place. All words must at first have had one original and primary signification, which, strictly speaking, may be called their proper sense. But it sometimes happens thro length of time, that words lose their original signification, and assume a new one, which then becomes their proper sense. So *hostis* in the Latin tongue at first signified a *stranger*; but afterwards that sense of the word was entirely laid aside, and it was used to denote a *public enemy*.

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enemy. And in our language it is well known, that the word *knave* antiently signified a *servant*. The reason of the change seems to be much the same, as in that of the Latin word *latro*, which first signified a *soldier*, but afterwards a *robber*. Besides, in all languages it has frequently happened, that many words have gradually varied from their first sense to others somewhat different; which may notwithstanding all of them, when rightly applied, be looked upon as proper. Nay, in process of time, it is often difficult to say, which is the original, or most proper sense. Again, sometimes two or more words may appear to have the same signification with each other, and may therefore be used indifferently; unless the beauty of the period, or some other particular reason, determine to the choice of one, rather than another. Of this kind are the words *ensis* and *gladius* in the Latin tongue, and in ours *pity* and *compassion*. And there are other words of so near an affinity to each other, or at least appear so from vulgar use, that they are commonly thought to be synonymous. Such are the words *mercy*, and *pity*; tho *mercy* in its strict sense is exercised towards an offender, and *pity* respects one in distress.

As this peculiar force and distinction of words is carefully to be attended to, so it may be known several ways. Thus the proper signification of substantives may be seen by their application to other substantives. As in the instance just now given, a person is said to shew *mercy to a criminal*, and *pity to one in distress*. And in the like manner verbs are distinguished, by being joined to some certain nouns, and not to others. So a person is said *to command an inferior*, *to intreat a superior*, and *to desire an equal*. Adjectives also, which denote the properties of things, have their signification determined by those subjects, to which they most properly relate. Thus we say, *an honest mind*, and *a healthful body*; *a wise man*, and *a fine house*. Another way of distinguishing the propriety of words, is by their use in gradations. As if one should say: *Hatreds, grudges, quarrels, tumults, seditions, wars, spring from unbridled passions*. The proper sense of words may likewise be known, by observing to what other words they are either opposed, or used as equivalent: So in that passage of Cicero, where he saith: *I cannot perceive why you should be angry with me; if it be because I defend him, whom you accuse;*

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*cuse ; why may not I be displeased with you,
for accusing him, whom I defend ? You say,
I accuse my enemy ; and I say, I defend my*

¹Pro Sutta,
c. 17.

freind ¹. Here the words *accuse* and *de-
fend*, *freind* and *enemy*, are opposed ; and
to be angry and *displeased*, are used as terms
equivalent. Lastly, the derivation of words,
contributes very much to determine their
true meaning. Thus because the word
manners, comes from the word *man*, it may
properly be applied either to that, or any
other put for it. And therefore we say,
the manners of men, and *the manners of the
age*, because the word *age* is there used for
the men of the age. But if we apply the
word *manners* to any other animal, it is a
trope. By these, and such like observa-
tions, we may perceive the proper sense
and peculiar force of words, either by their
connection with other words, distinction
from them, opposition to them, equiva-
lency with them, or derivation. And by
thus fixing their true and genuine signifi-
cation, we shall easily see when they be-
come tropes. But tho words, when taken
in their proper signification, generally con-
vey the plainest and clearest sense ; yet
some are more forceable, sonorous, or beau-
tiful than others. And by these conside-
rations

rations we must often be determined in our choice of them. So whether we say, *he got*, or, *he obtained the victory*, the sense is the same; but the latter is more full and sonorous. In Latin, *timeo* signifies *I fear*, *pertimeo* is more full and significant, and *pertimesco* more sonorous than either of the former. The Latin and Greek languages have much the advantage of ours in this respect, by reason of their compositions; by the help of which they can often express that in one word, for which we are obliged to put two words, and sometimes more. So *pertimeo* cannot be fully expressed in our language by one word; but we are forced to join one or two particles to the verb, to convey its just idea, and say, *I greatly*, or *very much fear*: and yet even then, we scarce seem to reach its full force. As to tropes, tho generally speaking they are not to be chosen, where plainness and perspicuity of expression is only designed, and proper words may be found; yet thro the penury of all languages, the use of them is often made necessary. And some of them, especially metaphors, which are taken from the similitude of things, may, when custom has rendered them familiar, be considered as

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proper words, and used in their stead. Thus, whether I say, *I see your meaning*, or, *I understand your meaning*, the sense is equally clear; tho the latter expression is proper, and the former metaphorical, by which the action of seeing is transfered from the eyes to the mind.

BUT *Perspicuity*, as I have said, arises not only from a choice of *single words*, but likewise from the *construction* of them in sentences. For the meaning of all the words in a sentence, considered by themselves, may be very plain and evident; and yet by reason of a disorderly placing them, or confusion of the parts, the sense of the whole may be very dark and obscure. Now it is certain, that the most natural order is the plainest; that is, when both the words and parts of a sentence are so disposed, as best agrees with their mutual relation, and dependance upon each other. And where this is changed, as is usually done, especially in the antient languages, for the greater beauty and harmony of the periods; yet due regard is had by the best writers to the evidence and perspicuity of the expression.

BUT to set this subject in a clearer light, on which the perfection of language
so

so much depends, I shall mention some few things, which chiefly occasion obscurity; and this either with respect to single words, or their construction.

AND first, all ambiguity of expression is one cause of obscurity. This sometimes arises from the different senses, in which a word is capable of being taken. So we are told, that upon Cicero's addressing himself to Octavius Caesar, when he thought himself in danger from his resentment, and reminding him of the many services he had done him; Octavius replied, *He came the last of his friends* ¹. But there was a

¹ Appian.
De Bell.
civ.
Lib. v.

designed ambiguity in the word *last*, as it might either respect the time of his coming, or the opinion he had of his friendship. And this use of ambiguous words we sometimes meet with, not only in poetry, where the turn and wit of an epigram often rests upon it; but likewise in prose, either for pleasantry or ridicule. Thus Cicero calls Sextus Clodius, *the light of the senate* ²; which is a compliment he pays to several great men, who had distinguished themselves by their public services to their country. But Sextus, who had a contrary character, was a relation of P. Clodius, whose dead body, after he had

² *Pro Milon.* c. 12.

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been killed by Milo, he carried in a tumultuous manner into the senate house, and there burnt it with the senators benches, in order to inflame the populace against Milo. And it is in illusion to that riotous action, that Cicero, using this ambiguous expression, calls him, *the light of the senate*. In such instances therefore it is a beauty, and not the fault I am cautioning against; as the same thing may be often good or bad, as it is differently applied. Tho even in such designed ambiguities, where one sense is aimed at, it ought to be sufficiently plain, otherwise they lose their intention. And in all serious discourses they ought carefully to be avoided. But obscurity more frequently arises from the ambiguous construction of words, which renders it difficult to determine, in what sense they are to be taken. Quintilian gives us this example of it: *A certain man ordered in his will, that his heir should erect for him a statue holding a spear, made of gold*¹. A question arises here, of great consequence to the heir, from the ambiguity of the expression; whether the words *made of gold*, are to be applied to the *statue*, or the *spear*: that is, whether it was the design of the testator by this appointment, that

the

¹ Inst. orat.
Lib. vii.
c. 9.

the whole statue, or only the spear, should be made of gold. A small note of distinction, differently placed between the parts of this sentence, would clear up the doubt, and determine the sense either way. For if one comma be put after the word *statue*, and another after *spear*, the words *made of gold*, must be refered to the *statue*, as if it had been said, *a statue, made of gold, holding a spear*. But if there be only the first comma placed after *statue*, it will limit the words *made of gold*, to the *spear* only; in the same sense, as if it had been said, *A statue holding a golden spear*. And either of these ways of expression would in this case have been preferable, for avoiding the ambiguity, according to the intention of the testator. The antient heathen oracles were generally delivered in such ambiguous terms. Which without doubt were so contrived on purpose, that those, who gave out the answers, might have room left for an evasion.

AGAIN, obscurity is occasioned either by too short and concise a manner of speaking, or by sentences too long and prolix; either of these extremes have sometimes this bad consequence. We find an instance of the former in Pliny the elder, where

LECT. where speaking of Hellebore, he saies: *They*
 XXI. *forbid it to be given to aged persons and chil-*

¹ *Hist. Nat.*
Lib. xxv.
 c. 5.

*dren, and less to women than men*¹. The verb is wanting in the latter part of the sentence, *and less to women than men*, which in such cases being usually supplied from what went before, would here stand thus: *and they forbid it to be given less to women than men*. But this is directly contrary to the sense of the writer, whose meaning is, either that it is ordered to be given in a less quantity to women than men, or not so frequently to women as men. And therefore the word *order* is here to be supplied, which being of a contrary signification to *forbid*, expressed in the former part of the sentence, occasions the obscurity. That long periods are often attended with the same ill effect, must be so obvious to every one's experience; that it would be intirely needless to produce any examples, in order to evince the truth of it. And therefore I shall only observe, that the best way of preventing this seems to be, by dividing such sentences, as excede a proper length, into two or more, which may generally be done without much trouble.

ANOTHER cause of obscurity, not inferior to any yet mentioned, is *Parentthesis*,
 when

when it is either too long, or too frequent. This of Cicero, in his oration for Sulla, is longer than we usually find in him: *O immortal gods (for I must attribute to you, what is your own: nor indeed can I claim so much to my own abilities, as to have been able of myself to go thro so many, so great, such different affairs, with that expedition, in that boisterous tempest of the state) you inflamed my mind with a desire to save my country*¹. But where any obscurity arises from such sentences, they may frequently be remedied by much the same means, as was just now hinted concerning long and prolix periods; that is, by separating the parenthesis from the rest of the sentence, and placing it either before or after. So in this sentence of Cicero, the parenthesis may stand last, in the following manner: *O immortal gods, you inflamed my mind with a desire to save my country: for I must attribute to you, what is your own; nor indeed can I claim so much to my own abilities, as to have been able of myself to go thro so many, so great, such different affairs, with that expedition, in that boisterous tempest of the state.* This order of the sentence is very plain, and less involved than the former. But to remove the obscurity,

¹ Cap. 14.

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security, which otherwise might be occasioned by a long parenthesis, one or more words are sometimes repeated immediately after it, which had been mentioned just before. Thus Cicero in his second Philippic says: *A spear being erected before the temple of Jupiter Stator, the goods (unhappy I, tho my tears are exhausted, my grief yet continues fixed in my breast) the goods, I say, of Pompey the Great were exposed to* ¹ *Cap. 26. auction by the doleful voice of a crier*¹. In the following sentence of the same excellent writer, there are no less than three parentheses; which I take notice of, as a thing very seldom to be found in him; and therefore rather to be observed, than imitated without necessity. Speaking of the duty of magistrates, and such who have the management of public affairs, he says: *Care must be taken, that it be not (as was often done by our ancestors, thro the smallness of the treasury, and continuance of the wars) necessary to raise taxes; and in order to prevent this, provision should be made against it long before hand: but if the necessity of this service should happen to any state (which I had rather suppose of another, than our own; nor am I now discoursing of our own, but of every state in general) me-*

thods

methods must be used to convince all persons (if they would be secure) that they ought to submit to necessity. Every one will readily perceive, that the sense of this period is not altogether so clear, nor the run of it so free and easy, as it would otherwise have been without the parentheses. But even two of these might be avoided, by a small change in the disposition of the members, in the following manner: *Care must be taken, that it be not necessary to raise taxes, as was often done by our ancestors, thro the smallness of the treasury, and continuance of the wars; and in order to prevent this, provision should be made against it long before hand: but if the necessity of this service should happen to any state (which I would rather suppose of another, than our own; nor am I now discouraging of our own, but of every state in general) methods must be used to convince all persons, that they ought to submit to necessity, if they would be secure.* The words are here exactly the same as before, and no other alteration made, but that two of the members, which before were included in others, are now placed after them. I have been the longer upon this head, because it is what many persons are too apt

¹ De Offic.
Lib. ii.
c. 21.

to fall into, by involving several sentences, or parts of sentences, one within another, instead of separating them, and placing one after another, in a proper dependance and connexion, as might be done by due care and attention.

THESE are the principal things, which occasion obscurity in a discourse, with respect to the language. There have been some persons, who have affected a dark and obscure way of speaking. We are told concerning Tiberius the emperor, that, *He was thought to speak better off hand (as we say) than when he made a studied and*

¹ Suet. in *set discourse* ¹. But this was not occasioned from his want of skill, but, as the historian says, from an affected obscurity in his style. And Heraclitus was called the *dark*

² Clem. *philosopher* upon that account ². And Quintilian mentions a certain rhetorician of this make, *Who used to order his scholars to cloud their discourses*. And his highest applause was: *Bravely said, I did not understand it*

³ *Inst orat* *myself* ³. It is hard to guess what such persons can propose to themselves by this conduct; unless they imagine their discourses will be thought to have the more in them, the less they are understood. But the design of language is to communicate our thoughts

¹ *Inst orat*
Lib. viii.
c. 2.

² Clem.
Strom. v.

thoughts to others, and the plainer it is, the better this design is answered. And therefore Quintilian very prudently advises persons not only to endeavour, *that their hearers may understand them, but as far as may be, that it should be impossible for them not to understand them* ¹.

¹ Ubi *supra*.

LEC-

LECTURE XXII.

Of Composition, and particularly of Period.

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THE first part of *Elocution*, which consists in *Elegance*, I finished in my last discourse; and shall now procede to the second, which is *Composition*.

Now *Composition*, in the sense it is here used, gives rules for the structure of sentences, with the several members, words, and syllables, of which they consist, in such a manner, as may best contribute to the force, beauty, and evidence of the whole. Some have not only neglected this, but pleaded against it, that such an attendance to rules of art in the structure and formation of sentences rather weakens and enervates the stile; which is more strong and natural, when every thing is expressed in the manner it first occurs to the mind. But to this Quintilian very well replies: *If that only is to be esteemed natural, which first sprang from nature, before it was cultivated; then the whole art of oratory is unnatural. And besides, if what nature at first dictates, is not to be improved by study and industry, mankind must be deprived not only*

only of many pleasures, but likewise conveniences of life. But if all these are found suitable to nature; then that seems to be most natural, which is most agreeable to reason; and that is most agreeable to reason, which is best in its kind¹. So that nature and art are not opposite to each other, and different in kind, but only in degree, as art is nature improved. Nor is it true, that rough and harsh language is more strong and nervous; than when the composition is smooth and harmonious. A stream, which runs among stones and rocks, makes more noise, from the opposition it meets with in its course; but that, which has not those impediments, flows with greater force and strength. So harsh and jarring sounds are disagreeable to the ear, which does not give them that easy admittance to the mind, as those, which are more pleasant and melodious. Besides harmonious numbers do not only give delight; but oftentimes impress the mind with an irresistible force, by the powerful influence they have upon the passions. This is evident from music, whose sounds, not being attended with rational ideas, cannot affect the understanding, and yet raise in the hearers a variety of emotions.

¹ Inst. orat.
Lib. ix.
c. 4.

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But poetry is still a greater instance of it, which, by reason of its numbers joined to fine thoughts, affords us both a rational and delightful entertainment. But nothing more is necessary to shew the advantage of this part of elocution, and how necessary it is for an orator, than to take a period well wrought up, and alter the form of it; by which it may be easily seen, how differently the mind will be affected by such an alteration. Cicero has shewn this from several instances, in his book ¹ *Cap. 70. Of a perfect orator*¹. But since they cannot so well be expressed in a translation, let us try it by one example in our own language, taken from a very polite writer, thus addressing his patron: *You have, says he, acted in so much consistency with yourself, and promoted the interests of your country in so uniform a manner; that even those, who would misrepresent your generous designs for the public good, cannot but approve the steadiness and intrepidity, with which you pursue them*². I think this may be justly esteemed an handsome period. It begins with ease, rises gradually till the voice is inflected, then sinks again, and ends with a just cadency. And perhaps there is not a word in it, whose situation could be altered

² *Spectat.*
Vol. v.
pref.

tered to an advantage. Let us now but shift the place of one word in the last member, and we shall spoil the beauty of the whole sentence. For, if instead of saying, as it now stands, *cannot but approve the steadiness and intrepidity, with which you pursue them*; we put it thus, *cannot but approve the steadiness and intrepidity, which you pursue them with*; the cadency will be flat and languid, and the harmony of the period entirely lost. Let us try it again by altering the place of the two last members, which at present stand in this order, *that even those, who would misrepresent your generous designs for the public good, cannot but approve the steadiness and intrepidity, with which you pursue them*. Now if the former member be thrown last, they will run thus, *that even those cannot but approve the steadiness and intrepidity, with which you pursue them, who would misrepresent your generous designs for the public good*. Here the sense is much obscured by the inversion of the relative *them*, which ought to refer to something that went before, and not to the words *generous designs*, which in this situation of the members are placed after it. And Perspicuity, as I have shewn already, is to

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be always carefully regarded, as the chief and most necessary property of language. It may perhaps be thought, that this is a thing in itself so very plain and obvious, that no one can well miss of falling into that manner, which is best. But surely if it was so, the contrary would not so often appear both in speaking and writing.

COMPOSITION consists of four parts; which rhetoricians call *Period*, *Order*, *Punctuation*, and *Number*. The first of these treats on the structure of sentences; the second of the parts of sentences, which are words and members; and the two last of the parts of words, which are letters and syllables. For all articulate sounds, and even the most minute parts of language, come under the cognizance of oratory. I shall begin with the first of these, which relates to sentences.

BUT before I enter upon this, it may not be improper to consider a little the nature of a sentence in general, with the different kinds of it, which are either simple or compound. Now in every sentence, or proposition, something is said of something. That of which something is said, logicians call the *subject*, and that, which is said of it, the *predicate*: but in grammatical

grammatical terms, the former is a *noun substantive of the nominative case*, and the latter a *finite verb*. These two parts may of themselves constitute a sentence. As when we say, *The sun shines*, or, *The clock strikes*, the words *sun* and *clock* are the subject in these expressions, *shines* and *strikes* the predicate. But most commonly they are accompanied with other words, which in grammatical construction are said either to be connected with, or to depend upon them; but in a logical consideration they denote some property, or circumstance relating to them. As in the following sentence: *A good man loves virtue for itself*. The subject of this sentence is a *good man*; and the predicate, or thing affirmed of him, that he *loves virtue for itself*. But the two principal or necessary words, on which all the rest depend, are *man* and *loves*. Now a simple sentence consists of one such noun and verb, with whatever else is joined to either, or both of them. And a compound sentence contains two or more of them, and may be divided into so many distinct propositions, as there are such nouns and verbs, either expressed or understood. So in the following sentence: *Compliance gains friends,*

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*but truth procures hatred*¹, there are two members, each of which contains in it an entire proposition. For, *Compliance gains freinds*, is one complete sentence; and, *Truth procures hatred*, is another; which are connected into one compound sentence by the particle *but*. Moreover it frequently happens, that compound sentences are made up of such parts or members, some if not all of which are themselves compounded, and contain in them two or more simple members. Such is that of Sallust: *Ambition has betrayed many persons into deceit; to say one thing, and to mean another; to found freindship and enmity, not upon reason, but interest; and to be more careful to*

² Bell. Cat. *appear honest, than really to be so*². This sentence consists of four members, the three last of which consisting of opposite parts are all compounded; as will appear by expressing them at length in the following manner: *Ambition has betrayed many persons into deceit; it [that is ambition] has betrayed them to say one thing, and to mean another; it has betrayed them to found freindship and enmity, not upon reason, but interest; and it has betrayed them to be more careful to appear honest, than really to be so.* The three last of these members, beginning with

² Bell. Cat.
c. 10.

with the words *it betrays*, are all of them compounded, and consist of two opposite members; which might each of them be expressed at length in the same manner, by supplying the ellipsis. As: *Ambition has betrayed many persons to say one thing, and it has betrayed them to mean another.* And so of the rest. From this instance we see, how much is left to be supplied by the mind in all discourse; which if expressed, would both destroy its harmony, and render it exceeding tedious. But still regard must be had to that, which is omitted, so as to render what is said consistent with it; otherwise there can be no propriety in what is spoken. Nor can the members of a sentence be distinguished, and duly ranged in their proper order, without this. But to procede, some sentences consist either wholly, or in part, of such members, as contain in them two or more compound ones, which may therefore for distinction's sake be called decompound members. Of this kind is that of Cicero, in his *defence of Milo*: *Great is the force of conscience, great either way: that those persons are not afraid, who have committed no offence; and those, who have offended, always think punishment present be-*


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*fore, their eyes*¹. The latter member of this sentence, which begins with the word *that*, contains in it two compound members, which represent the different state of mind between innocent and guilty persons. And it is in the proper distinction, and separation of the members in such complex sentences, that the art of pointing chiefly consists. For the principal use of a comma is to divide the simple members, a semicolon the compound ones, a colon such as are decomposed, and a period the whole from the following sentence. I mention this the rather, to shew the different acceptation of these terms by grammarians, from that of the antient writers upon oratory. For these latter apply them to the sense, and not to any points of distinction. A very short member, whether simple or compound, with them is a comma; and a longer a colon; for they have no such term, as a semicolon. Besides they call a very short sentence, whether simple or compound, a comma; and one of somewhat a greater length, a colon. And therefore, if a person expressed himself either of these ways in any considerable number of sentences together, he was said to speak by commas, or colons. But a sentence

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containing more words, than will consist with either of these terms, they call a simple period; the least compound period with them requiring the length of two colons. However this way of denominating sentences, and the parts of them, rather from their length, than the nature of them, appearing not so suitable, I have chosen rather to make use of the terms simple and compound members; and to call all those compound periods, which contain two or more members, whether simple or compounded.

BUT I procede to the structure of sentences, which with respect to their form or composition, are distinguished into two sorts, called by Cicero *tracta*, strait or direct; and *contorta*, bent or winding¹. By¹ *Orat.*
the former are meant such, whose mem-^{c. 20.}bers follow each other in a direct order, without any inflexion; and by the latter those, which strictly speaking are called periods. For *περίοδος* in Greek signifies a circuit or circle. And so the Latins call it *circuitus* and *ambitus*. By which they both mean a sentence consisting of correspondent parts, so framed, that the voice in pronouncing them may have a proper elevation and cadency, and distinguish them
by

LECT. by its inflexion. And as the latter part
 XXII.  returns back, and unites with the former, the period, like a circle, furrounds and incloses the whole sense. This elevation of the voice in the former part of the period, is by the Greeks called, *πρότασις*, and by the Latins *propositio*; and the depression of it in the latter part, by the one *ἀπόδοσις*, and by the other *redditio*.

Now as simple sentences have not these correspondent parts, which require any inflexion of the voice; nor a circular form, by reason of their brevity, they are not properly periods, in the strict sense of the word: tho in common speech the words sentence and period are often used as equivalent terms. Thus, if I say: *Generous minds are incited to the performance of noble exploits from motives of glory*: here is no distinction of parts, nor inflexion of the voice in this sentence. And indeed there is not any thing, which relates to the structure of these sentences, but what will more properly be taken notice of in the second part of *Composition*, which is *order*.

AND as to those compound sentences, whose members follow each other in a direct order, without any inflexion, there is little art required in their composition.

I shall produce one example of this kind from Cicero: *Natural reason inclines men to mutual converse and society; and implants in them a strong affection for those, who spring from them; and excites them to form communities, and join in public assemblies; and for these ends to endeavour to procure both the necessaries and conveniences of life; and that not for themselves only, but likewise their wives, children, and others, who are dear to them, and have a right to their assistance*¹. Here are five short members in this sentence, placed in a series, without any inflexion of the parts, or orbit of the whole. And as such sentences have no other boundary, but the conclusion of the sense, suited to the breath of the speaker; he may either contract, or lengthen them at pleasure, without offending the ear. So should the sentence last mentioned conclude with the first member, in this manner: *Natural reason inclines men to mutual converse and society*: the sense would be perfect, and the ear satisfied. The case would be the same at the end of the second member, thus: *Natural reason inclines men to mutual converse and society; and implants in them a strong affection for those, who spring from them*. And the like

¹ Off.
Lib. i.
c. 4.

may be said of the rest. Since such sentences therefore may be thus limited at pleasure, it seems more convenient both for the speaker and hearers to confine them to a moderate length.

BUT because the principal art, relating to this part of composition, lies in the frame and structure of such compound sentences, as are properly called periods; I shall treat upon these somewhat more largely. In the formation of these periods, two things are chiefly to be regarded, their length and cadency. As the length ought to be suited to the breath of the speaker, the antient rhetoricians scarce admit of more than four colons; by which we may here understand compound members of a moderate size, which will, I beleive, upon observation be generally found a suitable and proportionate length¹. For to extend them farther, than the voice can well manage, must be painful to the speaker, and of consequence unpleasant to the hearers. As to the cadency, what Cicero has observed, is found true by experience, that the ears judge what is full, and what is deficient; and direct us to fill up our periods, that nothing be wanting, of what they expect. When the voice is raised at

¹ Cic.
Orat.
c. 66.

the beginning of a sentence, they are in suspense till it be finished; and are pleased with a full and just cadency, but are sensible of any defect, and are displeased with redundancy. Therefore care must be taken, that periods be neither deficient, and as it were maimed, that is, that they do not drop before their time, and defraud the ears, of what seemed to be promised them; nor, on the other hand, offend them by too long and immoderate excursions¹. This rise and cadency of the voice in pronunciation, depend on the nature and situation of the members, as I shall endeavour to shew by particular instances; in the explication of which, by the word *members*, are to be understood such as are compounded. In a period of two members, the turn of the voice begins with the latter member. Of this kind is the following sentence of Cicero: *If impudence prevailed as much in the forum and courts of justice, as insolence does in the country and places of less resort; Aulus Caecina would submit as much to the impudence of Sextus Ebutius in this cause, as he did before to his insolence when assaulted by him*². Here the cadency begins at the words *Aulus Caecina*. If a sentence consist of three members, the inflexion is best

¹ See Cic.
De clar.
orat. c. 8.
& Orat.
c. 50,
& 53.

² *Pro Caecina. c. 1.*

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best made at the end of the second member; for if it begin immediately after the first, the voice will either be apt to sink too low, and not be heard, before it reach the end; or else be precipitated, in order to prevent it. Cicero begins his oration for Milo with a sentence of this form: *Altho I fear, it may be a shame to be dismayed at the entrance of my discourse in defence of a most valiant man; and that it no ways becomes me, while Milo is more concerned for the safety of the state than for himself, not to shew the same greatness of mind in his behalf: yet this new form of prosecution terrifies my eyes, which, whatever way they turn, want the antient custom of the forum, and former manner of trials.* Here the cadency begining at the third member with the word *yet*, makes a proper division of the sentence, and easy for the speaker. But a period of four members is reckoned the most complete and perfect, where the inflexion begins at the middle, that is, with the third member. Nor is it the same case here, as if in a sentence of three members, the cadency be made at the second. For in proportion to the time of raising the voice, may the space be allowed for its sinking. The following sentence
of

of Cicero gives us an instance of this, where he speaks to his son: *Altho, son Mark, having now been an hearer of Cratippus for a year, and this at Athens, you ought to abound in the precepts and doctrines of philosophy, by reason of the great character both of your instructor, and the city; one of which can furnish you with knowledge, and the other with examples: yet, as I always to my advantage joined the Latin tongue with the Greek, and have done it not only in oratory, but likewise in philosophy; I think you ought to do the same, that you may be equally conversant in both languages*¹. The turn in this period begins at the word *yet*, which standing near the middle, the voice is raised to that pitch in pronouncing the former part, as to admit of a gradual cadency, without being lost, before the conclusion of the sentence. But where the sense does not suit with this division at the entrance upon the third member, it is best made at the fourth. Such is the following sentence of Cicero: *If I have any genius, which I am sensible how small it is; or any readiness in speaking, wherein I do not deny, but I have been much conversant; or any skill*
in

¹ De Off.
Lib. i.
c. 1.

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in oratory, from an acquaintance with the best arts, to which I confess I have been always inclined: no one has a better right to demand of me the fruit of all these things, than this Aulus Licinius ¹. The cadency of this sentence does not begin, till the words *no one*; yet it ends handsomly, and without disappointing the ear. Tho indeed the three first members having each of them an inflexion, check the elevation of the voice, and by that variety in the pronunciation add to the harmony of the sentence. An equality of the members should likewise be attended to in the composition of a period, the better to adjust their rise and cadency. And for this reason in sentences of three members, where the cadency begins with the third; or in those of four members, where it begins at the fourth; it promotes the harmony, to make the last member longest. This is properly the nature of rhetorical periods, which when rightly formed have both an equal beauty and dignity in their composition.

¹ *Pro Archia, c. 1.*

BUT, as all discourse is made up of distinct sentences, and whenever we express our thoughts, it is in some of the forms
above

above mentioned; so the use of them is not promiscuous, but suited to answer different designs in speaking. And in this view they are considered, and made use of by the orator, as will be shewn hereafter.

LECTURE XXIII.

*Of Order.*LECT.
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HAVING already discoursed upon the different forms and structure of sentences, I am next to consider the construction of the parts, of which they consist. This rhetoricians call *Order*. And by this they mean the placing each word, and member of a sentence, in such a manner, as will most contribute to the force, beauty, or evidence of the whole. But regard must always be had to the genius and custom of different languages. For that order is agreeable to one language, which will not suit with another; as I shall have occasion to shew in the series of this discourse.

Now there are two kinds of *Order*, one of which may be called *natural*, and the other *artificial*. And each of these may be considered with respect to the parts either of simple, or compound sentences.

As to simple sentences, we may call that order *natural*, when all the words in a sentence are so placed, as they are connected with, or follow each other, in a gram-

grammatical construction. And it may properly enough admit of this name, as it is founded in the nature of a proposition; and the relation of the several words, of which it consists, to each other. This I explained in my last discourse, and illustrated by proper examples; and shall therefore only give one instance of it here, to introduce the subject I am now upon. And it is this: *The fame of Isocrates excited Aristotle to the profession of oratory.* Here these words, *the fame of Isocrates*, contain the subject of this sentence, with what relates to it; and all those which follow, *excited Aristotle to the profession of oratory*, make up the predicate, and its dependants. And in both parts each word grammatically considered stands in its proper order of construction. And this seems agreeable to the natural way of conveying our thoughts, which leads us first to express the subject, or thing, of which some other thing is said, before the predicate, or that which is said concerning it; and with respect to both, as every idea succeeds another in the order of our conceptions, to range it in the same order, when we communicate them to others. Our language in the general keeps pretty

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much to this method. But in one thing particularly it recedes from it; and that is, in placing adjectives, which denote the properties of things, before their substantives or subjects, whose properties they are. As when it is said: *Evil communication corrupts good manners.* And this we always do, except something follows, which depends upon the adjective. So we say: *He was a man eminent for his virtue,* not, *an eminent man.*

ARTIFICIAL order, as it respects simple sentences, has little or no regard to the natural construction of words; but disposes them in such a manner, as will be most agreeable to the ear, and best answer the design of the speaker. The Latins take a much greater liberty in this respect, than we do, or the nature of our language will permit. Quintilian says, it is best for the verb to stand last, when there is no particular reason to the contrary. And he gives this reason for it, *because the force of the sentence lies in the verb*¹. So that according to him, they seem to have had this view in putting the verb at the end; that as the whole sentence is imperfect without the verb, the mind being thus held in suspense might receive the deeper impression from

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. ix.
c. 4.

from it at last. They likewise separate such words, as have an immediate relation between them, or dependance one upon another; and place any of them first or last, as they please. In short, their order seems in a manner arbitrary, if it does not break in upon perspicuity, to which they usually attend. But most of these things are unsuitable to the genius of our language. One might say indeed: *Convince him he cannot*, instead of saying: *He cannot convince him*. Or: *With my own eyes I saw it*, for, *I saw it with my own eyes*. And again: *In proportion to the increase of luxury the Roman state declined*, for, *The Roman state declined in proportion to the increase of luxury*. But the inversion of the words in the former order of these expressions, doth not sound so kindly to an English ear, which is not accustomed to such a manner of speaking.

As to compound sentences, that is, such as consist of two or more members, either simple or compounded; what relates to the words in each member separately, is the same, as in simple sentences. But with regard to the disposition of the several members, that may be called the *natural* order, which so places them, as they mu-

tually depend on each other. Thus the antecedent member naturally precedes the relative. As in this expression: *Men are apt to forgive themselves, what they blame in others.* In hypothetical sentences the conditional member naturally stands first. Thus: *If Socrates be a rational creature, he is a man.* That member, which expresses the effect of an action, naturally comes last. As: *Tho you offer never so good reasons, you will not prevail with him.* The like may be said of time, with regard to things done in it. As: *The Roman eloquence soon declined, when Cicero was dead.* And to name no more, the reason of a thing naturally follows that, of which it is the reason. As thus: *All the pleasures of life must be uncertain, since life itself is not secure.*

WHEN this order is inverted, it may be stiled *artificial*. So to keep to the instances already given, the two members in the first sentence may be thus inverted: *What they blame in others, men are apt to forgive themselves.* In the second in this manner: *Socrates is a man, if he be a rational creature.* In the third thus: *You will not prevail with him, tho you offer never so good reasons.* And so in the rest. As: *When*
Cicero

Cicero was dead, the Roman eloquence soon declined. And: Since life itself is not secure, all the pleasures of life must be uncertain. The variety of inversions in a sentence may generally be greater or less, in proportion to the number of its members. In the following sentence of Cicero, the natural order seems to be this: *If that greatness of mind be void of justice, which shews itself in dangers and labors, it is blameable.* Which may be varied by changing the place of the first and third member, in the following manner: *That greatness of mind is blameable, which shews itself in dangers and labors, if it want justice.* Or by altering the place of all the three members thus: *That greatness of mind is blameable, if it be void of justice, which shews itself in dangers and labors.* But oftentimes one member may be included in another, as in the instance here given: *If that greatness of mind, which shews itself in dangers and labors, be void of justice, it is blameable.* Here the relative member is included in the conditional, which is placed first, and the antecedent member follows both. But in Cicero it stands thus: *That greatness of mind, which shews itself in dangers and labors, if it want justice, is blameable*.¹

¹ De Off.
Lib. i.
c. 19.

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Where the relative and conditional members are both included in the antecedent member. The Latin tongue commonly admits of a much greater variety in the transposition of members, as well as in that of single words, than suits with our idiom. In the following sentence the natural order is much preferable, as it best suits with the proper elevation and cadency of the voice in its pronunciation: *I am willing to remit all that is past, provided it may be done with safety.* But should we invert the members, and say: *Provided it may be done with safety, I am willing to remit all that is past:* the harmony of the cadency would be lost. And if the latter member be included in the former, the alteration will still be worse. As: *I am willing, provided it may be done with safety, to forgive all that is past.* Here the inflection of the voice falls upon the same member as before, and destroys the beauty of the period by its elevation afterwards. Some sentences admit of no involution of their members. Such are those, whose members are connected by conjunctive or disjunctive particles. As: *Virtue furnishes the mind with the truest pleasure in prosperity, and affords it the greatest comfort in adversity.* And:

A wise man is neither elated by prosperity, nor depressed by adversity. And the like may be said of those, where the latter member begins with some illative or red-ditive particle. As in these instances: *The chief thing to be regarded in life is virtue, for all other things are vain and uncertain. And: Tho' fortune is always inconstant, yet she has many votaries.* Neither of the members in any of these ways of expression, and some others, which might be named, can be included one in the other. In all the examples hitherto given, the sentences consist only of simple members; and indeed compound members are not so often inverted, nor included one in another, by reason of their length. However I shall here produce one instance of each: *Whoever considers the uncertainty of human affairs, and how frequently the greatest hopes are frustrated; he will see just reason to be always on his guard, and not place too much dependance upon things so precarious.* This sentence consists of two compound members, which here stand in their natural order, but may be thus inverted: *He will see just reason to be always on his guard, and not place too much dependance on things so precarious; whoever considers the uncertainty*
of

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of human affairs, and how often the greatest hopes are frustrated. In the following sentence one compound member is included in another: *Let us not conclude, while dangers are at a distance, and do not immediately approach us, that we are secure; unless we use all necessary precaution to prevent them.* Here the natural order would be: *While dangers are at a distance, and do not immediately approach us; let us not conclude, that we are secure; unless we use all necessary precaution to prevent them.*

BUT there are some other considerations relating to order, which being taken from the nature of things, equally suit all languages. So in amplifying there should be a constant gradation from a less to a greater. As when Cicero says: *Ambition creates hatred, shyness, discords, seditions, and wars*¹. On the contrary, in extenuating we should descend from a greater to a less. As if speaking of the antient laws of Rome one should say: *They were so far from suffering a Roman citizen to be put to death, that they would not allow him to be whipt, or even to be bound*². In constituting any whole we put the parts first. As: *Invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation, make up the art of oratory.* But in separating any whole

¹ *De fin.*
Lib. 1.
c. 13.

² *In Verr.*
c. 66.

whole the parts follow. As: *The art of oratory may be divided into these four parts; invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation.* In every enumeration care must be taken not to mix the whole with the parts; but if it be mentioned at all, it must either be put first, or last. So it would be wrong to say: *He was a man of the greatest prudence, virtue, justice, and modesty.* For the word *virtue* here contains in it the other three, and therefore should not be inserted among them.

THESE are the principal things necessary to be observed with regard to order. There are others, which might be mentioned; but they will readily offer themselves to those, who attend to this subject. And there are some so variable and uncertain, that they are scarce reducible to any fixed rules; and may therefore be more easily acquired by use and observation. Variety is always necessary, for the most accurate and exact composition, if it return too often, will be unpleasant. And therefore, notwithstanding Quintilian recommends it as best in the Latin tongue to end a sentence with the verb; yet it would be wrong, and contrary to the usage of the best writers, always to keep to this, or indeed

deed too frequently. Besides, the same accuracy is not at all times necessary; but regard must be had to the nature of the discourse, as I shall have occasion to shew hereafter.

IN treating upon this subject I have been more particular in observing the analogy between our language, and the Latin; because there seems to me no better way of discovering the genius, and peculiar properties of any language, than by comparing it with others. And we cannot but perceive, from what has been said, that our composition is in this part of it much more limited and confined, than the Latin. The natural order is certainly more plain and easy; but yet it must be owned, that the other has its advantages, and those very considerable. The language both of the Greeks and Romans has more strength, as well as harmony, than any modern tongue; which is owing in a good measure to this liberty in their composition. For by giving their periods the finest turn, and placing the most significant words, where they may strike the mind with the greatest force; at the same time they both delight the ear, and excite the attention. Soon after learning began to revive in Europe, and to

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dispel

dispel those clouds of ignorance, which had overspread it for several ages before, the study of the antient languages was very much pursued, as the necessary key to all useful knowledge. At which time many learned men began to cultivate the language of their own country, both in foreign parts, and here in England. And some among us endeavoured to reduce our tongue, as near as they could, to the Latin, as in other things, so likewise in the composition of sentences. However this did not meet with the desired success, but rendered their stile very harsh and stiff, and often obscure; as appears by the works of some eminent writers in that age. Nor have some later attempts of that kind been able to reconcile it to an English ear. And indeed our language is not suited to all the varieties in this respect, which the Latin tongue admits of from the different terminations of the declinable words. I will illustrate this by one plain instance. In Latin these three forms of expression, *Aristoteles docuit rhetoricam*, and, *Rhetoricam docuit Aristoteles*, and, *Docuit Aristoteles rhetoricam*, have all one sense; the same, as when I say in English, *Aristotle taught rhetoric*. But with us, if the words are placed in the

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the second form, *Rhetoric taught Aristotle*; the sense is absurd. And in the last, *Taught Aristotle rhetoric*, they make only an imperfect sentence without a subject. But now in the Latin, the word *Aristoteles* being limited to the subject, and *rhetoricam* to the predicate, by their terminations, the sense remains the same, in whatever order the words are placed. So great is the advantage of a language to be thus formed.

UPON the whole therefore; in English the nearer we keep to the natural or grammatical order, it is generally best; but in Latin we are to follow the use of the best writers; a joint regard being always had to the judgement of the ear, and perspicuity of the sense, in both languages.

L E C-

LECTURE XXIV.

Of Juncture and Number.

QUINTILIAN speaking of composition, represents a discourse, as very happy in that respect, when the Order, Juncture, and Number, are all just and proper. The first of these, which gives rules for the due placing of the words, and members of a sentence, I made the subject of my last lecture. The other two relate to letters and syllables, the former treating of their connection, and the latter of their quantity. I propose therefore to give some account of both these in my present discourse, and shall begin with *Juncture*.

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Inst. orat.
Lib. ix.
c. 4.

BUT before I enter upon this, it will be proper to take notice of some conditions, which are necessary to render the sounds of words and syllables agreeable in their pronunciation; as likewise of the force and power of the different sorts of letters, which compose them.

AND with regard to sounds, it is requisite in the first place, they should be moderate; that is, soft, and yet clear and distinct. For harsh and rough sounds grate

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upon

upon the ears, and by that means give them offence; and if they are too low or confused, they displease, by not being fully and clearly perceived. And the case is the same with respect to the other senses, which feel the most agreeable sensations from such things, as act upon them with moderation. Sweet things are soft to the tongue, and so create a pleasure; whereas sour things give pain, by being too pungent; and those things, whose parts are too blunt to excite a sensation, are therefore insipid. So likewise moderate light is most agreeable to the eyes; and that which is either too strong, or too feeble, is offensive. And the like may be said of the rest of the senses. Again, sounds must have a certain equality and proportion, to render them agreeable. Unequal sounds, that strike the organ strongly or weakly, swiftly or slowly, by frequent and sudden changes from one to the other, without a due proportion, can never be grateful. Lastly, a variety is requisite, in conjunction with their proportion or symmetry. This is a necessary ingredient of pleasure, for similitude and a constant return of the same thing soon cloy. And it is this conjunction of a proportionate equality with variety,
which

which constitutes all harmony. These conditions are indeed necessary in sounds of all kinds, to render them pleasant and delightful. But my business is to consider them only, as they relate to discourse. There is a natural sympathy between the ears of the hearer, and the voice of the speaker; insomuch that whatever is difficult to pronounce, is painful to hear. We find this very evidently in those, who have an impediment or hesitation in their speech. When they attempt to speak, it gives an uneasiness to those about them. From whence it is plain, that no discourse can be attended to with pleasure, which is not so composed, as to be spoken with ease.

As to the letters, some have a smother, and others a harsher sound. All the vowels have a softer pronunciation, than the consonants; for which reason it is necessary in the formation of words, that the roughness of the latter should be duly tempered with a just proportion of the former. But tho all the vowels are softer than the consonants, yet they differ considerably from each other in that respect. *A*, *o*, and *u*, have generally a much stronger and broader sound, than *e*, and *i*. As to the consonants, those are hardest, which end with

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the sound of the vowel, and are therefore called mutes, as *b, c, d, g, k, p, q,* and *t*; of which *c, k,* and *q,* may be considered as the same letter. The other single consonants, which begin with the sound of the vowel, being softer, are for that reason called half vowels, as *f, h, l, m, n, r,* and *s*. *X* and *z* are double consonants, the former of which has the force of *cs*, and the latter of *ds*. And some letters are both vowels and consonants in a different situation, as *i, u, w,* and *y*. Besides, most of the letters are very differently pronounced, and have a variety of sounds, harder or softer, fuller or smaller, longer or shorter, in different words. Now there are several organs of speech, whose action is not only different, but sometimes contrary, in pronouncing the letters, and their various combinations, both in the forming of separate words, and their connection in sentences. Thus the lips are drawn backward in pronouncing the three first vowels, *a, e,* and *i*; and pushed forward in the two last, *o,* and *u*. *P,* and *b,* are called labials, because they principally require the action of the lips, which are first closed, and then opened again, in their pronunciation. *C,* and *g,* are termed dentals, from the agency of the

the teeth; and *t*, and *d*, linguals, from that of the tongue; but they all four draw back the lips, when they are pronounced. Besides, *p*, *c*, and *t*, require less force of the organ in sounding them; than *b*, *g*, and *d*. Now it is the different mixture of the letters and syllables in the make of the words, suited to the action of the several organs of speech, that in a good measure renders the harmony of one language greater than another. The English tongue abounds with consonants, and therefore cannot but seem harsh and rugged to those, whose ears have been accustomed to softer sounds. Indeed use makes this less observable to us, unless when we compare it with other languages, which are smoother (as those are in the more southern climates) and then we soon perceive the difference. Tho of late years, it must be owned, that our tongue has in this respect, as well as others, been very much improved and polished by persons of the finest taste, and most exact judgement. But in order to render the sound of words more smooth and easy, it has been customary in all languages to take out, and put in letters, or to substitute one in the place of another. And the more any language has

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been cultivated, the more commonly has this been practised. And therefore, as the Greeks seem to have been most careful to improve and perfect their language, they have taken the greatest liberties in this respect. They often put one vowel for another, or unite them into diphthongs; and in like manner, with regard to the consonants, they frequently change, insert, or remove them. And this they do both in the inflexion of their simple words, and the formation of such as are compounded. By which means they not only increase the variety of sounds in the pronunciation of their words, but likewise promote their harmony. Examples of all these things might easily be given from their writers, were they suitable to an English discourse. The Latins copied after them in some measure, but not to the same degree, nor will their language admit of it. But it is doubtless from a regard to the sound, which makes them say *abstineo* for *ab-tineo*, and *prodes* for *proes*; by inserting a letter; and by dropping one to say *coheres* for *conheres*; as also to alter *abfero* into *aufero*, *adlego* to *allego*; with many other instances of the like nature. We take the same method likewise in some cases. As
when

when we say *mirrou* for *mirour* to strengthen the sound, *can't* for *cannot* to ease it, and *knives* for *knifes* to soften it. And the French do this more than we. But this is not properly the subject, I now propose to treat on; tho it may help to illustrate, and shew the use of it. For an orator must take the words of a language, as he finds them; tho he may place them in such a manner, as will render the pronunciation most easy and pleasant, and best promote the harmony of the sentence; which, so far as it relates to letters and syllables, is what rhetoricians call *figure*.

Now the method of doing this consists in three things; a due attendance to the nature of the vowels, consonants, and syllables in the connexion of words, with regard to the sound: each of which I shall consider distinctly.

As to the first, when a word ends with a vowel, and the next begins either with a different vowel, or the same repeated, it usually renders the pronunciation hollow and unpleasant. For, as Quintilian has justly observed: *This makes a chasm in the sentence, and stops the course of it*¹. For there must be some pause, in order to

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. ix.
c. 4.

pronounce them both, or otherwise the sound of one will be lost. So, for instance, in pronouncing these words, *the other day*, unless you stop a little after the word *the*, the sound of *e* will not be heard. And if it is dropt, it will occasion a rougher sound, from the aspiration of *th* twice repeated so near together, as *th' other day*. Therefore to prevent both these inconveniences, we usually say, *t'other day*. But the different consonants, which together with the vowels make up those syllables, often cause a considerable difference in the pronunciation, so as to render it more or less agreeable. As, if I say, *he over did it*, the words *he over* have not so harsh a sound, as *the other*; tho' still they require some pause to keep them distinct. Besides some vowels meet more amicably, and admit of a softer pronunciation, than others. Those which have the weakest and smallest sound, follow best; because they occasion the least alteration of the organ in forming the two sounds. Such are *e* and *i*; and therefore without any chasm in the sound, or hesitation of the voice, we say, *he is*. But where the action of the organ is greater, and the sound stronger, the pronunciation is more difficult: as when we say, *tho' all*.

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For here is a contrary motion of the lips, which are first put forward in sounding the *o*, and then drawn backward to pronounce the *a*; and therefore the sound is much softer to say, *tho every*, where their action is less. And the like ill effect commonly happens from the repetition of the same vowel: as if I say, *go on*, or, *you usually act thus*. There is a considerable difference between these two expressions, in repeating the sound of the vowel, and where either of them is doubled in a single word. For then the same sound only is protracted by one continued motion of the organ; as in the words *good*, and *deem*. But here the sound is repeated again by a new action of the organ, which, if precipitated, obscures the sound of one of the vowels, and, if too much retarded, makes a chasm in the pronunciation; either of which is unpleasant to the ear.

BUT as the coalition of two vowels occasions an hollow and obscure sound, so the meeting of some consonants renders it very harsh and rough. Thus the words *king Xerxes*, and *public good*, when so placed, have not only a roughness, but likewise a difficulty in their pronunciation, from the contrary action of the lips; which

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in the former are first drawn back and then forward, but in the latter the contrary way, and in both of them with some considerable force. But this may very easily be avoided, by saying, with a little alteration in the words, *Xerxes the king*, and *the good of the public*. So likewise the words *ill company* have a softer sound, than *bad company*, for the same reason. To multiply instances of this kind seems unnecessary, which so frequently occur in all discourse.

THE repetition of the same syllable, at the end and beginning of words, is the last thing to be considered. And a little observation will convince us, that where this happens, it generally renders the sound either confused, or unpleasant. Cicero was often rallied on account of this verse :

† Quint.
Inst. orat.
Lib. ix.
c. 4.

O fortunatam natam me consule Romam ¹.

Every one will easily perceive a disagreeable sound in the following expression :

A man many times does that unadvisedly, of which he afterwards repents. The chime of the words *man many* both seems affected, and displeases the ear. But this will soon be remedied, if we separate those two words, and say, *A man does that many times unadvisedly*.

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FROM the short account here given of this part of composition it is easy to perceive, what things are necessary to render it most complete and accurate; which are these following. If a word end with a vowel, the next ought to begin with a consonant; or such a vowel, whose sound may agree well with the former. But if a word conclude with a consonant, either a vowel should follow; or such a consonant, whose pronunciation will suit with it. And lastly, the same syllable ought not to be repeated at the end of one word, and the beginning of the next. It has been observed by some critics, that the following verse at the beginning of Virgil's *Eneid*, has all these properties.

*Arma virumque cano, Trojae qui primus
ab oris.*

Where any word in this verse ends with a vowel, the next begins with a consonant; and where any one ends with a consonant, the next begins with a vowel; and there is no repetition of the same sound throughout the whole. But this is what rarely happens, especially in our language, which abounds with consonants. And what Quintilian says of the coalition of vowels, in treating upon this subject, seems applicable

cable to the whole. *This, says he, is a thing not much to be dreaded, and I know not whether the neglect of it, or too great a concern about it, be worse. It necessarily checks the vigor of the mind, and diverts it from matters of greater importance. And therefore, as it shews negligence to permit it; so to be in constant fear of it discovers a low*

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. ix.
c. 4.

*genius*¹. This was the opinion of that judicious writer. And as these things cannot always be attended to, it may be sufficient to avoid them, where they prove very offensive to the ear, and it may be done without some greater inconvenience. So in this sentence, *Honesty is the best policy*, the coalition of *t* and *p* in the two last words *best policy* produce a roughness in their pronounciation; but as the expression is strong, and cannot perhaps be well altered for the better, the sound here ought to give way to the sense.

I COME now to the fourth and last part of *Composition*, which is called *Number*. And this respects the quantity of syllables, as *Juncture* does their quality. In the Greek and Roman languages every syllable has its distinct quantity; and is either long, short, or common: two or more of which joined together in a certain order

make a foot; and a determinate number of these in a different order constitute their several sorts of metre. This variety of sounds gives a much greater harmony to their poetry; than what can arise only from the seat of the accent, and the similitude of sound at the end of two verses, which chiefly regulate our metre. And altho their prose was not so confined with regard to the feet, either as to the kind or place of them, as their metrical compositions; yet it had a sort of measure, more especially in the rise and cadency of their periods. This they call *rhetorical number*. And accordingly the antient writers upon this art acquaint us, what feet are best suited to the beginning, middle, or conclusion of a sentence. Such rules are not applicable to our language, which has not that accurate distinction of quantity in its syllables. For we are apt to confound accent with quantity, and pronounce those syllables longest, on which we lay the accent, tho in their nature they are not so. As in the word *admirable*, where none but the first syllable *ad* is pronounced long; tho that is only rendered so by position, and the two following are so by nature. And again, in the word *avarice*, we found
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the first *a* long for the same reason, and the second short; contrary to the nature of both those vowels. However I shall offer a few things, that may be of some use to modulate our periods, and adjust their cadency.

A GREAT number of monosyllables do not stand well together. For as there ought to be a greater distance in the pronunciation between one word and another, than between the syllables of the same word; such pauses, tho short, yet when too frequent, make the sound rough and uneven, and by that means spoil its harmony. And this may seem more necessary to be attended to, because the English language abounds so much with monosyllables. On the contrary, a continuation of many long words makes a sentence move too flow and heavily. And therefore such periods generally run best, which have a proper mixture of words of a different length. Besides, as every word has its accent, which with us stands for quantity; a number either of monosyllables, or long words, coming together so far abates the harmony, as it lessens the variety.

AGAIN, several words of the same ending do not stand well together, especially where

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the accent falls upon the same syllable in each of them. For this creates too great a jingle by the similitude of sound; and is apt to displease, from an appearance of affectation. Of this kind is the following sentence: *Nothing is more welcome, delightful, or wholesome, than rest to a wearied man.* In such expressions therefore, if the order of the words cannot well be altered; some other word should be substituted in the room of one of them at least, to diversify the sound. So in the example here given, the sound might be varied by saying: *Nothing is more welcome, pleasant, or wholesome.*

BUT to add no more, if a sentence end with a monosyllable, it is apt to hurt the cadency, and disappoint the ear; whereas words of a moderate length carry a greater force with them, by the fulness of their sound, and afford the ear what it expected. And there is one sort of monosyllables more especially, which never stands well at the conclusion of a period, tho we frequently find it there; and that is the signs of cases. Thus we say: *Avarice is a crime, which wise men are too often guilty of.* But the cadency would doubtless be more agreeable, if it was altered thus: *Avarice is a crime,*

crime, of which wise men are too often guilty.

Every one must perceive, when the accent falls upon the last syllable in the sentence, as it does, if it end with *of*, the sound is not so pleasant, as when it rests upon the preceding syllable in the word *guilty*. Nor are very long words well suited, either to the beginning or conclusion of a period; for they retard the pronunciation at first, and fall too heavy at the end.

THESE observations may suffice for our conduct, in what relates to number, so far as it agrees with the genius of our language. But this, and all the parts of composition, should be so managed, as may best suit the nature of the subject, and design of the speaker. Long and full periods, a just order, smooth connection, and flowing numbers, are not always requisite. Nay sometimes the neglect of accuracy is itself a beauty. And even harsh and rough sounds, when most expressive of those ideas, they are designed to convey, ought to be chosen. But of these things I shall have occasion to speak more largely hereafter, in their proper place.

LECTURE XXV.

Of Dignity, and particularly of Tropes.

HAVING finished the two first parts LECT. XXV.
of *Elocution*, I now procede to the
third and last part, which is called *Dignity*,
and consists in the right use of *Tropes* and
Figures. It is not sufficient for an orator
to express himself with propriety and clear-
ness, or in smooth and harmonious periods;
but his language must likewise be suited
to the nature and importance of the sub-
ject. And therefore as *Elegance* gives rules
for the first of these, and *Composition* for
the second; so does *Dignity* for the last of
them. It is very evident, that different
subjects require a different stile and man-
ner of expression; since, as Quintilian says,
*What is magnificent in one discourse, would
be turgid in another; and those expressions,
which appear low upon a sublime subject,
would suit lesser matters; and as in a florid
harangue a mean word is remarkable, and
like a blemish, so any thing lofty and bright
upon a trivial argument is disproportionate,
and like a tumour upon an even surface*¹.
Now this variety in the manner of ex-
pression

¹ Inst. orat.
Lib. viii.
c. 3.

pression arises in a great measure from *Tropes* and *Figures*, which not only inviven and beautify a discourse, but give it likewise force and grandeur; for which reason this part of elocution seems to have been called *Dignity*.

TROPEs and *Figures*¹ are distinguished from each other in several respects. *Tropes* mostly affect single words, but *Figures* whole sentences. A *Trope* conveys two ideas to the mind by means of one word, but a *Figure* throws the sentence into a different form from the common, and usual manner of expression. Besides, *Tropes* are chiefly designed to represent our thoughts, but *Figures* our passions. In treating upon this subject, I shall begin with *Tropes*. And that I may procede in the most regular and easy method, I shall first consider the nature of *Tropes* in general, with the several kinds or species of them; then assign the reasons, which have occasioned their use; and lastly, lay down some directions, proper to be observed in the choice of them.

A TROPE then, as it has been usually defined, is, *the change of a word from its proper signification to some other with advantage*¹. The words *with advantage* are added

¹ Quint.

Inst. orat.

Lib. viii.

c. 5.

added in the definition, because a *Trope* ought not to be chosen; unless there is some good reason for using it rather than the proper word. But in what manner, or how far, it can be said of all *Tropes* in general, that they change the proper signification of words, will best appear by considering the nature of each kind of them separately. Now in every *Trope* a reference is had to two things, which occasions two ideas, one of the thing expressed, and another of that thing, to which it has a respect, and is supplied by the mind. For all *Tropes* are taken either from things internally related, as the whole and a part; or externally, as cause and effect, subject and adjunct; or from some similitude, that is found between them; or from a contrariety. The first of these is called *Synecdoche*, the second *Metonymy*, the third *Metaphor*, and the last *Irony*. I will endeavour to illustrate this by examples. When I say, *Hannibal beat the Romans*, the meaning is, that Hannibal and his army did this. So that altho in some sense a part may here be said to stand for the whole, which makes it a *Synecdoche*; yet strictly speaking the word *Hannibal* does not alter its sense, but there is an ellipsis in the expression,

pression, Hannibal being put for himself and his army. But if I say, *Cicero should be read by all lovers of eloquence*, here indeed the word *Cicero* appears to be changed from its proper sense, and to signify the books of Cicero, which is a *Metonymy*, the author being put for his works; and therefore such expressions need not be deemed elliptical. Again, if any one speaking of a subtle and crafty man, should say, *He is a fox*, the meaning is, he is like a fox, which is a *Metaphor*, where the word *fox* retains its proper sense, and denotes that animal, to which the man is compared on account of his craft. Lastly, if a person say to another, *Well done*, meaning that the thing was ill done, the word *well* keeps its own sense, but from the manner of its pronunciation, or some other circumstance attending the expression, it will be evident, that the contrary is intended, which is called an *Irony*. From these instances it may appear, in what latitude we must understand the common definition of a *Trope*, which makes it to consist in the change of a word from its proper sense into some other. But tho in reality there are but four kinds of *Tropes*, which are distinguished by so many different respects, which things bear

bear one to another; yet as these several respects are found in a variety of subjects, and attended with different circumstances, the names of *Tropes* have from hence been greatly multiplied; which however may all be referred to some or other of those already mentioned, as will be shewn, when I come to treat of them in their order. And for distinction sake I shall call the former *primary* and the latter *secondary Tropes*.

I now proceed to consider the reasons, which have occasioned the introduction of *Tropes*. And these, as Quintilian observes, are three; *Necessity*, *Emphasis*, and *Beauty*.

TROPES were first introduced from *Necessity*, because no language contains a sufficient number of proper words, to express all the different conceptions of our minds. The mind considers the same thing various ways, views it in different lights, compares it with other things, and observes their several relations and affections, wherein they agree, and in what they differ. From all which reflections it is furnished with almost an infinite number of ideas; which cannot all of them be distinguished and expressed by proper words, since new ones occur daily. And were this possible, yet would it be

impracticable ; because the multitude of words must be so vastly great, that the memory could not retain them, and be able to recall them as occasion required. *Tropes* have in a good measure redressed both these inconveniences ; for by means of them the mind is not burdened with a numberless stock of different words, and yet nothing seems to want a name. Thus sometimes, where a word is wanting to express any particular thing, it is clearly enough represented by the name of some other thing, by reason of the similitude between them. At other times the cause is signified by the effect, the subject by the adjunct ; or the contrary. And the whole is often understood by a part, or a part by the whole. And thus by the use of *Tropes* the mind is helped to conceive of something not expressed, from that which is expressed. It is much the same case, as when we have occasion to speak of a person, whose name we are either unacquainted with, or have forgot ; for by describing his person, abode, or some other circumstances relating to him, those we converse with as well understand whom we mean, as if we mentioned his name. So the shepherd in Virgil, when he could not think of the name
of

of Archimedes, describes him by his works : LECT.
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*And what's his name, who form'd the
sphere,*

And shew'd the seasons of the sliding year ? Ecl. iii.

Besides, it sometimes happens in a discourse, v. 40.
that those things are necessary to be said,
which, if expressed in their proper terms,
would be offensive ; but being clothed with
metaphors, may be conveyed to the mind
with decency.

A SECOND reason above mentioned for
the use of *Tropes* was, *Emphasis*. *Tropes* do
many times express things with greater
force and evidence, than can be done by
proper words. We receive much the grea-
test part of our knowledge by our senses.
And similitudes taken from sensible things,
as in metaphors, very much assist the mind
in its reflections upon those things, which
do not come under the cognizance of the
senses. For it is certain, that we are sooner,
and more strongly affected with sensible
objects ; than with such things, of which
we can have no ideas but from the internal
operations of our own minds. Nay some-
times one bright and lively *Trope* shall
convey a fuller, and more just idea of a
thing, than a large periphrasis. So when

LECT. XXV.

Aen.
Lib. vi.
v. 842.

Virgil calls the Scipios, *two thunderbolts of war*¹, he gives us a more lively image of the rapid force, and speedy success of their arms, than could have been conveyed by a long description in plain words. And in many cases the tropical use of words is so emphatical, and suited to the idea we design to excite; that in this respect it may be justly esteemed the most proper. So, *incensed with anger, inflamed with desire, fallen into an error*, are all metaphorical expressions, used in a way of similitude; and yet perhaps no proper words can be made use of, which will convey a more lively image of the thing, we design to represent by them.

BUT *Beauty* and ornament, as was observed before, has been another cause of the use of *Tropes*. Some subjects require a more florid and elegant dress, than others. When we describe or applaud, ornaments of speech, and a gaiety of expression, are requisite. And it is the business of an orator to entertain his hearers, at the same time that he instructs them. Now Cicero, who was an admirable judge of the force and power of eloquence, has observed, that tropical expressions give the mind the greatest delight and entertainment. *I have often wondered,*

wondered, sais he, why tropes should give greater pleasure, than proper words. I imagine the reason must be, either that there is an appearance of wit in neglecting what is at hand, and making choice of something at a distance; or that the hearer is furnished with a different thought, without being led into a mistake, which affords a very agreeable pleasure; or that a whole similitude is conveyed to the mind by a single word; or that particularly in the best and most lively metaphor, the image is presented to our sight, which is the quickest of our senses¹. And therefore he supposes, that, as garments were first invented from necessity, to secure us from the injuries of the weather; but improved afterwards for ornament and distinction; so the poverty of language first introduced tropes, which were afterwards increased for delight². Besides, a variety of expression is pleasing in a discourse. It is many times necessary, that the same things should be repeated. And if this be done in the same words, it will grow tiresome to the hearers, and sink their esteem of the speaker's ability. Therefore to prevent this, it is proper the expression should be varied, that altho the sense be the same, it may give the mind a new pleasure by its different dress.

¹ De Orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 39.

² Ibid.
c. 38.

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I COME now in the last place to lay down some directions, proper to be observed in the choice of *Tropes*.

AND first, as every *Trope* gives us two ideas, one of the word expressed, and another, which by means of that the mind connects with it; it is necessary, that the relation between these two appear very plain and evident. For an obscure *Trope* is always faulty, unless where some particular reason makes it necessary. And therefore *Tropes* ought not to be too far fetched, lest that should render them dark. For which reason Cicero saies, he should not choose to call any thing destructive to a person's fortune, *the Syrtis of his patrimony*, but rather *the rock of it*; nor, *the Charybdis of his estate*, but *the gulph of it*¹. For those, who either did not know, that the Syrtes were two quicksands upon the coast of Africa, or that Charybdis was a gulph in the streight of Sicily, both of them very destructive to mariners, would be at a loss to understand the meaning of the metaphor. Besides, metaphors taken from things we have seen, affect the mind more forcibly; than those, which are taken from such things, of which we have only heard. Now there is scarce any one, who has not
seen

¹ *Ibid.*
c. 41.

seen a rock, or a gulph ; but there are very few persons comparatively, who have been either at Charybdis, or the Syrtes. It is necessary therefore in a good *Trope*, not only that there be a near affinity between the two ideas, but likewise, that this affinity be very obvious, and generally known ; so that the word be no sooner pronounced, but both images do immediately present themselves to the mind.

AGAIN, as a *Trope* ought to be very plain and evident, so likewise should it bear a due proportion to the thing it is designed to represent, so as neither to highten, nor diminish the just idea of it. Indeed sometimes, when we speak of things indefinitely, we say too much, lest we should seem to say too little. And this manner of speaking is called an *Hyperbole*, which is not uncommon in the sacred writings. So, for instance, *Saul and Jonathan* are said to be, *swifter than eagles, and stronger than lions* ^{1. 2 Sam. i.}

But even in this way of expression a proportion is to be observed. For some very considerable, and unusual excess of the thing in its kind is at least designed by it ; which perhaps cannot, or however is not necessary to be defined. And therefore Quintilian blames Cato for calling the top of an hill

LECT.
XXV.¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. viii.

c. 3.

² *Gell.**Lib. iii.*

c. 8.

³ *De rhe-*
tor. Lib. iii.

c. 2. §. 3.

a *wart* ¹. Because the proportion between the two ideas is no ways adequate. And so on the contrary, Aristotle censures Euripides for calling *rowing, the empire of the oar* ². Poets indeed are allowed a greater liberty in this respect. But an orator should be modest in his expressions, and take care, that he neither so highten, nor diminish the natural ideas of things by *Tropes*, as to lead his hearers into mistakes.

BUT further, as a moderate use of *Tropes*, justly applied, beautifies and inlivens a discourse; so an excess of them causes obscurity, by runing it into abstruse allegories and riddles. *Tropes* are not the common and ordinary dress of our thoughts, but a foreign habit. And therefore he, who fills his discourse with a continued series of them, seems to act like one, who appears in public in a strange dress; which no man of character would choose to do.

MOREOVER, as one use of *Tropes* is pleasure and entertainment, we should endeavour to make choice of such, as are smooth and easy. But if at any time we think it necessary to use a harsh *Trope*, it is proper to soften it by some precaution. For, as Cicero very handsomly sais: *A trope should be modest, since it stands in a place, which*
does

does not belong to it: for which reason it ^{LECT. XXV.} should seem to come thither by permission, and not by force. And therefore, when he thought it harsh to say, *The death of Cato made the senate an orphan*, he guards the expression by saying, *The death of Cato has (if I may be allowed to say so) rendered the senate an orphan* ¹.

¹ De orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 41.

AND to add no more, care should be taken how we transfer *Tropes* from one language into another. For as they are frequently taken not only from natural things, or such notions, as are common to the generality of mankind, but likewise from the manners, customs, and occurrences of particular nations; so they may be very plain and obvious to those, among whom they took their rise, but altogether unintelligible to others, who are unacquainted with the reason of them. It was customary for the Roman soldiers to carry their money in their girdles; hence it was the same thing with them to say, *a person had lost his girdle* ², as that, *he had lost his money*. And because the Romans wore the *toga*, which was a long gown, in time of peace, and a different garb, when engaged in war, their writers sometimes use the word *toga* to signify peace. But as neither

² Hor.
Lib. ii.
ep. 2.

LECT. of these customs is in use among us, so
 XXV. { neither would the *Tropes* suit our language,
 or be generally understood by us. And
 even in such *Tropes*, as are taken from the
 common nature of things, languages very
 much differ. There is a very beautiful
Trope in the account of St. Paul's ship-
 wreck, where it is said: *The ship was*
caught, and could not bear up into the wind.
 The original word, that we translate *bear*
 up, is ἀντοφθαλμεῖν¹, and properly signifies,
 to look, or keep its eyes against it; which is
 a very strong and lively image, taken from
 animate beings, and when applied to men
 often signifies, to withstand, or resist: as,
 ἀντοφθαλμεῖν πολεμίῳ, to resist an enemy:
 and Plutarch saies of Demosthenes, that he
 could not ἀντοφθαλμεῖν τῷ ἀργυρίῳ², look
 against, or, resist the power of money. No-
 thing is more common with Latin writers,
 than to call men of a public spirit, and
 true patriots, *lumina et ornamenta reipubli-*
cae, that is, *the lights and ornaments of the*
state. And we have borrowed from them
 the use of both these metaphors. But be-
 cause *Tropes* and *Figures* illustrate and
 highten the stile, they call them also, *lu-*
mina orationis, or, *the lights of a discourse*;
 which I do not know that we have yet
 adopted

¹ *Act.*
 xxvii. 15.

² *In vit.*

adopted into our language. It sometimes happens, that only the tropical sense of a word is taken from one language into another, and not the proper signification of the same word. So *scrupulus* in Latin properly signifies, *a little stone, which getting into the shoe, hurts a person as he walks*; hence it is applied to the mind, and used to express, *a doubt, or uneasy thought, that gives it pain*. We have borrowed this latter sense of the word, but not the former.

I SHOULD now procede to treat more particularly on the several kinds of *Tropes*, but this will be the subject of some following discourses.

LECTURE XXVI.

*Of a Metaphor.*LECT.
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IN my last discourse, I observed, that all *Tropes* may be reduced to four species, which are taken from the different respects, things bear one to another. For in every *Trope* a reference is had to two things; and where those things have a natural and internal relation, as the whole and a part, it is called a *Synecdoche*; where the relation is external, as between the cause and effect, subject and adjunct, it is a *Metonymy*; where they have only some similitude, as rational and brute animals, and their properties, it is a *Metaphor*; and where they are opposite to each other, as virtue and vice, it is called an *Irony*. And this seems to be the natural order of placing them, if regard be had to the rise and foundation of them. But if we consider their use and beauty in language, a *Metaphor* ought to stand first, a *Metonymy* next, then a *Synecdoche*, and an *Irony* last. And this is the usual order, in which they are placed. Cicero, speaking of a *Metaphor*, calls it, *the most florid manner of expression, and brightest ornament of lan-*

language, that consists in single words ¹. LECT. XXVI.
Wherefore both in compliance with custom, and by reason of the just preeminence ¹ *De Orat.*
of this *Trope*, I shall begin with it, and Lib. iii.
make it the subject of my present discourse. c. 41.

AND here I shall endeavour first to explain the nature of this *Trope*, then consider the several kinds of it, and lastly, offer some considerations relating to the choice of *Metaphors*.

Now a *Metaphor*, as usually defined, is:
A trope, which changes words from their proper signification to another different from it, by reason of some similitude between them ². 2 Voff. Inst. orat. Lib. iv. c. 6.
But that a word, when used metaphorically, does not alter its signification, but §. 1.
retains its proper sense, was shewn in my last discourse. However, it may not be amiss to explain this matter more fully, and set it in a clearer light. Every *Metaphor* then is nothing else but a short similitude. Cicero calls it, a *similitude reduced to a single word* ³. And Quintilian to the same purpose says, that, a *metaphor is a short similitude, and differs from it only in this; that the former is compared to the thing, we design to express, and the latter is put for it. It is a similitude, when I say of a man, he has acted like a lion; and a metaphor, when I say,*

LECT. say, *he is a lion*¹. Thus far Quintilian.
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Now in every similitude three things are requisite, two things, that are compared together, and a third, in which the similitude or likeness between them consists. And

¹ *Inst. orat.*
Lib. viii.
c. 6.

² *Carm. iii.*
2, 11.

Horace calls a Roman soldier *a lion*², if the word *lion* did not retain its proper sense, there could be no similitude; because there would not be two things to be compared together with respect to a third, which is necessary in every similitude, and was designed by this expression. The sense of which is plainly this: *That as a lion seizes his prey with the greatest fierceness, so a Roman soldier with like rage and fury attacked his enemies.* In the same manner, when Ci-

³ *In Pison.*
c. 16.

cero calls Piso, *the vulture of the province*³, his meaning is, *that he was like a vulture, or, acted in such a manner, as a vulture acts, that is, rapaciously.* So that the real difference between a metaphor and a similitude consists in this; that a metaphor has not those signs of comparison, which are expressed in a similitude. But some persons have run into mistakes in reasoning from tropes of this kind. For they have so argued from metaphorical words, as if all the affections and properties of the things expressed

pressed by them, might be attributed to those other things, to which they are applied, and by that means have strained the comparison (which has usually but one particular view) in order to make it tally in other respects, where there is not that similitude of ideas. I will endeavour to make this more evident by another example from Cicero, where he calls M. Antony, *the torch of the state*¹. The similitude between Antony and a torch lay in this: *That as a torch burns and destroys every thing within its reach; so Antony brought devastation and ruin, wherever he came.* Now a torch has not only a property to burn, but also to give light; but the similitude would not hold in this respect, nor was it at all designed. For Cicero never calls a wicked, profligate man, as Antony was, *the light of the state*; tho he often gives that character to good and virtuous men², who by their examples do, as it were, enlighten others, and shew them the way to be happy themselves, and useful to others. But tho metaphors are usually taken from a similitude between two things, as in the instances here mentioned; yet sometimes they are founded in the similitude, which two things bear to two others in some particular respect,

¹ Philipp.
vii. c. 1.

² Pro Sulla,
c. 2.

spect, by means whereof what properly belongs to one of them is transfered to the other: the former of which are called simple metaphors, and the latter analogous. Hence the rudder of a ship may be called its reins; for what the reins are to a horse, that the rudder is to a ship, in guiding and directing it. So that here is a double similitude, one between a ship and an horse, and another between the rudder of the former, and reins of the latter; and from the analogy between the use of the rudder to the one, and reins to the other, the reins, which belong properly to the horse, are applied to the ship. Again, some metaphors are reciprocal, in which the similitude holds either way. Thus to steer and to govern are used reciprocally both of a ship and a state; the proper expressions being, *to steer a ship*, and *govern a state*, and the contrary metaphorical. But tho we say, *the foot of a mountain*, borrowing the similitude from animals, yet we do not say on the contrary, *the bottom of an animal*, meaning his feet, and therefore that metaphor is not reciprocal. From this account therefore of the nature of a metaphor, it may be said to be:

The application of a word by way of similitude to some other thing, than what it properly signifies.

nities. And the plainer this similitude appears, the greater beauty there is in the *Trope*. LECT. XXVI.

THE use of metaphors is very extensive, as large as universal nature. For there are scarce any two things, which have not some similitude between them. However, they may all be reduced to four kinds, which was the second thing proposed to be considered.

THE first kind of metaphors therefore may be taken from similitudes between animate beings. As where those things, which properly relate to brutes, are accommodated to men; or those, which belong to men, are applied to brutes. Of the former sort is that joke of Cicero: *My brother being asked by Philip, why he barked so: answered, because he saw a thief*¹. Here barking, the property of a dog, is applied to a man. And the reply does not seem to carry more severity, or harshness with it, than the question. By the latter sort we say, *a crafty fox*, and *a generous horse*; which are affections, that properly relate to men. And to this kind of metaphors may those likewise be referred, when that, which properly belongs to the senses, is applied to the mind. Thus we often say, *that we see*

¹ De Orat. Lib. ii. c. 54.

a thing, when we mean, *that we understand*, or *apprehend it*. And in the same sense we say, *that we hear such a thing*, or *person*. And by the like manner of expression, a person is said, *to smell out a thing*. And those, who have a genius or disposition for any art or science, are said, *to have a taste for it*. And such, who have entered upon the study of it, are said, *to have a touch of it*. These are common ways of speaking in most languages, and very expressive of what is intended by them. And we may also bring those metaphors under this head, by which the properties and affections of men are attributed to the deity: as, when God is said *to bear, see, be angry, repent*, and the like; which are forms of expression very frequent in the sacred writings.

A SECOND kind of metaphors lies between inanimate things, whether natural or artificial, which bear some similitude to each other. And this head is very extensive. Thus we say, *floods of fire*, and *clouds of smoke*, for large quantities. And so likewise, *to inflame an account*, that is, to lighten or increase it; with innumerable others of the like sort. In the two first of these instances, the terms proper to one element are applied to another; and as those elements

ments of fire and water are opposite to each other, they shew the extensiveness of this trope, that there are no things in nature so contrary, but may come within the limits of it, and be accommodated to each other in a way of similitude. In the last example, a natural action is applied to what is artificial.

A THIRD sort of metaphors is, when inanimate things are applied to animals, on the account of some like properties between them. Thus Homer calls Ajax, *the bulwark of the Greeks*¹, on account of his valour, which like a wall defended them from

¹ *Iliad* γ. 229.

the Trojans. And nothing is more common with Cicero, than to brand ill men with the character of being, *the pest of the state*², by reason of the mischief, which they bring to the public. So likewise he calls Zeno the philosopher, *an acute man*³, for his great discernment, and quick perception of things, fetching the allusion from metals, when brought to an edge, or a point. As

² *Pro Milon.* c. 25, 33.

³ *Ad fam. Lib. ix.* ep. 22.

on the contrary, old Chremes in Terence calls himself a *stone*, for want of apprehension⁴. And we say, *a gay person*, and *a bright genius*, by this kind of metaphor.

⁴ *Heaut. Act. V. Sc. I.*

THE fourth and last kind of metaphors is that, by which the actions, and other at-

v. 43.

LECT. tributes of animals are accommodated to
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inanimate things. Thus Cicero speaking of Clodius sais: *The very altars, when they saw that monster fall, seemed to move themselves, and assert their right against him*¹.

¹ Pro Mi.
lon. c. 31. Here the words, *saw, move, and assert*, are all metaphors, taken from the properties of animals. And Virgil, when he would represent the impetuous force and rapidity of the river Araxes, sais, *it disdained a bridge*².

² Aen.
Lib. viii.
w. 728. And it is a very usual epithet, which Homer gives to words, to call them *ὑπερέννα*³, or *winged*, to intimate the swiftness of speech.

LASTLY, as to the choice of metaphors, those are esteemed the finest and strongest, which *give life and action to inanimate things*⁴. The reason of which is, because they do as it were invigorate all nature, introduce new forms of beings, and represent their images to the sight, which of all the senses is the quickest, most active, and yet most unwearied. What can be more moving, or in stronger terms express the villainy of Clodius, than when Cicero sais:

*The very altars of the gods seemed to exult at his death*⁵. And the same great orator particularly commends those metaphors, for their sprightliness and vivacity, which are

taken

taken from the sense of seeing¹, as when we say, *a bright thought*, or, *a gay expression*. LECT.
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HOWEVER, care must be taken not to venture upon too bold and daring metaphors. ¹ De Orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 40.

Poets indeed claim greater liberty in this respect, whose view is often to amuse, terrify, or delight, by heightening the just and natural images of things. But it is expected the orator should reason coolly, tho strongly and forceably; and not by theatrical representations so transport the mind, as to take it off from reflection, unless perhaps on some particular occasion. And yet on the other hand, metaphors ought not to sink below the dignity of what they are designed to express; but the idea they convey should at least be equal to the proper word, in the place of which they are substituted.

BUT there is a very great difference in the choice of metaphors, as they are designed either to praise, or dispraise. One thing may be compared to another in a great variety of respects. And the same thing may be made to appear either noble or base, virtuous or vicious, by considering it in a different light. Such metaphors therefore, as are chosen to commend, must be taken from great and laudable things;

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and on the contrary, those which are designed to discommend, from things vile and contemptible. Aristotle gives us a very pleasant example of this in the poet Simonides. A certain person, who had carried the prize at a race of mules, offered him a reward to write a poem in honor of that action. Simonides thought he did not bid high enough, and therefore put him off with saying, the subject was too mean to write in praise of mules, which were the offspring of asses. But upon his being offered a larger sum he undertook the task, and, as Aristotle observes, when he has occasion to speak of the mules in that poem, he does not mention them by that name; but calls them, *the daughters of fleet and generous horses*; tho he might with as much propriety have called them, *the daughters of dull asses* *. But it was the poet's business in praising to take the most advantageous part of the character. Where things are capable of such different turns, metaphorical expressions are generally most beautiful. And sometimes the same metaphor may be applied contrary ways, both in praise and dispraise, as it will suit different properties of the thing, to which it refers. So a dove in a metaphorical sense may represent, either

* De rhetor. Lib. iii. c. 2.

innocence, or fear; and an iron heart may denote, either courage, or cruelty, as an hard head strength, or weakness of thought. And this ambiguity, in the application of metaphorical words, often affords occasion for jests, and concise wit. I observed before that Cicero never calls ill men, *lights of the state*. But he once in this manner calls Sextius Clodius, *the light of the senate*.¹ For, when his kinsman Publius Clodius had been killed by Milo, and his corps was brought to Rome, Sextius raised the mob, and in a tumultuous manner carried it into the senate house, where they burnt it, and by that means set the building on fire. For which seditious action Cicero passes that joke upon him, under the metaphor of light, which elsewhere he always uses in a good sense.

¹ Pro Mi-
lon. c. 12.

BUT to procede, all forced and harsh metaphors should be avoided, the one being no less disagreeable to the mind, than the other to the ear. Nor should they come too thick in a discourse. In a word, they ought not to be used, but either where a proper word is wanting, or they are more significant, or beautiful than the proper word. But altho these cautions do more especially relate to metaphors, yet they are also

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also to be attended to in some other tropes; for which reason I treated of them more largely in my last discourse.

GIVE me leave only to add, that from what has been hitherto discoursed concerning the nature, and properties of metaphors, it is very evident, that the Cynics, and such of the Stoics, who fell in with them, were guilty of a mistake in asserting, that there is no turpitude, or immodesty in words. The argument they went upon in defending their notion was this. If two words signify the same thing, they are both immodest, or neither of them. Not both, because there is nothing, which cannot some way or other be modestly expressed. Consequently, if one of the words be modest, the other must be so also: because they have both the same sense¹. But this way of reasoning is false and sophistical. For a word is either modest or immodest, according to the different manner, in which it affects the mind, and the emotions it excites, when pronounced. But it is plain, that of the several words made use of to express the same thing, some may be heard without the least offence to the chastest ear, and others not without offering violence to the modesty of the auditors. And this difference

¹ See
Cic. Off.
Lib. i.
c. 35.
Ad fam.
Lib. ix.
ep. 22.
& Voss.
Inst orat.
Lib. iv.
c. 6. §. 14.

ference arises from several causes. For one word may only express the thing in general, and so convey but a confused and imperfect idea; and another may be more proper and peculiar to that thing, and so represent it more fully. Nay, even of those words, which are commonly esteemed synonymous, or of an equivalent signification, one either from its nature and origin, or from use, may have an immodest idea affixed to it, which another has not. And from thence it happens in most languages, that some words, which at first were modest and innocent enough, have afterwards become obscene and indecent. Besides, words may be rendered immodest by conveying a more lively image of the thing to the senses, than others do. And this, as was said before, is the property of some metaphors.

LECTURE XXVII.

*Of a Metonymy.*LECT.
XXVII.

THE most considerable *Trope* next to a *Metaphor* is a *Metonymy*, whether we consider its force and elegance, or the frequent use of it both in speaking and writing. Having therefore treated upon the former in my last discourse, I shall endeavour in this to give the best, and clearest account I can of the latter. And in doing this I shall first explain the nature of a *Metonymy* in general, and then consider the several species contained under it.

Now a *Metonymy*, as defined by Quintilian, is, *the putting one word for another*¹.

¹Inst. orat.
Lib. viii.
c. 6.

But Vossius describes it more fully, when he calls it: *A trope, which changes the names of things, that are naturally united, but in such a manner, as that one is not of the essence of the other*². That a *Metonymy* is thus distinguished from the other tropes, has been sufficiently shewn already in my two last discourses. When it is said, *to put one word for another*, or, *to change the names of things*, the meaning is, that the word so used changes its sense, and denotes something different from its proper signification.

²Inst. orat.
Lib. iv.
c. 7. §. 1.

Thus,

Thus, when *Mars* is put for *war*, and *Ceres* for *corn*, they lose their personal sense, and stand for such effects, of which those deities were said to be the cause. So likewise, when Virgil says:

He drank the frothing bowl ¹.

¹ *Aeneid.*

the word *bowl* must necessarily signify the *liquor* in the bowl. And, when in another place describing the temple of Juno at Carthage, in which the actions of the Trojan war were represented, and the images of the heroes, he makes Aeneas, upon discovering that of Priam among the rest, cry out,

Lo here is Priam ²,

² *Ibid.*

it is plain the word *Priam* there must stand not for his person, but his *image* or *figure*.

And this property of changing the sense of the word appears peculiar to a *Metonymy*.

In treating upon a metaphor I observed the mistake of those, who teach, that a word used metaphorically loses its proper signification; whereas it only changes its place, but not its sense; being applied to a thing, to which it does not naturally belong, by way of similitude. And as the not attending to this has run some persons into very great absurdities, in treating upon metaphorical expressions, and reasoning from them in the tropical sense; so the like has happened

opened to others in some instances of a *Metonymy*, where by misapprehending their true nature, they have reasoned from them in the literal sense, as I shall shew presently. A *Metonymy* is not so extensive as a metaphor, nor altogether so necessary: because nothing is said by a *Metonymy*, which cannot be expressed in proper words; whereas metaphors are often used for want of proper words to express some ideas. However, *Metonymies* are very useful in language, for they enrich a discourse with an agreeable variety, and give both force and beauty to an expression. And what I observed with relation to a metaphor, is true also of this trope; that some *Metonymies* even in common discourse are more frequently made use of, than the proper words, in whose room they are put. So, *pale death*, *a blind way*, and *a happy state*, are very common expressions with us. And it is more usual to say, *This is such a person's hand*, or, *I know his hand*, than his writing, when we intend this latter sense of the word.

I now proceed to the division of *Metonymies*, which are commonly distinguished into four kinds, from the different manner, in which things are naturally, but externally united to one another. Now things are thus

thus united, or one thing depends upon another, either with respect to its production, or in the manner of its existence, when produced. In the former way the effect depends upon its cause, and in the latter the adjunct upon its subject. And hence arise four sorts of *Metonymies*, which receive their names from the *cause* and *effect*, the *subject* and the *adjunct*.

It is called a *Metonymy* of the *cause*, when the external cause is put for the effect. The external cause is twofold, the agent and end, which are usually called the efficient and final cause. Of the former kind are such *Metonymies*, where the inventor or author is put for what was invented, or effected by him. Thus, as I said before, *Ceres* is sometimes put for *corn*, the use of which she was said first to have introduced; and *Mars* for *war*, over which he was thought to preside. And by this way of speaking, any artist or writer is put for his work. So Juvenal blaming the luxury, and profuseness of the Romans, says: *There are few tables without Mentor*¹, that is, which were not made by him, or after his manner. And our Saviour says in the parable of the rich man, and Lazarus, *They have Moses, and the prophets*², meaning the books

¹ Sat. viii.

² v. 104.

² Luke xvi.
29.

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books of Moses, and the prophets. But under this sort of *Metonymy* is included not only the agent, strictly so called, but also any means, or instrument made use of in the doing of a thing, when put for the thing done. Thus, *polite literature* is called *humanity*, because it cultivates and improves the human mind. And in that expression of Cicero: *Words move no body but him, who understands the tongue*¹: the word *tongue*, which is the instrument of speech, is put for *speech*, or *language*. And in the like sense *arms* are sometimes put for *war*, and the *sword* for *slaughter*. By the same kind of *Metonymy* likewise any affection, or quality is put for its effect. As when it is said, *the end of government is to maintain justice*, that is, *such mutual offices among men, as are the effects of justice*. And so likewise in that of Cicero: *It is the business of magistrates to check the levity of the multitude*²: by which he means tumults occasioned by their levity. Moreover, as human affections are attributed to the deity in a metaphorical sense, so several parts of the human body are likewise ascribed to him by this kind of *Metonymy*. Thus, his *hand* and his *arm* are used to express his *power*³; as his *ear* and *eye* his *care* and *providence*⁴; these being the instruments

¹ De Orat.
Lib. iii.
c. 59.

² Pro Mi-
lon. c. 8.

³ Isaiah 1.
2. liii. 1.

⁴ Psalm
xvii. 6.
xxxiii. 18.

struments of such effects in mankind. *Metonymies* of the final cause are such, by which the end in doing a thing is put for the thing done. As when we say, *The watch is set*, meaning the *watchmen*, who are appointed for that purpose. And so likewise that expression, *to make an example*, as it signifies to *punish*, in order to deter others from the like crimes by such an example. As also that of Virgil,

Phyllis should garlands crop ¹,

¹ Eclog. x.

by which are meant *flowers* to make garlands. ^{v. 41.}

THE second kind of *Metonymy* puts the effect for the efficient cause, whether the agent, or only the means and instrument. So Virgil calls the two Scipios, *The destruction of Lybia* ², because they were the agents, ² Aen. vi. who effected it. And Horace compliments his patron Maecenas with the titles of being, *his guard and honor* ³, that is, his guardian, ³ Carm. i. and the author of his honor. But when ^{1, 2.} Cicero tells the citizens of Rome, that *the death of Clodius was their safety* ⁴, he means ⁴ Pro Milon. c. 2. the occasion only of their safety. And elsewhere he calls that, *a dark hope, and blind expectation* ⁵; the effect of which was dubious and uncertain to those, who entertained it. ⁵ In Rull. ii. c. 25. And in like manner the sons of

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XXVII.¹ 2 Kings
iv. 2.² Gen.
iii. 19.³ Cic.
De orat.
Lib. i.
c. 60.

the prophets, when they were eating the pottage, which Elisha had ordered to be set before them, cried out, *There is death in the pot*¹, that is, *some deadly thing*, as is presently after explained. And thus sweat, which is the effect of labor, is sometimes put for labor. As in the threat denounced against Adam: *In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread*²: that is, by labor in cultivating the ground. And, in allusion to this way of speaking, Antony the orator tells Crassus, *the improvement of the stile by constant exercise, as he prescribed, was a thing of much sweat*³. And, *virtue is said to be gained by sweat*, that is, continued care and exercise in subduing the passions, and bringing them to a proper regulation. But in these two expressions there is likewise a metaphor, the effect of bodily labor being applied to that of the mind. In all these instances the effect is put for the efficient cause.

THE third kind of *Metonymy* is, when the subject is put for the adjunct. By subject here in a large sense of the word may be understood that, wherein some other thing is contained, or about which it is conversant, as likewise the possessor with respect to the thing he possesses, and the thing

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signified, when put for the sign of it. Now by the first of these ways of speaking the seat of any faculty, or affection, is used for the faculty, or affection itself. So it is usual to say, *a man of a clear head*, when we mean a clear mind or understanding; the seat of the mind being in the head. And a person is said, *to have a warm heart*, because the heart has been thought the seat of the affections. In like manner the place, where any actions are performed, is put for the actions done in it. As when Cicero says: *Do not always think of the forum, the benches, the rostra, and the senate*¹; meaning the discourses, which were usually made in those places. So likewise the country, or place of residence, is put for the inhabitants, as in that passage of Cicero: *And to omit Greece, which always claimed the preeminence for eloquence, and Athens, the inventress of all sciences, where the art of speaking was invented and perfected; in this city of ours, meaning Rome, no studies have prevailed more, than that of eloquence*². Where the words Greece and Athens stand to denote the inhabitants of those places. And hither may also be referred such expressions, in which the time is put for the persons living in it, as, *the degeneracy of the present age*,

¹ *De Orat.*
Lib. i.
c. 8.

² *Ibid. c. 4.*

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age, the virtue of former times. In the second way above mentioned, the object is used for the person, or thing imployed about it. As when Cicero saies: *In time of battle the laws are silent*¹. Where by *laws* he intends the judges, who pronounce sentence according to law. By the third of these ways, in which the possessor is put for the thing he possesses, we say, *to devour, destroy, or ruin a man*, meaning not his *person*, but his *estate*. And mythologists explain the fable of Acteon by this trope, who is said to have been devoured by his dogs. For by dogs they understand flatterers and parasites, who consumed his estate, and brought him to beggary. By the last way before recited, which puts the thing signified for the sign, statues and pictures are called by the names of the persons, which they represent. As in that jest of Cicero upon his brother Quintus, when, as Macrobius relates, *being in the province, which his brother had governed, and seeing a large portrait of part of his body, holding a sheild, the Quintus was but a little man, he said: My half brother is bigger than my whole brother*². The popish doctrine of transubstantiation is founded upon an abuse of this trope. For when our Saviour, speaking of the bread and wine at that time

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¹ Pro Milon. c. 4.

² Saturn. Lib. ii. c. 3.

before him, said: *This is my body, and this is my blood*¹: his plain meaning is, they were the signs of his body and blood, the thing signified being put for the sign by this sort of *Metonymy*. But the papists take the expression literally, which must doubtless be very absurd; since the words relate to the time then present, while Christ was yet living, and spoke them; when it was impossible for the bread and wine to be converted into his body and blood, it being evident to all, who were present, that those elements, and his body existed separately at the same time. But if the words are explained by this trope, the sense is plain and easy, and the way of speaking familiar to all writers. Whereas they, who plead for the literal sense, might with equal reason assert, that those expressions above mentioned are to be taken literally, in which several parts of the human body, as the hand, the arm, the ear, and the eye, are ascribed to the deity: or that, when our Saviour in a metaphorical sense calls himself, *a vine*, and *a door*², these words were designed to be applied to him strictly and properly, and not by way of similitude only, as is the case in all metaphors.

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¹ *Matth.*
xxvi.

26, 28.

John xv.
5. x. 7.

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THE fourth kind of *Metonymies* is that, wherein the adjunct is put for the subject, which is done in the same variety of ways as the former. It is therefore a *Metonymy* of the adjunct, when the thing contained is put for that, which contains it. As when Virgil sais, *They lie down upon purple*¹, that is, couches died with purple. And again, *They crown the wine*², meaning the bowl, which contained the wine; it being the custom of the antients to deck their bowls with garlands at their entertainments. By this trope likewise virtues and vices are put for the persons, in whom they are found. As in that beautiful passage of Cicero, where comparing the profligate army of Catiline with the forces of the state, he sais: *On this side modesty is ingaged, on that impudence; on this chastity, on that lewdness; on this integrity, on that deceit; on this piety, on that profaneness; on this constancy, on that fury; on this honor, on that baseness; on this moderation, on that unbridled passion: in a word, equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, and all virtues ingage with injustice, luxury, cowardice, rashness, and all vices*³. And to this trope those expressions are to be refered, in which any thing is put for the object, about which it is conversant. As in that saying of

¹ *Aen. i.*
v. 704.

² *Ibid.*
v. 724.

³ *In Catil.*
ii. c. 11.

of the wise man: *Hope deferred makes the heart sick*: where hope is put for the thing hoped for. And thus Suetonius calls the emperor Titus, *the love and delight of mankind*, whose mild, and obliging temper rendered him the object of those agreeable affections to all persons under his government. A third use of this trope is by putting a thing for the time, in which it was done. Thus we say of a person, *He has served so many campaigns*, meaning so many summers, that being the usual time, in which armies are drawn out into the field. Lastly, by this *Metonymy*, the sign is put for the thing it signifies. As, *the scepter for the regal dignity*, and *the sword for the authority of the magistrate*.

THESE are the four kinds or species, into which a *Metonymy* is usually divided. But Vossius adds two others, namely of the *antecedent* and *consequent*, which bear some analogy to the cause and effect, as the one does at least give occasion to the other. Both of them are often called *Metalepsis*; but since that name is likewise applied to another different trope, as will be shewn afterwards; I would rather choose with Vossius to bring these under a *Metonymy*, and consider them as two distinct species of

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*In Vit.
init.*

*Inst. orat.
Lib. iv.
c. 10. §. 1.*

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it. By the former, *to hear*, when spoken of a superior sometimes signifies to *grant*, or *comply with*; and of an inferior *to obey*. Thus the servant in Terence, says: *shall I assist Pamphilus, or hearken to the old man*¹, that is, obey his orders, and forbear. By the latter, it is not unusual to say, *I subscribe*, or *set my hand to such a thing*, meaning, that we assent or agree to it, and as a consequence are ready to attest it under our hand. So when Cicero, speaking of the pirates, who had lately infested the seas, says: *Shall I complain, that foreigners were taken in their passage hither, when the Roman legates have been redeemed*²; by which is intimated, that they were first taken, and afterwards purchased their redemption. And in that expression of Terence: *You will own that kindness well placed*³: the sense is, you will perceive or find it so, a consequence of which will be an acknowledgement of it.

¹ Andr.
Act. I.
Sc. 3.
v. 4.


² Pro leg.
Manil.
c. 12.

³ Phorm.
Act. III.
Sc. 2.
v. 9.

As to any observations necessary in the choice of *Metonymies*, I think nothing need be added, to what has been said already, when I treated upon the use of tropes in general.

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